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Synopsis 
The relationship of Jacques Derrida and Martin Heidegger has always been complex, 
encompassing an entanglement of two already immense networks and suspended between 
proximities and distances from infinitesimal to radical. Its peculiarity is evident in the 
way in which Derrida strategically inscribes his own text at the margin of Heidegger's 
thought via a double or cl6tural gesture which articulates the paradox that Derrida writes 
with Heidegger against Heidegger. One of the most decisive aspects of this gesture is 
Derrida's deconstruction of Heidegger's claims regarding the relation between 
technology and philosophy. In "The Question Concerning Technology" and 
accompanying essays Heidegger opens up a way of reflectincl upon the essence of 
technology moves against its metaphysical determination specifyin, (),, moreover, the sense 
of modern technology as a mode of disclosure. These reflections are, however, 
ambiguous. Heidegger is one of the first thinkers to confront technology in philosophical 
terms, and yet he wishes to purify thinking of originary technicity. Technology remains a 
question, and as a question asked by thinking, thinking is not technical. In other words, 
thinking for Heidegger, is constituted in its very difference from technology. This is the 
move that must be deconstructed. In simultaneously repeating and displacing the 
Heideggerian scheme, Derrida elaborates an infinitesimal and decisive diffýrance 
between the thinking of Being and his own notion of "writing" (Vecriture) or generalized 
inscription. What is crucial is that as against Heidegger's Being, the general text is not an 
essence of technics nor is it a proper thinking opposed to technology. On the contrary, 
Derrida's main point, among other things, against Heidegger, is that technology has 
always already begun, that it is originary with respect to the history of Being and 
thinking. In this study I examine the stakes and implications of Derrida's move along 
with a possible Heideggerian response. To begin with, I develop a reading of Heidegger's 
text that shows the import of technology to his work as a whole and its centrality to the 
thinking of Being as difference. I then take up the question of Derrida's deconstruction of 
Heidegger's analysis of the history of Being and its technological completion as this is 
played out in The Post Cai-d and related texts. Following this I revert back to Derrida's 
now "classic" writings of the late 1960s and early 1970s and explore the arguments that 
relate contemporary developments in technology, science, and the media to the 
problematic of writing and to the closure of logocentric metaphysics. The preceding 
chapters lay the groundwork for me to then offer a critical reading of Derrida's text that 
locates in the articulations and assumptions of deconstruction certain indications of its 
belonaim, within the horizon of Heidegger's thinking of technology. Finally, I offer a 
reading of some of Derrida's later texts with the aim of showincy that and how r-1 Z: 1 dcconstruction crnerges as an affirmative technology. 
V 
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Introduction 
Technology, Difference, and the Question of the Thesis 
In this study I focus on what for me has always been a particularly obscure and 
provocative topic: the relationship between the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and 
Jacques Derrida where this turns on the question of technology. As aiivone familiar with 
the critical writings on these two thinkers will recall, far more has been written on just 
about every aspect of what transpires in Derrida's deconstructive engagement with 
Heidegger's thought than on what happens with regard to the transmission and 
inheritance of the related problernatics of technology and philosophy, technology and 
metaphysics, technology and the West. Moreover, it occurred to me that if one wanted to 
understand the particular intellectual, disciplinary, and institutional stakes of Derrida's 
work where these concern his diagnosis of the "closure" of logocentric metaphysics along 
with his assertion that "deconstruction" is one of the many metonymic names for what is 
happening to our world as it becomes increasingly technicized, then one would 
necessarily be driven to come to terms with Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's text. 
Heidegger's question 
As is more or less well known, the question concerning technology dominates 
Heidegger's thinking of Being. Its peculiarity lies in the manner in which it opens up a 
way of reflecting upon technology that moves against its metaphysical determination 
specifying, moreovcr, the sense of modern techno-science in respect to technology in 
ocneral. A question that involves the "end" or completion of the history of Western 
philosophy and the possibility of a new task of thinking. A question that delineates the 
impending -turn" (Kehn) Heidegger wants to think as the moment of danger and saving, 
the move from the global framework of Ge-stell to Ereignis or the -event of 
appropriation". For Heidegger, the epochal passage of our moment rotates around an axis 
that gets articulated by the question of technology, while the question of technology is 
reopened in the epochal shift that moved away from the metaphysical -production i st 
determination of that question as one concerned with instrumentality. The major 
argument is that the traditional view of thinking technology on a horizon and in terms of 
"means" and "ends, " a determination that pertains to human inventions that alter or 
manage what is construed to be the natural environment, deprives one of any access to its 
essence which, as Heidegger famously asserts, is nothing technological. In this case, 
Heidegger envisions technology not primarily as a human invention, nor in the various 
concrete manifestations it most obviously offers up like motors or engines, but in a way 
that leads the multiplicity of dispersed phenomena back to their origin in the historical 
unfolding of metaphysics. 
The historical movement at work in technology is metaphysical because it concerns 
all domains of reality and not just machines. It marks beings in their totality. Technology 
has the character of Being. The question of technology requires that we address it in its 
metaphysical history because Heidegger identifies modern technology as "equivalent to 
the concept of metaphysics completing itself. " I It is important that the completion of 
metaphysics be understood not as something that happens in accordance with the wishes 
and desires of human beings, nor as an event in the "history of idea's"; rather, 
metaphysics is self-completing. It is the event in which philosophy becomes an 
"objectively" t1inctioning system in the world. Metaphysics is actualized in the 
permeation of the world by technical relations. With the arrival of technology the 
everyday thus becomes metaphysical-, and metaphysics becomes everyday. 
For Hcidegger, technical relations are the culmination of the history of philosophy L- 
because they make actual the various ways in which beings have hitherto been 
' Martin Heidegger, "Overcoming Metaphysics" in The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh, (Ncw 
York: Harpcr &, Row, 1973). 
represented in the basic ontological concepts of metaphysical inquiry. At the end of 
philosophy, that direction which philosophical thought has been pursuing in the course of 
its history makes itself known. This history is the history of Being itself and in a certain 
sense, as Samuel Uesseling remarks, it is the technicians who are most true to this history 
even though Heidegger never formulated it quiet so explici tly. 2 In this respect, all the 
great thinkers, beginning with the Greeks, "prepared" for the "release of Being into 
machination". When Plato represents Being as idea and as the koinonia of the Ideas, 
when Aristotle represents it as ousia, Kant as position, Hegel as absolute concept, 
Nietzsche as will to power, these are not doctrines advanced by chance, but rather words 
of Being that adhere to a productionist orientation that has determined Western thinking 
for nearly three millennia. As Heidegger shows, the actualization of philosophy in 
technology brings to completion the forgetting or erasure of the ontic-ontological and 
ecstatic difference between Being and beings insofar as Being is founded upon an 
unthernatized privilege granted to the present (over the past and future) as well as to those 
beings that are represented in their presence precisely as present-to-hand (as "objects") 
and as what have been produced. Technology continues the final metamorphosis and 
rnaterialization of all the activities of objectification. The radical transformations effected 
by contemporary techno-science come to pass in this culmination. 
If his vocabulary is still appropriate Heidegger claims that metaphysics culminates in 
the projection of a mathesis universalis that frames the world as a two-dimensional 
diagrarn or map, institutes a separation between subject and object, and opens a network 
in which subject and object mutually challenge, determine and position each other in such 
a fashion that the positioning itself reserves priority over both, which are "sucked up" into 
an ever shifting "reservoir" of manipulable resource. So defined, modern technics 
constitutes the Ge-stell, the reciprocal gathering and dissimulation of mankind and nature 
through generalized calculating, planning, automatization and cyberneticization. In this 
2 Samuel I. Isseling. "The End 01'Philosophy as the Con-inlencci-nent of Thinking" in Critical Heidegger, ed. 
Christopher Nlacann, (London: Routled, -, c, 1996). pp. 191-20-5. p. 195. 1 
4 
connection, Heidegger becomes Heidegger through the following four essential claims: I 
,, 3 "Technology is a mode of revealing. 2. "The revealing that rules throughout modem 
technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. "-' 3. 
"Enframing (Ge-stell) means the gathering-together of that setting-upon which sets upon 
man, i. e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering as , standing- 
reserve .,, 
5 4. "What we experience in the Ge-stell as the constellation of Being and man 
through the modern world of technology is a prelude to what is called the event of 
,, 6 appropriation (Ereignis) . Certainly it is a matter here of four essential views and not 
just an enunciation of a set of philosophical or theoretical propositions, academic theses 
or common opinions since these claims are given by way of a thinking that requires that 
we enter into the framework of technology as it projects itself into a space withdrawn 
from representationalist or calculative thought. To enter into such a space, and thereby 
into what remains concealed in technology as a contemporary potential, is precisely the 
task Heidegger envisages for thinking at the end of philosophy. 
Derrida and technics 
Now, if the question of modern technology has long been established as an important 
aspect of Heidegger's thought, when we consider the reception of the Derridean text 
technology does not immediately present itself as one of the major themes. Or at least it 
seemed that way. The first sustained reception of Derrida's work took place in university 
departments of literature, a context that was understandably selective and which fostered 
the common conviction that its concerns were primarily to do with reading and 
interpretation, with the method and epistemology of textual criticism and analysis. This 
3 Martin Heidcggcr, "The Question Concerning Technology" in The Question Concerning Technology and 71t, Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt, (NcN%- York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 3-35. p. 13; hereafter cited as 
QCT. 
4 Nd., p. 16. 
5 Ibid., p. 20. 
6 Martin Heidegger, lelentity and Difference. trans. Joan Stambaugh, (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 
36-37; hereafter cited as ID. 
5 
evaluation characterised the reception of Derrida's work until the latter part of the 1980s 
by which time, and owing to an increased recognition of its philosophical pertinence, the 
complex "logic" of "deconstruction" was being untied. By now. Derrida's arguments 
concerning decentering, supplementarity, marginalization, undecidability, deferment and 
differentiation have become philosophical commonplaces and are seen to be aspects of a 
"method" that is not reducible to any particular discipline, institution or practice. Indeed, 
the conceptual resources and strategies of deconstruction continue to replicate in 
explosive variants and viral elaborations and numerous interventions in Derrida's work 
can be seen to have targeted specific problems and fields, from law to architecture, ethics, 
aesthetics, religion, history, politics, and so on. Amongst these fields we must count 
technology. Of course, it is true that that technology is not a privileged object of reflection 
for Derrida. That said, technological considerations in general do play an important role 
in Derrida's work, from his introduction to Husserl's The Origin of Geometry to The Post 
Card and his most recent texts. Indeed, as I will argue in this study Derrida's engagement 
with technology, particularly its contemporary amalgamation with science and the media, 
is not merely one theme among others in his text; rather, it is central to his elaboration of 
deconstruction which, as we shall see, opens the necessity for a rethinking of technicity 
generally. In this case, it will be a question of drawing out certain aspects and 
implications of Derrida's work that have been more or less overshadowed by its literary 
and philosophical receptions and promoting it as a general theory of technics. 
Derrida's thinking on the distinct, if closely related, topics of technology, science and 
the i-nedia, is subtle and complex. Like Heidegger, his work takes on the radical 
consequences of conceiving technology in a way that resists its being totally understood Cý 
in terms of sorne posited function or purpose for human beings. And, like Heidegger. 
Derrida opens up a way of thinking that articulates the relation between technology and 
Wcstern philosophy. To begin with, as part of his general program, from Of 
Grainniatology on, and within a very broad conceptual and historical matrix, Derrida 
6 
relates technology to the question of the disavowal of writing, to its condemnation as 
techne, as merely an instrument in the service of speech and the normative procedures of 
truth. The disavowal of writing, including as techne-technology-is part of the history 
of Western philosophy and is the condition of the possibility of this history, even though 
it is writing, including as techne, that makes this history possible. The frame of reference 
into which Derrida fits this articulation generates an exorbitant method 
deconstruction-that intervenes in this aporetic circumstance opening up a new field of 
inquiry into textual processes that involves the elaboration of a general or arche-writing 
and its supplements text, gramme, diffirance, trace, iteration, dissemination, etc. Once 
writing, condemned throughout the history of philosophy as techne-an auxilliary 
technique, becomes irreducible, so does technology. Hence this perspective generates a 
very different view of both. Technology-as writing-poses a very different question, the 
question of a techne that comes "before" the "originals". Or, as one commentator puts it, 
"there emerges a play where all "befores" and "afters" must be re-played, re-inscribed, 
although in certain sequences the classical forms of "origin" will have to be preserved; 
but in a different type of efficacy and 'for other reasons than hitherto"". 7 For Derrida, the 
received concept of the technical must transgress itself in favour of the notion of an 
"originary technicity". This becomes a quasi -transcendental term, i. e., one that functions 
as a general ground or condition in a discourse, but which simultaneously questions the 
t oundational or explanatory power of any ground or condition. 
The philosophical disavowal of writing and the elaboration of general writing as 
originary technicity makes up the concerns of Derrida" now "classic" texts of the late 
1960s and early 1970s-Writing and Difference, Of Grammatology, Dissemination and 
Margins of Philosoph-i-in which, as is well known, Derrida develops deconstruction 
7" ida: Univcrsity Press of Florida, 1993). p. 3 15. \rklad) Plotnitsky. Recoilfigurations, (Florl iI, 
7 
with respect to what he takes to be "a new mutation in the history of writing. in historv as II 
writing". ' Here it is possible to conceive of deconstruction as grammatolocry, as a general 
grammar of technics and technicity as a condition of the im-possibility of logocentrism. 
In this connection, it is worth reconsidering a number of examples of Derrida's work in 
the ambit of this progam: if one thinks of Derrida's insistence on the role of writing given 
by Husserl in the constitution of ideality in "The Origin of Geometry, " or the 
irreducibility of the indicative sign in Speech and Phenomena, or the place of writing in 
the constitution of logos and phone in "Plato's Pharmacy, " or the logic of iterability in 
"Signature Event Context, " or the "Mystic Writing Pad" that functions as a necessary 
supplement to consciousness in "Freud and the Scene of Writing, " or the machines that 
haunt his reading of Hegel, notably the machine a drager in Glas (this list could be 
extended), then each of these discrete arguments can be viewed as claims for the 
irreducibility of technics. That is, deconstruction underscores the necessity of technics as 
what is irreversibly and inextricably presupposed in the constitution of the philosophical 
episteme, whether this is the realm of dialogue, of the soul conversing with itself, auto- 
affection, or the pure ideality of speech and meaning. Yet the necessity of technics to the 
constitution of philosophy is also the ruination or rendering impossible of the very project 
it was supposed to make possible. ' 
Now, having said this it would be wrong to think that Derrida's engagement with 
technology is solely or primarily an intra-philosophical matter. As I have already said, 
that approach which takes deconstruction to be primarily a method and epistemology for 
the critical reading and interpretation of texts is very selective. It severely underestimates 
the scope of deconstruction which is not reducible to the subjective movement of such an 
operation. Indeed, Derrida is keen to specify that deconstruction is not a praxis or 
technique, that it is not an initiative, inspiration or aesthetic fetish to which he can claim 
8 Jacqucs Derrida, Of Granunatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak-, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Univcrsity Press, 1974), p. 8; hereafter cited as OG. 
9- I'lic. se rcmarks folloý\ thosc of Simon Critchley. See his Ethics-Politics-Stibjectit, ii),: Essays on Derrida, 
Levinas awl Contcnipowrý, French Thought, (London: Verso, 1999), p. 174. 
8 
authorship; rather, what goes by the narne of "deconstruction- is an effect of a more 
general transformation of the contemporary episteme. Like Heidegger before him Derrida 
articulates the question of technology as a thinking of the event, of what happens to the 
world and to metaphysics in its actuality. In this case, his diagnosis of the "closure" of 
metaphysics, of which the grammatological turn is a symptom, is elaborated within the 
context of an unprecedented technicization of the world and the human-the context, that 
is, of the massive programming, capitalisation, and appropriation of techno-scientific 
invention by multinational corporations and nation states. Most strikingly, for Derrida it 
is the accelerating development of information and communications technology, of the 
"media, " and tele-technologies of all types that constitutes a "practical deconstruction" of 
the world. In this context, as Timothy Clark has remarked, one might say, "not that 
technology is the object of deconstruction as some method of analysis or critique, but 
rather that it is "in deconstruction" as the originary condition of its Being. "10 
The thesis of originary technicity, as the claim for the irreducibility of technics and 
the event, is reiterated and reworked across the whole of Derrida's oeuvre. In this regard, 
while developing over four decades through an astonishing array of styles or strategies, 
performative experiments and targeted interrogations, Derrida's work has been entirely 
consistent with his opening gambit. Whether it is a matter of considering the disavowal of 
writing in the works already mentioned, the logic of "postality" as in The Post Card, of 
C4 spectrality" as in Specters of Marx, of the archive as in Archive Fever, or of the 
indissociability of the machine and the event as in Typewriter Ribbon, what Derrida has 
rnanaged to write in this time is guided by the desire to render explicit what can be t-, 
described as a machinic intervention which interrupts the received programs of 
perccption, interpretation, and experience and, in the process of altering this past or 
archive, the very functioning of it, holds open the space for the arrival of an 
10 Timothy Clark, "Deconstruction and Technology" in Deconstructions: A User's Guide, ed. Nicholas 
Royle, (New York: Palgrave. 2000), pp. 238- 257. p. 252. See also Clark's "Computers as Universal 
Nfirnics: Derrida's Question of Mimesis and the Status of Artificial Intelligence" in Philosophy TodaY, 
Winter 1995, pp. 302-318. 
9 
unprecedented event, of a future to-come which is other than those programmatically 
foreseeable. II 
Deconstructing the thesis 
Given his concern with technics it should not therefore be surprising that Derrida 
should choose the question of technology as one of the main threads for his 
deconstructive reading of Heidegger which at the time of writing is, I presume, still not 
finished. Indeed, as I will show in this study it is precisely here, around the question of 
technics, the question of technology and philosophy, of an originary technics no longer 
subordinate to metaphysical conceptuality nor to a thinking of Being, that the stakes of 
the relation between Derrida's, own work and Heidegger's are played out. The reasons for 
this lie in the "entire-infinitesimal and decisive-diffýrance" that distinguishes 
Derrida's claims for the irreducibility of writing and technics from Heidegger's thinking 
of the essence of technology where this thinking adheres to a phenomenological 
orientation-technology as disclosure-that is constituted in its ontological difference 
from technological actuality. In order to understand what is at stake here it is necessary to 
consider that such diffirance would give us to think deconstruction as an affirmative 
technology against Heidegger's thought which, despite so many denials on the subject, 
and despite his subtle remarks about the difference between an actual technology and its 
essence, rernains symptomatic of the traditional relegation of technicity to a secondary 
position in relation to the originality of thinking and Being. 
The issue is more general and more complex, of course: more general because for 
both Heidegger and Derrida technology brings into play the entirety of their thought-, 11 
rnow complex because not only are we dealing here with two already immense networks, 
but Derrida's own work is indissociable from and, in a certain sense, is an interminable 
entanglement with Heidegger. This circumstance presents anyone who would attempt to 
11 See Toni Cohen's "Introduction: Derrida and the Future of... ", in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: 
.1 Critical Reatler, ed. Toni Cohen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pi-ess, 2001), pp. 1-23. 
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evaluate the relation between Derrida and Heidegger with enormous problems. Indeed, 
what I had not initially counted on when I began my research was that it would be beset 
by a number of difficulties to which, it seems, readers of Heidegger and Derrida (and not 
just these) are never sensitive enough. These difficulties, which already implicate us in 
the question of technology, turn on the question of whether what is to be dealt with here 
can conform to the staging and the particular discursive procedures which dominate 
academic discourse, in particular the type of text you now have in your hands-the 
"thesis". 
"How is this text to work ... if some day we are to become sensitive, today, as opposed 
to so many readings that are as partial as they are canonic, i. e., academic, to the essential 
impossibility of holding on to any thesis within it, any posited conclusion of the scientific 
or philosophical type, of the theoretical type in general? " This question, which will open 
us to the "themes" of this thesis, to what is at issue in it, is, of course, Derrida's. 12 The 
question that Derrida poses here relates to his resistance to the theoretical, that is, 
representational, logic of the thesis, a resistance which is part of his deconstruction of the 
essential tie of the thesis with the ontological and logocentric onto-encyclopaedic idea of 
the "book". In "The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations, " the transcript of a presentation 
given in 1980 at the opening of his own thesis defence at the Sorbonne, Derrida asks 
"Should one speak of an epoch of the thesis? [ ... ] Or of a thesis whose time would belong 
to the past? Should one speak of an age of the thesis, of an age for the thesis? " 13 Derrida's 
hesitancy and reservation over the thesis is, he says, "like a discomfiture at the moment of 
installation, an instability". 14 This remark reflects more than a mood. As Derrida explains, 
it was already clear to him that the general turn his research was taking could no longer 
12 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Be , yond, 
trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: The 
Univcrsity of Chicago Prcss, 1987), p. 261; hereafter cited as PC. Zý 13 Jacques Derrida, "The Time of a Thesis: Punctuations, " trans. Kathleen McLaughlin in Philosoph 
-v 
in 
France, Todav, cd. Alan Nlontcfiore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 34-50. p. 34ý 
hereafter citcd as T7T. 14 
Ibid., p. 34. 
conform to the classical norms of the thesis, nor did he think his work fit very weli with 
the laws regulating scholarly discourse: 
The very idea of a thetic presentation, of positional and oppositional logic. the idea of 
position, of Setzung or Stellung that which I called at the beginning the epoch of the 
thesis, was one of the essential parts of che system that was under cleconstruction. What 
was then put forth under the heading-itself lacking any particular status-of 
dissemination explicitly dealt, in ways that were neither thematic nor thetic, with the 
value of the thesis, of positional logic and its history, of the limits of its rights, its 
authority and legitimacy. 15 
Derrida's resistance to the thesis characterises the relation between deconstruction 
and the Heideggerian text too since it reflects his conviction that one cannot place oneself 
in relation to other texts in such a way that a thesis would result. Indeed, as Herman 
Rapaport points out in his study of Heidegger and Derrida (a text which has inspired my 
remarks here), the position that a thesis would take is inherently threatened by a bivalence 
of proximities, a bivalence which finds its approaches to figures like Heidegger 
multiplied and contradictory. 16 As Rapaport says, this avoidance of positioning which 
detaches Derrida from the ideology of the thesis is not merely a clever attempt to double 
bind the relation between cleconstruction and the Heideggerian text. Nor is it to be viewed 
as some kind of rhetorical trick designed to undermine the notion of the thesis through the 
tactics of differentiation. Rather, Derrida is asking us to consider how a thesis can take 
place in the instability of relation to other figures. And he wonders how given this 
instability, one can write within an academic framework wherein discourse is regulated 
by the notion of the thesis. In this case, Derrida's remarks are part of his insistence that 
15 Ibid.. p. 42. 
16 Herman Rapaport, Heidegger and Dei-rida: Reflections on Time and Language, (Lincoln: The Uniý crsity 
of Nebraska Prcss, 1989), p. 248. 
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his thinking is different from Heideggerian philosophizing where such difference must by 
understood as the diffýrance of a dynamic that acknowledges a multiplicity of 
relationships running between complex formations of knowledLc that cannot be reduced 
to the "differences" of theses with impunity, and which cannot be localised to the 
historical philosophical framework of a tradition of great minds wherein each thinker is 
reducible to a thesis or set of basic principles that follows from or differs from the 
thoughts of predecessors and followers. 
What is at issue here is something I take seriously. Although this study will not be 
performative in a way which could only appear mock-Derrida, I take the point that in any 
consideration of the relation between Heidegger and Derrida one needs a complex 
interplay of proximities and distances rather than a simple demarcation along any given 
set of lines, even if such lines can within certain contexts be drawn and be very 
effective. 17 While I may not always engage this complexity, I cannot uncritically suspend 
it. And this is not simply for reasons of having to obey the deconstructive logic of 
Heidegger's and Derrida's texts. It is equally the case that the problernatic of technology 
itself demands such an approach since, as will be apparent from what I have said above, 
this is deeply implicated in the performative aspects of Heidegger's and Derrida's work in 
its respective enactment of thinking and writing. 
Overview 
Deconstructions overflow of the logic of the position, it's a-thesis, " is part of a 
strategic set of relays whose aim is to expose the strictures of academic presentation. In 
this regard, Derrida's text articulates what is one of the most significant aspects of his 
work-the extent to which the necessity of deconstruction is not primarily a matter of 
philosophical contents, themes or theses, philosophemes, poems, theologemes or 
ideologernes, but especially and inseparably meaningful frames, institutional structures, 
17 This is a point made by Plotnitsky. Cf. op. cit., n7 at p. 46. 
8 On the "a-thcsis" sce cspccially PC., p-260-73- 
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pedagogical or rhetorical norms, the possibilities of representation in terms of its very 
market. This means to include "deconstruction" itself since amono, the major stakes of 
Derrida's work is the way in which his writings resist, in order to challenge, every 
movement of appropriation that tends to reduce deconstruction to a body of easily 
reproducible means, methods and technical procedures; a body of powerful know-how 
that would be at once understandable and offered for didactic transmission, susceptible of 
acquiring the academic status and dignity of a quasi -interdi scipl i nary discipline, and even 
saleable as a commodity, as merchandise. " 
This aspect of deconstruction has strong resonance with Heidegger's text. As is well 
known, one of the central strands of the question concerning technology is the difference 
Heidegger draws between philosophy and thinking (Denken). This difference is not an 
absolute opposition; rather, it articulates Heidegger's assessment of the technological 
bifurcation of modernity as a site of transition in which thought is simultaneously carried 
into and withdrawn from the representative-calculative operations of completed 
metaphysics. In this case, thinking is announced as a contemporary potential from out of 
its actuality as a purely academic and cultural concern-this concern coinciding with 
what today is presented as "philosophy" in all its interdisciplinary modes. It seems to me 
that the stakes attached to this aspect of Heidegger's question are high indeed and should 
not be underestimated by those who would follow his work. They involve us in the 
unavoidable issue of what happens or takes place today, there, ývhere Heidegger's own 
thought becomes present as it moves into its metaphysico-technical determination. That 
is, they involve us in the question of the production and transmission of Heidegger's text, 
of its tech no-medi a-(tiz)ation as an object of academic scrutiny and resource of 
philosophical scholarship. In this connection, in Chapter I of this study I will develop a 
19 Sce Jacques Derrida, - Dccons truc t ions: The Im-possible, " trans. Micheal Taormina in French Theon- in 
America, ed., Sýlvýre Lofringcr and Sande Cohen, (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 13-31. p. 19; hereafter 
cited as DI, 
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reading of Heidegger's question of technology in the context of a critical discussion of its 
institutional manifestation. As I will say, the demands of contemporary academic research 
and publishing have diverted attention away from the peculiar dynamic and long term 
task of Heidegger's thinking to favouring the current attunements of consciousness where 
these are concerned above all with deriving, evaluating, explicating and positing the 
contents and themes of his work in its chronological development. This circumstance has 
had predictable results: The very movement of Heidegger's thought, its own "immanent 
transformation" and "pathway character, " has become obscured. It is my belief that this 
dynamic is central to Heidegger's question concerning technology and that its obfuscation 
has had a considerable impact on our ability to follow this question and track what 
happens in those texts in which this matter unfolds. This event turns on the ambiguous 
status of technology in Heidegger's work where it appears simultaneously as the ultimate 
obstacle to and as the ultimate possibility of thought. In this case, technology must be 
seen as the decisive condition across which Heidegger's turn out of metaphysics takes 
place. Indeed, I will assert that it is technology and only technology which opens 
Heidegger to the most radical developments of the thinking of Being as difference. In this 
connection, I want to argue for the centrality of technology to the enactment of 
Heidegger's thinking as a whole where this is key to unlocking the various 
" correspondences" of his text which is differentiated and pluralized into "Heideggers, " 
topoi, and thoughtpaths as he pursues the self-differentiating matter (Sache) of thinking. 
In order to understand what is at issue here it is necessary to come to terms with the 
pert orinative difficulty of Heidegger's thought where this turns on the paradox that the 
movement to which his thought opens is understood by Heidegger to have both a 
gathering and unifying character and that it is differential, that it is projected into a 
movement which exceeds it and carries it beyond itself. This conjoined dynamic 
corresponds to the strange mixture of stasis and transitivity which characterises modern 
technology w1mi this is thought in its essence. One of the central concerns of this chapter 
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will be the attempt to elaborate this paradox as a corrective to those interpretations which 
would make of Heidegger's text a thesis and a philosophy. Such interpretations are 
manifest in a reading which takes Heidegger's meditation on the essence of modem 
technique to be primarily an exposition on representation whereby the question of 
technology is elaborated within a constellation or chain of some of the major concepts of 
metaphysics, all of which can be derived from Ge-stell, and all of which are, in effect, 
connected with a static conception of Being. In this case, Heidegger's thinking remains 
determined by, and limited to, the restricted economy of representation that it reveals. I 
will argue that this reading does not go far enough. Not only does it limit the scope of his 
thought as it enacts the "turn" (Kehre) out of metaphysics into a space withdrawn from 
representation, it misses the decisive import of technology for Heidegger's articulation of 
a nonmetaphysical notion of Being as event (Ereignis) or difference (Unter-Schied). In 
this connection, Chapter I will be composed of two parts: in the first I will point up the 
iinportance of the immanent dynamic of Heidegger's thinking to the problematic of 
technology-, in the second, I will develop what is said in the first by way of a reading that 
shows technology to be that condition which opens Heidegger's thinking to that dif- 
ference which, by remaining unthought, has always dominated metaphysics. 
Chapter I sets the scene for the passage to Derrida, or rather, to Derrida's relation to 
Heidegger, since it offers a reading which shows that a certain "tracing" or "inscription" 
has already taken place in the latter's text. In Chapter 2,1 take up this relation as it is 
elaborated in the context of Derrida's The Post Card. It seems to me that this text is the 
most ideal for establishing what is at issue in this study since it fashions a text which not 
only articulates the necessary deconstruction of the positional logic of the thesis, but it 
also elaborates the at once infinitesimal and decisive diffýrance between his own text and 
I leideauer's as regards the question of technology. In The Post Card Derrida lets the L-t-, 
postcard, the post, and the card become the organizing figures for a discussion of the 
various deconstructive effects established through the process of a messages transmission 
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not only as these bear upon the traditional assumptions at work in any delivery system, 
but also as they affect Heidegger's thinking of the "destiny" or "sending" of Being in its 
technological outcome. Such a sending destined for "us" and always assured of reaching 
its destination is, Derrida insists, a "postal idea" that is symptomatic of of metaphysical 
thought. In elaborating the necessary deconstruction of this idea Derrida countersigns a 
"telecommunicative disposition" which articulates a network comprised of relays, 
deviations and transferences that both comprehends and subverts Heidegger's text. By 
way of a selective, filtrating, discriminating reading I will be concerned to assemble from 
the vast network of The Post Card and certain related texts several fragments with a view 
to marking the juncture or loci at which what is at issue here converges towards its most 
simple, most economical, and most formalizable statement. As we shall see, Derrida 
asserts that the significance of a text is very much determined by the various media and 
delivery systems involved in its transmission and that one is very much mistaken to 
isolate it from its machinic relays, as he says Heidegger does when he takes technology to 
be derivative with respect to the sending of Being. By transposing Heidegger's 
ontological vocabulary into the context of the discourse of the general text, Derrida both 
literalizes Heidegger's Being-historical schema as the postal systems technology and 
reinscribes what he considers to be the restricted economics of this system in terms of an 
66originary" envoi or "dispatch". In this case, my assessment of Derrida's deconstruction 
of Heidegger's text will explore the implications of his insistence that "techne-this is the 
entire-infinitesimal and decisive diffýrance, does not arrive. No more than metaphysics, 
therefore, and than positionality; always, already it parasites that to which [Heidegger] 
says it happens, arrives, or that it succeeds in happening to [arrive ci arriver]. 20 
In addition to its significance for Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's text, The Post 
Cw-(I provides the resources for me to begin to elaborate the question of technology and 
of originary technicity as this unfolds in Derrida's early work. This is the issue I shall take 
20 PC.. 192. 
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up and develop in Chapter 3. As I have already said, within his general prograin, from Of 
Grammatology on, and within a very broad conceptual and historical matrix which aligns 
deconstruction with an unprecedented transformation of the contemporary technological 
culture, Derrida relates the question of techne to the traditional disavowal of writing, to 
the cleconstruction of this disavowal and to the elaboration of the co-implication of 
general writing or inscription (where this means to include diffýrance, trace, iteration, 
supplement, etc. ) and originary technicity. The central concern of this chapter will be to 
draw out and analyse what I take to be the key elements for an understanding of what is 
involved here. In particular, I will elaborate the clear set of intellectual, disciplinary and 
institutional stakes of cleconstruction as these emerge in Derrida's writings of the late 
1960s and early 1970s. As is well known, in this period Derrida develops cleconstruction 
by way of an articulation of the "closure" of logocentrism an event which is registered on 
two fronts which articulate the episternic ti-sansformation I discussed above: in the 
movement out of structuralism (and its grid of binary distinctions) in micro terms; and out 
of metaphysics (and it's privileging of presence) in a large scale perspective. Insofar as it 
impacts on both these cases Derrida's diagnosis of the traditional treatment of writing 
opens up a space for thinking this event in its both its philosophical and extra 
philosophical significance. In this case, Derrida negotiates a relation between philosophy 
and the then triumphalist discourses of the "human sciences" under the aegis of 
StrUcturalism. One of the decisive outcomes of this encounter was the development of the 
methodological thrust of deconstruction which enacts a displacement and reorganization 
of the metaphysical opposition between the transcendental and the empirical, opening up 
an aporetic and undecidable "position, " neither in philosophy (as it is traditional 
organised) nor outside it. Asserting the necessity and irreduciblity of this double 
impossibility, Derrida dernonstrates how it obliges philosophy to entertain an open matrix 
of transversal relations with emergent forms of knowledge and their technical 
elaborations. Its effect is to rethink knowledge as science: internally through its 
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grammatological unworking; vertically, through its reinscription in a retreating past: and 
horizontally, through a redistribution of the disciplines along zones of contact rather than 
confrontation. Philosophy must think its implication in these multiple orders even as it 
thinks their role in it. As I will show, thinking this necessity means thinking the 
inescapability of inscription in general and of originary technicity. The chapter will 
conclude with a consideration of some of the ambiguities and questions that are raised as 
Derrida attempts to elaborate this circumstance. 
Derrida's elaboration of deconstruction from out of the implication of philosophy in 
the emerging and multiple orders knowledge and their techno-scientific instances, 
constitutes perhaps the most immediate point of reference for understanding the centrality 
of technics to his early work. Equally, however, this work can be seen as emerging 
against the background of Heidegger's questioning of cybernetics and information theory 
as an aspect of his diagnosis of the dissolution of philosophy into the various human 
sciences in the 1960s. In this connection, in Chapter 4 the focus will turn back to the 
complex interplay of proximity and distance between Heidegger's and Derrida's texts. 
My aims here will be twofold: firstly, to further elaborate Derrida's notion of originary 
technicity in the context of its its impact on Heidegger's text; and then, in conjunction 
with this, to develop a reading that offers a Heideggerian response to this impact. The line 
of argument I will pursue takes up the question of where such a response would begin if it 
sought to situate Derrida's notion of originary technicity with the help of issues drawn 
tI rorn the Heideggerian reflections themselves. In this connection, I will develop a reading 
that elaborates the charge that Derrida's work is symptomatic of thinking in the age of 
technology in the sense that Heidegger gives it. More specifically, I will be concerned to 
locate in the articulations and assumptions of deconstruction certain indications of its 
belonging within the horizon of Heidegger's thinking of the "standing reserve" and the 
Ge-stell. As I will say, the Derridean text has to face up to the incalculable shock that it 
bears a much closer proximity to Heideguer's thinking of technology than Derrida is able 
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to show. This assessment will be guided by my conviction that not only can Derrida's 
elaboration of writing, diffirance, trace, etc., be seen to reiterate the very terms by which 
Heidegger defines the way in which all that is given under the sway of technology, but 
also that the deconstructive scope of Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger, his attempt to 
mark the closure of Heidegger's text, can be taken as exemplary of the type of restricted 
reading that I problernatize in Chapter 1. As I will say, Derrida's reading is one which 
takes the movement and necessity of the whole Heideggerian meditation on the Ge-stell 
and the modern essence of technique to be organized around the Stellen of Vorstellen, 
around, that is, representation. Insofar as such a reading obscures or forgets the 
irreducible differentiality of Heidegger's thought, it amounts to a letting fail of 
Heidegger's surpassing of metaphysics. I will argue that in the context of Derridean 
deconstruction such a move is the result of a strategic misreading that paves the way for a 
restricted econornization of the sheer plurality of the many "ways, " "paths, " or way-traces 
of Heidegger's text with a view to integrating it into the general economy of writing as a 
way of opening up its textuality (as Derrida's own). In this case, Derrida hopes that the 
entire topology of Being will be subject to the graphic possibilities of originary technicity. 
If my arguments hold, deconstruction must be reevaluated as an operation which 
simultaneously arises from and comes back to the topology of Being-and not the other 
way around. 
Of course, this matter is undecidable. The assertion that Derrida's work belongs to the 
same as what Heidegger calls das Ge-stell cannot be demonstrated as a thesis. If it 
remains the case that Derrida's text finds itself having to pass through Heidegger's 
question concerning technology there is nonetheless a fundamental limitation to the 
strange affinity between Derridean writing and the thought of Ge-stell, a limitation which 
makes all the difference, if not the "infinitesimal and decisive diffirance" of which 
Derrida speaks. This turns on the circumstance that although Heidegger is one of the first 
philosophers to be very attentive to the systematic links between technology and Western 
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philosophy, he nonetheless remains, as Derrida insists, tempted by a certain relegation of 
technics to a secondary position in relation to the pretechnical originariness of what is 
taken up as the matter of thinking. In this case, Heidegger's assertion that the essence of 
technology is nothing technological remains, at least in one of its aspects, traditionally 
philosophical. It maintains the possibility of thought which questions, which is always 
thought of the essence, protected from any originary and irreducible contamination by 
technology. In Chapter 51 will acknowledge this circumstance with the aim of developing 
a reading of some of Derrida's more recent texts where deconstruction emerges as what is 
often called an "affirmative deconstruction". A common feature of deconstruction in its 
affirmative phase is Derrida's willingness to engage directly with overtly political and 
religious themes. The idea of Europe and national identity, the legacy of Marx and 
marxism, justice, democracy, hospitality and religious faith are just some of the themes 
Derrida has dealt with in the 1990s. If these are the most commonly recognisable features 
of Derrida's latest writings, it is, however, no less the case that Derrida's elaboration of 
the indissociability of the event and technology are central to the development of 
affirmative deconstruction. Indeed, building upon the groundwork of the previous 
chapters, and following Derrida's lead, I will argue that deconstruction is an affirmative 
technology. The issue continues to be that of a method devoted to originary technicity, of 
a method that at one and the same time articulates both what is happening-the event- 
and technology, but now seen from the perspective of the affirmation of the open future 
described in terms of the "to-come" (a-venir). Among the texts under discussion here will 
be Specters of Marx where I will be interested in Derrida's deconstruction of Marx as this 
figures in his thinking of "spectral i ty". This notion, which belongs among the most 
recurrent of Derridean scherna's, articulates the political inflection of Derrida's work as it 
engages the inventive tele-techno-media(tiz)ation, and thereby deconstruction, of the 
world. In this context, deconstruction can be understood as the site of a non-formalizable 
resistance to the totalizing ambitions of contemporary techno-science, and to the massive 
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capitalization of invention in the guise of programmes of "research and development" 
Here, Derrida's writings affirm a logic of invention that entails a re-invention of the waN' I 
this concept is conventionally understood; they affirm a logic of the impossible, of what 
cannot be built, calculated or programmed. Such an invention is L'im, ention de Vautre, 
the invention of the other, of the wholly other beyond any possible status. The powerful 
thematic of invention can be clearly identified in several of Derrida's works and, 
particularly, in Psyche: Inventions of the Other a pivotal essay in this chapter. As an 
invention of the other, deconstruction is engaged in and by an affirmation of the in- 
venire, the in-coming, the arrival (venue) of what is coming, what is to-come (a-venir), in 
and by the future (1'avenir) and the adventure (adventure) of the future. As I will show 
this affirmation goes to the very heart of what deconstruction is all about since it remarks 
Derrida's assertion that if there is an affirmation, if there is the promise of a future, a to- 
come, it has to do with some technology, with the deconstruction of the world by, 
through, or within technology in its becoming other. 
I 
0 Re-opening the Question 
Part 1: "Heidegger Viewed as Commonplace" 
Introduction 
As part of his Manifesto for Philosophy first published in 1989 the French 
philosopher Alain Badiou rehearses a question which takes aim at contemporary thought 
and its Heidegger, its modernity, and ultimately, its philosophy. Badiou asks "What does 
the "current" Heidegger say, the one who organizes opinion 
? 912 ' Asserting that "He says 
the following, " Badiou then offers a set of six frames which serve as the basis for a series 
of judgements on what are taken to be the accomplishments of Heidegger's arguments 
regarding the history of Western metaphysics and its technological outcome. Thus we 
read : 
1) The modern figure of metaphysics, such that it has been articulated around the 
category of the subject, is in the epoch of its completion. The veritable sense of the 
category of Subject is rendered in the universal process of objectification, a process 
whose appropriated name is: the reign of technology. The becoming subject of man is 
merely the ultimate metaphysical transcription of this reign: "The very fact that man 
becomes subject and the world object is but the consequence of the essence of 
technology which is in the process of being installed. Indeed, inasmuch as it is an effect 
of the planetary deployment of technology, the category of subject is incapable of 
turning thought back towards the essence of this deployment. Thinking technology as the 
ultimate historical metamorphosis. and closure, of the epoch of the metaphysics of Being 
Alain Badiou, ManifestojOr PhilosophY. trans and ed. Norman Nladarasz, (Suny: State UnIvers, ty of New 
York Press, 1992). p. 47. 
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is the only possible program today for thought in and of itself. Thought cannot thus Cý, 
establish its site from that which the category of subject enjoins us to hold: this 
injunction is indistinguishable from technology's. 
Cut. Having cited this much, already more than enough, there is no need for rne to quote 
to all of Badiou's frames. That for Heidegger technology "is the ultimate destiny of the 
hiddeness of Being, " that technology is "the will to en-frame (Ge-stell), - that "the only 
concept of Being known to technology is raw material, " that "only in the most extreme of 
perils does what saves also grow, " etc., etc., all this it would seem is common enough. 
Indeed, Badiou's frames are arranged and filed under a chapter entitled "Heidegger 
Viewed as Commonplace" the provocation of which will be readily apparent to those 
familiar with Heidegger's work. 
For its part Badiou's own effort is directed towards marking a break with what he 
takes to be the "paralysis" of a thinking that is "closely linked to the constant and 
pessimistic relation of philosophy to its glorious metaphysical past. " As such, he proposes 
.f 
philosophY, thus a violent forgetting of the whole -a violent forgetting of the histot-N, q 
historical montage of the oblivion of Being". Consequently, Badiou is compelled to 
polcmically proclaim 
We shall not accept that the word "technology"--even were to resonate the Greek 
tekhný within it-is apt to designate the essence of our time, nor that there can be any 
useful relation to be thought between "technology's planetary reign" and "nihilism". The 
ineditations, calculations and diatribes about technology, widespread though they are, 
are noncti-icless uniformly ridiculous. And we must loudly proclaim what many refined 
Heideo-crians think in private: Heidegger's texts on this point do not in any v. 'ay avoid 1ý I- 
this poinposity. 2' 
Ibid., p. 48. 
Ibid., p. 53. 
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Badiou's polemic turns on what he considers to be the "meagre conceivable sense" of the 
stereotype and pathos of Heidegger's thinking which, we are told, is "spun only from 
reactionary nostalgia" and is expressive of an anti -technological archaistic sentiment. 
What are we to make of this appraisal of Heidegger's text where it is viewed both as 
commonplace and, as commonplace, ridiculous with regard to what is taken to be its 
protest against modern technology? To begin with we would have to take Badiou at his 
word; what he asserts is neither casual nor arbitrary but is symptomatic of the way in 
which Heidegger becomes present today for those who would follow his thought. 
The necessity that thought is "especially prone to succumb to the danger of 
commonness" is a circumstance that Heidegger has examined and elaborated since his 
earliest writings. It forms one of the central threads of a thinking that has to come to 
terms with the contemporary outcome of philosophy as the techno-scientific 
dissimulation of Being. In this connection, Heidegger's work has always been prepared 
in an inner tension; its unfolding is anchored in a certain hesitancy and reserve 
(Verhaltenheit), in the anxiety of having to contend with the recognition that that which 
he attempted under the heading "thinking" (Denken) is bound up with a constellation of 
all pervasive countervailing forces and interests to which "subjects" and agents 
producers and consumers, sometimes they are "philosophers" and always interpreters, 
too-are never sensitive enough. Indeed, one might want to argue that the question of 
such forces and interests has been completely evaded by those who would follow and 
capitalize upon Heidegger's work (and not just Heidegger's). These forces must, 
however, be taken into consideration from the outset if we are to come to terms not only 
with Badiou's staternent, but also with Heidegger's thinking as a whole. I refer here to 
one of the peculiarly contemporary features of Heidegger's concern with technology. It 
has to do with publicity and publication, the media, the accelerating pace at which 
intelicctual and philosophical production is actualized by way of the programming and 
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technical organization of professional knowledge and competencies, ýxith everything that 
comes across in the body of today's most phenomenal culture and which could be 
included under the heading of a producing society, of commodity exchange, of spectacle 
with all the discursive processes and modes of appropriation this implies. In his "Letter 
on Humanism" Heidegger marks what is at stake here: 
When thinking comes to an end by slipping out of its element It replaces this loss by 
procuring a validity for itself as techne, as an instrument of education and therefore as a 
classroom matter and later a cultural concern. By and by philosophy becomes a 
technique for explaining from highest causes. One no longer thinks; one occupies 
oneself with "philosophy. " In competition with one another, such occupations publicly 
offer thernselves as "-isms" and try to outdo one another. The dominance of such terms 
is not accidental. It rests above all in the modem age in the peculiar dictatorship of the 
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public real M. 
In pointing up the distance between the end of thinking and its arrival as an object of 
scholarship-"philosophy"-Heidegger initiates an analysis of the ongoing extension and 
consolidation of the administered space of the modern university and its academic 
functionaries along with the growing importance of publishing in connection with the 
dominant position of the calculative businesslike character of representationalist thinking. 
Such an analysis necessarily turns on his own role as a professor" as well as the 
.. iiicisivencss- and "ongoing activity" of the modern "researcher" who responds without 
Nlartin Heidcoger, "Letter on "Humanism.... in Pathinarks, ed. William McNeill. trans. Frank A. Capuzzi. C, I- (Canibridge University Press. 1998), pp. 239-276. p. 242. 
25 C- In his Introduction to AfettilVivsics, Heidevver writes: "The misinterpretations by which philosophý 
remains constantly beseiged are mainly promoted by what people like us do, that is, by professors of 
philosophy. Their CUStornary, and also legitimate and even useful business is to transmit a certain 
educationally appropriate acquaintance with philosophy as it has presented itself so far. This then looks as 
though it itself' N%, cre philosophy. N%licrcas at most it is scholarship about philosophy. " Martin Heidegger, 
hiti-oduction to MetaphYsics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, (Ne%ý HavenAale University Press, 
" 000), P. 12. 
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question to the demand to enter into critical debates, negotiate at meetinLs, and 
participate in the programs of conferences, the researcher who contracts for commissions 
with publishers "who determine along with him which books must be written". 26 
The stakes of Heidegger's analysis can be easily formulated. The demands of 
contemporary academic research in conjunction with those of publishers have diverted 
attention from the long-range task of thinking to favoring the procedures of "making 
public". To be more specific, a diverse and ever growing body of derivative discursive 
practices including monographs, applications of the texts to particular issues, archival 
work, editing, translation, journals, conferences, university courses, and academic 
societies (with all their techniques of distribution and exchange, transversal and 
transferring coordinations) constitute the most easily identifiable network across which 
the production and reception (destination) of Heidegger's thought takes place and works 
precisely under the name of "philosophy". Today, no aspect of that which this name signs 
appears to have been left unexamined or without comment, whether it be a matter of the 
man, his thought, his political (mis)adventures, etc. Heidegger himself called this 
institutional manifestation of his work "chatting ... .. passing the word along, " and 
11 scribbling, " and although he repeatedly insisted that his thinking was not to be turned 
into an object of scholarship, research, doctrine, or program, all of which are 
technological in the double sense of the construction of a Heideggerian "World Picture" 
and the systematic reduction of his thinking to a "standing-reserve" of information, it 
goes without saying that there is no engagement with his thought today that takes place 
outside this immense and differentiated terrain. Indeed, this very study must contend with 
this context as its im-possibility. 
This reference to the technological determination of Heidegger's work with respect to 
those productive forces which facilitate its transmission and reception is important here 
20 Scc Martin Heideg-cr, "The A, -, c of the 
World Picture" in The Question Concet-ning Technology and 
Other Esstj 
, 
vs, trans. William Lovitt, (Nc\ý York: Harpcr&, Row, 1977), pp. 114-154 and especialk p. 125, 
lici-cafter cited a-sA 11T. 
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because I asked what it means to say that Heidegger is to be viewed as "commonplace". 
In considering the vicissitudes of Heidegger's work, it is crucial to attend to the 
implication of philosophical thought and its techno-media(tiz)ation, to the question of 
both, and to what is really at stake today for those in-formed by this machine (whatever 
their particular "interests"). If Badiou's assessment is at all intelligible then it must 
presuppose this implication. That is, when one tries to think what is being said by 
Heidegger, particularly where this touches upon his concern with technology, then it is 
impossible to avoid this decisive aspect of his meditation which opens up the question of 
what happens or takes place today where his thinking is instituted. In short, Heidegger's 
question concerning technology is equally, and just as importantly, the question of the 
production and transmission of Heidegger's thought itself and how it becomes present 
today for those who would who engage his work. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
what is being marked here has a direct bearing on Derrida's relation to Heidegger since 
the relaying of Heidegger's text, its address and reception (the emitter/transmitter/recepter 
system), its passage and destination (its "dissemination via the detour of an institutional 
telecom mun i cation"), along with the various tele-techno-media this implies, are central to 
his cleconstructive re-inscription of Heidegger's thinking. " For the moment, however, let 
me stick with Badiou. 
Despite its attempt to set itself off against Heidegger's thought, or rather, precisely 
because of this, Badiou's text is patent and is itself exemplary of the commonplaceness of 
which it speaks. It is therefore unwittingly implicated in the question of that which it 
finds "i-idiculous". Regarding Heidegger's thinking, Badiou's Manifesto clearly speaks 
both of and for other texts that would appear to say the same, that is, it speaks of the 
-CM-rent" Heidegggci-, the "one who organises opinion, " and for those Heideggerians- 
27 As Derrida says, "In all cases, foci of- reflection should be instituted wherever the question of the end and 
al as such can take placc, wherever the limit, the borders or the destination of ends of' the philosophic. 
philosophy is at stake. N\ herevcr there is cause to or space to ask: Philosophy in view of what? Since and 
until whi'll In what and how? Sce -Sendoffs- in Yale French Studies. - Reading the Archive: Ott Texts and 
Institutions, 77 (1990), pp. 7-43. p. 19. 
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refined or otherwise-whose opinions so organised function in such a way that this 
Heidegger can be viewed as commonplace. In speaking both of and for these other texts 
Badiou says nothing that hasn't commonly been said (even in prIvate). Thus Heldegger's 
concern with technology is routinely heard as a "negative" account of technology, that is, 
as a critically antagonistic and reactionary protest that would pass judgement on the 
modem world. More importantly, however, I would have to say that Badiou's fascination 
with what are taken to be the "contents" or "themes" of Heidegger's work along with his 
desire to construct a "plot, " that is, his need to locate, place and narrativize, is 
symptomatic of an approach to Heidegger's thinking that responds without responding to 
its metaphysico-technological determination. 
"Should one henceforth forbid oneself to to speak of the "philosophy" of Heidegger" 
Not at all, and there would undoubtedly be no error in principle in so speaking, merely an 
inevitable abstraction. Heidegger's philosophy would mean, in these conditions, the 
thesis or theme that one has extracted by artifice, by misprison, and abstraction from his 
thought. Once this abstraction has been supercharged and deployed, it will be extended 
over all the folds of his work, of its ruses, overdetermi nations, and reserves, which the 
abstraction will come to cover up and dissimulate. In constructing itself, in being posed in 
its dominant form at a given moment (here that of the Heideggerian thesis or philosophy), 
his thinking is neutralized in it, numbed, self-destructed, or dissimulated. Nevertheless, 
the forces that are thus inhibited continue to maintain a certain disorder, some potential 
incoherence, and some heterogeneity in the organization of the theses. They introduce 
parasitism into it, and clandestinity, ventriloquism, and above all, a general tone of denial, 
which one can learn to perceive by exercising one's ear or eye on it. Hence the necessity 
to to continue to try and think what takes place in Heidegger, with Heidegger, what is 
,, 28 shown there, what is hidden . In this connection, I shall be concerned with two issues 
28 This elaboration is already to let the Derridean text or graft take hold since it is virtually a direct 
quotation from Derrida's Khoi-a where Derrida develops a reading of the "philosophy" of Plato 
("Platonism"), which is an ensemble of "thescs, " of "philosophemes, " of thematic philosophical "claims, " 
which corrcspond to the "dominant, " reproductive reading, which can be turned against the "text" of Plato, 
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which are intimately connected. Firstly, I shall argue that what is often overlooked in 
Heidegger's concern with technology is precisely its import as a question and as a task or 
way of thinking. Too often, it seems, Heidegger's text has been read with a view to 
appropriating only its content, what is thought, with little attention being given to how it 
is thought. As a consequence the active or dynamic "path way- character" character of 
Heidegger's thinking has become obscured. In this case, what is passed by is the 
performative difficulty of Heidegger's thought where this involves the simultaneous 
comprehension and surpassing of the technological outcome of metaphysics and its 
representationalist schemas. If we shift our attention from what Heidegger thinks to how 
he thinks it we see that it implicates the "immanent transformation" of thought in its 
arrest or capture by what Heidegger calls die Sache des Denkens, the matter for thinking. 
This matter is not a theme, or content of thought, it is not Heidegger's philosophical 
invention, nor should it be confused with the progress of an intelligible argument. Indeed, 
what is at issue here exceeds the purview of the theoretical or philosophical gaze as this is 
traditionally instituted. Rather, die Sache is equal to what is the central concern of 
Heidegger's thinking: namely, the radical happening or event of Being that stands over 
against the metaphysical ideal of Being as absolute, constant presence, as ultimate cause 
and foundation. Of thought's transformation, we may say that the questioning relation to 
technology bears not upon the object of this questioning but upon the enactment of 
thinking itself where this is understood by Heidegger according to the paradox that it has 
both a unifying gathering character and a differentiating movement that carries it beyond 
itself. This dynamic articulates a non-thetic projection or opening which undermines the 
possibility that what Heidegger offers us is a thesis on or about Being. 29 Where such a 
thesis is produced it takes the form of a philosophical abstraction that fails to take the full 
which is an ensemble of textual events-this ensemble without limýit which Derrida calls the general text. 
See Jacques Derrida, Khora, trans. Ian McLeod, in On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutiot, (Stanford. Calif.: 
Stanford University Press. 1995, pp. 89-127. p. 119-12 1. 
29 For an intcrestim-, discussion of the enactment sense of Heideggcr's thought see Karen Feldman, "The 
Pci-formative Difficulty of Being and Time" in Philosoph. v Today: Winter 2000. pp. 366-379. 
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measure of the decisive import of technology for Heidegger's thinking as a whole where 
this is key to unlocking the various "correspondences" of his text %%hich is differentiated 
and pluralized into Heideggers, topoi, and thoughtpaths. In this connection, in the first 
part of this chapter I will trace the paradox of the transformation of Heidegger's thought 
as he questions into the essence of modern technology. More particularly. via a 
clarification of the much discussed "turn" (Kehre), I will be concerned to show that the 
inner convergence between the enactment of Heidegger's thought and its matter 
articulates and originates from within a transformation that is the occurrence of 
technology itself. In order to enter onto the path of Heidegger's thinking we must take 
into account this transformation of technology which (transformation) is the onset of the 
thinking of Being as event (Ereignis) and as dif-ference (Unter-Schled). In this case, I 
will argue that it is technology and only technology which opens Heidegger to the most 
radical developments of his thinking of Being. 
This brings me to my second point of discussion. A dominant interpretation has arisen 
in the literature that takes the Heideggerian thinking of technology to mean primarily the 
fulfilment of metaphysics insofar as this is equal to the representing of beings. In this 
interpretation priority is given to Heidegger's characterisation of the modern age as that 
which is primarily instantiated in the so-called subject-object schema. This 
understanding, as far as it goes, does indeed follow Heidegger's thinking as even the most 
cursory glance at certain texts written in the late 1930's and early 1940s would show. 
However, such an interpretation has also come to inform and determine Heidegger's later 
thinking of the essence of technology understood as Ge-stell. In this case, technology is 
understood to mean primarily and fundamentally the stele, the systematic setting-up and 
positioning of beings in a "standing-reserve" or framework. Again, and to an extent, this 
reading corresponds to Heidegger's text. However, it tells us only part of what Heidegger 
has to sav and is not applicable without further ado to what the decisive essays of the 
1950s onward revcal. More decisively, in his writings of this period technology is now Z:, ý 
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said by Heidegger-and here I shall pay special attention to the peculiar mobile and 
tranýitive character of Ge-stell-to be a revealing which extends out beyond the frame of 
representation opening a site or place whereby the unthought of metaphysics-Being as 
dif-ference (Unter-Schied) or event (Ereignis)-first becomes the matter for thinking. 
Any reading that emphasises the former view without taking into account the latter 
seriously obscures what is at issue here since it takes Heidegger's concern with 
technology to be primarily a meditation organised around a static and thereby 
metaphysical conception of Being. Such a reading amounts to a letting fail of Heidgger's 
surpassing of metaphysics. Once again the the paradoxical and unsettling movement that 
characterizes Heidegger's thought in its becoming other is missed and the peculiarity of 
his response to contemporary technology as it is drawn into a space withdrawn from 
representation is overlooked. With this in mind my aim in the second part of the chapter 
will be to develop what is said in the first by showing that far from being merely a 
meditation on the completion of metaphysics (i. e., the insight that representationalism is 
the outcome of the history of Being when this history designates Being understood as 
constant presence), Heidegger's thinking of the essence of technology as Ge-stell is the 
decisive condition that gives thought its movement out of metaphysics. 
The ambiguity of technology (Dreyfus's thesis: part 1) 
Let me proceed by pursuing the tendency towards the obfuscation of Heidegger's 
thought in another instance. In an essay entitled "Heidegger's History of the Being of 
Equipment" Hubert L. Dreyfus comments on how Heidegger's occasional retrospective 
remarks on Being and Time are mostly limited to pointing out the way this text is already 
on the way to overcoming metaphysics by reawakening the concern with Being, or to 
acknowledging Being antl Time's transcendental neglect of the history of Being. " But, 
notes Dreyfus, "one looks in vain through Heidegger's occasional references to his most 
30 Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment, " in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, 
ed., Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall. (Blackwell Publishers, 1992), pp. 173-85. 
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celebrated work for an indication of how we are to fit Being and Time into the history of 
Being which Heidegger later elaborated". " In this connection, Dreyfus wonders "To 
what extent is Being and Time itself metaphysical? To what extent is it nihilistic? " As a 
step towards answering these queries Dreyfus poses what he considers to be a more 
manageable question: "To what extent is the account of equipment in Being and 1-itne a 
critique of the ontology of technology and to what extent is it a contribution to the 
technological understanding of Being? ' ý32 Commenting on the fact that in his Nietzsche 
lectures Heidegger singles out Descartes establishment of the subject/object distinction as 
the philosophical development that marks the commencement of modern technology, 
Dreyt'us suggests that insofar as Heidegger's fundamental ontological account of 
equipmental bei ng- i n-the- world offers a phenomenological critique of the subject/object 
relation, Being and Time would seem to stand in direct opposition to the technological 
understanding. However, elaborating on the question cited above Dreyfus writes 
Opposing the Cartesian subject/object distinction in terms of an account of Dasein as a 
user of equipment becomes an ambiguous form of opposition, for it is no longer clear 
whether such an analysis offers a critique of technology in the form of a transcendental 
account of the pre-tec hno logical everyday understanding of equipment, or whether, 
under the guise of a transcendental account of everyday activity, such an analysis 
reflects a transition in the history of the way equipment is which prepares the way for 
technology. In other words, it is not clear whether Being and Time opposes technology 
or promotes it. -'; 
Now, before I offcr a response to the problem Dreyfus encounters here let me try to 
specify the conditions that (-, iN, e rise to it in the first place. Heidegger's now famous 
analysis of equipment elaborated in Being and Time and related texts, its centrality to the 
31 Ibid., p. 173. 
. 12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., p. 175. 
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project of fundamental ontology as that which will re-open the ancient question of Being, 
continues to generate much discussion and I cannot possibly do it justIce In the space of 
this chapter. Nor do I wish to. My aim in mobilizing Dreyfus' argument is to mark, in the 
most provisional way, a link between technology and the movement of Heidegger's 
thinking as a whole, the demonstration of this link and its significance being my ultimate 
goal 
As Dreyfus's comments imply, although Being and Titne does not yet pose the 
question concerning technology it can be seen that what will later become explicit is in 
fact already an emerging theme. Indeed, Dreyfus is not the only commentator to see in 
Heidegger's text a determining, if ambiguous, relation between the thinking of equipment 
and the so called "later" thinking of the essence of modern technol ogy. 34 It is well known 
that in texts subsequent to Being and Time Heidegger opens up a way of questioning into 
technology that moves against its instrumental determination. It is equally well known, 
however, that Heidegger's elaboration of this matter is extremelY complex and the 
questions it raises attests to the fact that the difficulty of an interpretation of the meaning 
of technology for Heidegger is on a par with the difficulty of his entire thought. 
Technology is the concern of numerous texts which do not always appear to move in the 
sarnc direction nor on the same level. On the one hand, technology is "the supreme 
danger". As the completion and actualization of Western metaphysics in the modem 
project of representation and of the subjective setting-up of "what is" as an "object, " 
technology comes to pass when the trace of the question of Being qua Being 
disintegratcs, when thinking is left with nothing but the cybernetic regulation of a 
"standing reserve" of mere beings, and when this leads to what Heidegger calls Ge-stell: 
planetary industrial technics-the systematic and global exploitation of resources, which 
;4 Don llide, for example, offers an interestifill-I attempt to articulate the connection between Being and Time 
and the later texts. See his Technic's and Pra-vis, (Holland: D Reidel Publishing Company, 1979) pp. 103- 
129. See also Graharn Harman's recent Tool-Being. - Heidegger and the Metaphysics of'Objects, (Illinois: 
Open Court Publishing, 2002). 
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implies a worldwide economic, political, cultural, social and military interdependence. 
On the other hand, to argue that technology is equal to the completion of metaphysics is 
to consider only one side of its "Janus head". For at the same time as Heidegger questions 
into the Ge-stell we are told "where danger is grows the saving power also. ' 35 In this 
case, just as it is equivalent to the completion and actuality of metaphysics modern 
technology also constitutes its dissolution. In elaborating this paradox Heidegger 
proposes that technology as the optimization of calculation and the setting into order of 
all beings, implicates a "peculiar quality" wherein the modern world "projects itself into a 
space withdrawn from representation and so grants to the incalculable its proper 
,, 36 determination and historical uniqueness. As equal to the "objectlessness" (das 
Gegenstands lose) of the standing-reserve technology is not simply the end of metaphysics 
but also, and just as importantly, the prelude to its "appropriation" (Ereignis) and 
overcoming. 
As this brief sketch indicates, technology is ambiguous in Heidegger's work. It 
appears simultaneously as the ultimate obstacle to and as the ultimate possibility of 
thought. This ambiguity is the center of gravity of the Heideggerian text, it is where its 
drama is played out, and is that with which any interpretation must negotiate. Articulating 
the analyses of equipmentality at the close of the 1920s (where the theme is inaugurated 
through the attempt at a destructive retrieve of the Greek "productionist" orientation to 
Beitio) 37 with the decisive insight into the essence of technology as Ge-stell in the 1950s, 
AS QCT., p. 28. 
3o 4 WP., pp. 114-154. p. 135-136. 
37 Heidc, -,,, cr perceives a decisive but unthernatised element at the 
heart of Greek metaphysics to which he 
bcllc\, cs philosophy has remained prey throughout its history and that was ultimately to culminate in the 
technological era. This consists in having taken the understanding of Being appropriate to the everyday 
ýictivity and experience of production (poiesis) as the interpretive horizon for the basic ontological 
determinations of Being in general-an interpretation which coincides with the conception of Being as 
presence. This explanatory capacity is so important because "the basic concepts of philosophy" arose from 
it. In this connection, the metaphysical schemes of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger argued, were based on the 
view that the structure of all things is akin to the structure of products or artifacts. Aristotle's metaphysics, 
for example, is "productionist" insofar as he conceived of all things as "formed matter. " The most obvious 
cxaniple of such "I'Ormed matter" is the work produced hy an artisan who gives form to material. Plato and 
. ý\rlstotle seemingly projected onto all entities the structure of artifacts. 
For Heidegger what such an 
interpretation inad\crtantly blocks above all is an adequate ontological account of human being as that 
35 
Heidegger's thinking is organized around the "turn" (Kehre) or "reversal". As such it is 
inscribed in a complexity which cannot be reduced to a simple expression and which 
points to a crucial distinction which the scholarship has not always maintained. Given the 
importance of this notion to my concerns let me clarify what is at issue here. 
Die Kehre: Heidegger's ostensible turning 
As one commentator has remarked, "that the key to reading Heidegger is "a" or "the" 
"turn" or "reversal" has become a commonplace, so much so, that the "tum" seems to 
have been with us from the very beginning, enabling us everywhere to clarify our reading 
of Heidegger's work. 938 Although the notion is not reducible to any given text, line, or 
idea, Heidegger scholars have debated several understandings of what this turn is and 
where it occurs in Heidegger's text. We are told variously that it is the later privileging of 
Being over Dasein, of the "truth" of Being over the "meaning" of Being, truth (as 
aletheia) over time, language over truth, time over beings, to name but a few. 39 Despite 
the many attempts to come to terms with what die Kehre is, however, the question still 
impresses itself upon us: In what might this turn consist and why is it present alongside 
the key moments of Heidegger's thinking? If we are to provide an adequate response to 
this question we need to recognize four principles that function as fundamental pre- 
which, distinct from the work, engages in productive activity. Only if such an account were secured in 
contradistinction to the understanding of Being derived from production could, in Heidegger's view, 
ontology be placed on a firm footing and, as a CODSequence, could the questioning which aims at retrieving 
Being from its forgotteness be raised. By way of response, Heidegger's fundamental ontology, insofar as it 
has the existential analytic of Dasein at its centre, has, as one of its primary elements, a deconstructive 
appropriation of Greek thought-and in particular Aristotle's practical philosophy-such that both the 
Being of human existence and that of the complex of beings (equipment) with which it deals in productive 
activity get articulated from out of a structural whole that nontheless grants both their ontological 
specificity. For Heidegger's arguments on this see The Basic Problems of Phenonlenolog 
, 
N,, trans. Albert 
Hofstadter, (B loomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); especially pp. 112-122; hereafter cited as BPP. 
For an in-depth discussion of the question of productionist metaphysics and technology see Micheal E. 
Zininiernian, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modentily: Technology, Politics, and Art, (Bloomington: 
Indiana Univcrsity Press, 1990). 
39 l. awi-ci1cc Paul'Hernming, "Speaking out of Turn: Martin Heidegger and die Kehre" in International 
Journal of Philosoj)hical Studies, vol. 6 (3), 393-423. Routledge 1998. ltý 39 Tom Rockrnore, for example, distinguishes at least nine ways in ýý hich this notion figures in Heidegger's 
text. See his Heidcgger and French Philosoj3h. v. (London: Routledge, 1995) pp. 98-103. 
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conditions for understanding Heidegger's thinking as a whole: 1. The recognition that the 
question of Being as the grounding question of philosophy is worked out from two 
different "perspectives"-the perspective of the "transcendental-hori zonal disclosure of 
Being" (fundamental ontology) and the "Being-historical perspective", 2. the recognition 
that the emergence of the Being-historical perspective is not at the cost of, but in and 
through an "immanent transformation" of the transcendental -horizonal perspective, 
preserving thereby the unity and continuity of Heidegger's thinking; 3. The recognition 
that Heidegger followed a typical methodological procedure of working out the individual 
elements of a "one-fold matter (Sache)" in his various lecture courses and seminars 
without letting this matter itself become visible as an object; 4. The recognition that the 
"pathway-character" of philosophy in general and Heidegger's efforts in particular is 
decisive for the thought of Being in its technological outcome. 40 
The significance and interconnection of each of these four points for the question of 
the Kehre will be made explicit as I proceed. To begin with let me turn to what W. J. 
Richardson has set out in his Heidegger. - Through Phenomenology to Though t. 41 As is 
well known, in this pioneering study Richardson first introduced the idea of a "Heidegger 
F and a "Heidegger 11", a characterization which has played a large part in the common 
conccrn of much scholarship to separate an "earlier" from a "later" Heidegger. For 
Richardson, however, these are not two entirely different characters. Though clearly 
distinguishing between an earlier and a later phase in Heidegger's way of thinking, 
Richardson forwards the claim that "Heidegger I and Heidegger 11 are not the same, but 
they are one. ,, 4 ' This is a clear recognition of the peculiar identity-in-difference of 
ficidegger's thought. The grasping of this peculiarity has a bearing not only on 
understanding the history or moves of his way of thinking but also, and quite radically, on 
40 1 arn indebted to Thomas Kalary for these points. See his "Hermeneutic Pre-Conditions for interpreting 
Hcidegger: A Look at Recent Literature" in Heidegger Studies, vol. 18.2002. pp. 159-180. 
41 Sce William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Fivin Phenomenology to Thought, (The Hague, Martinous 
Nijholf, 1964). 
42 Ibid., p. 028: sec also p. 625. 
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discerning his primal experience of Being as the original "matter" (Sache) and source of 
his thinking as a whole. In this connection, Richardson takes great pains to distinguish 
between (1) Heidegger's focal topic, die Sache des Denkens and (2) what Richardson 
calls the "shift in focus" or .... reversal" in manner and method" that unfolded in 
Heidegger's work in the 1930's as he continued pursuing that single topic. Failure to 
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make this distinction can, as Thomas Sheehan has remarked , be disastrous for 
understanding Heidegger and the danger only becomes more acute the more one tries to 
fathom the intimacy in which Heidegger's work is bound to die Sache. What, then, does 
this distinction and this intimacy amount to ? 
(a)Die Kehre: Being itself 
The first issue, die Sache des Denkens, locates die Kehre. As Sheehan asserts, it is 
emphatically not a transformation of Heidegger's thinking, not an episode that could be 
dated to a particular phase or period in his philosophical career. Nor is it a conceptual 
construct or image of Heidegger's thought. Indeed, as Heidegger himself states in his 
I'amOLIS preface to Richardson's book, I did not invent it, nor does it concern merely my 
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thinking" . To be sure, one can certainly date when Heidegger's insight into the turn led 
to die Wendung im Denken, the reorientation of his thinking (namely, 1930-1938, and 
especially 1936-1938). But it is a very different matter with the turn itself. As opposed to 
being an accomplishment or result of thought, die Kehre is one name among many for the 
Aiding topic of Heidegger's work and for what this work is the response: namely, the 
radical happening or event of Being that stands over against the metaphysical ideal of 
Being as absolute, constant presence, as ultimate cause and foundation. Understood in 
this way the Will is indeed a kind of movement but it is not one that Heidegger's thought 
43 Scc Thomas Sheehan, "Kehre and Ereignis: A Prolegomenon to Introduction to Metaphysics- in A 
Companion to Heldegger's Introduction to Afetaph 
, 
N-sics, eds. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried, (Ncýý 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 3-16. p. 3. 
44 Martin Heldcgger, "Prefacc, " to Richardson's Through Phenomenology to Thought. Cf. op. cit., n 41 at 
[I. \Vill. 
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underwent in the 1930's. Rather, die Kehre points to Being itself and its history and only 
to this. In this respect, as essentially historical Heidegger associates die Kehre with 
Ereignis and specifically with the "time-space-play" (Zeit-Spiel-Raum), concealing- 
revealing (Verborgenheit-Unverborgenheit), sending (Geschick), or dif-ference (Unter- 
Schied) of Ereignis. More specifically still and important for my concerns, Heidegger 
links this dynamic of Ereignis to the thinking of technology. In this case, die Kehre 
indicates an impending-or at least possible-turn in Western history, a turning which 
articulates the outermost point or eschaton of Being in which the future of our 
technological era is at stake. Here, the turn is precisely the axis around which the 
undecided shift from Ge-stell to Ereignis comes into play, the interplay between "danger" 
and "saving" that articulates the stakes of Heidegger's thought. For Heidegger, it is in the 
Ge-stell that "the first oppressing flash of Ereignis" is revealed such that die Kehre 
articulates the ambiguity that attends the sudden but uncertain transition out of the reign 
of planetary technology understood by Heidegger as equal to the completion of the "first 
beginning" of metaphysics, into the "other beginning" of the future "belonging-together" 
of man and Being from out of appropriation. 
(b) Manifold thought: Heidegger I and 11 
Bearing in mind what I have just said, let me turn to the second issue; the change or 
transformation of Heidegger's thinking (die Wendung im Denken). This refers to the 
many and ever more radical ways in which Heidegger formulated and expressed the 
central matter of his thinking of which die Kehre is but one name. It is a change in das 
DenkenlSagen dei- Kehre. If die Kehre refers to Heidegger's central topic, the "thinking 
and saying" of the turn refers to Heidegger's ongoing efforts to articulate that state of 
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affairs in an ever more primordial fashion . This must not be understood to mean 
45 As a subset ofthis "the change in Heidegger's thinking" refers to Heldegger's shift in orientation from the 
trimsendenuil-horizonal approach of 1926-28 to the Being-historical perspective that characterized the rest 
of' his career. Indications of a change in Heldeggcr's thought are evident in the inaugural lecture of 1929 Cý 
What Is Afetal)hYsics? And with the 1929/30 lecture course The Fundamental ConL41, fs qj'MetaphYsics: 
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however that Heidegger's thinking is a thetic positing which, via a series of logical steps, 
unfolds in a linear sequence of moments from one position to another as if A led to B and 
B to C etc. Nor must it be taken to mean, as the term "turn" misleadingly suggests, a 
straightforward circling movement that returns back to a point or position that has 
remained unchanged throughout the dynamic that thinking entails. Insofar as it is 
understood by Heidegger to have a gathering and unifying character, his thought does 
indeed return to the same matter again and again. However, in its attempt to think and say 
its topic it does not merely return to the same abstract place. Indeed, because this unique 
subject matter is intinsically manifold (in sich mehrfd1tig) and abounds in plenitude 
(Fidle bergend), it requires a manifold thought (mehrfdtiges Denken). As organized 
around neither a point nor position Heidegger's thinking undergoes a paradoxical double 
movement such that one must take seriously what I have called its performative difficulty. 
In this connection, Heidegger's comments on Richardson's identification of a "Heidegger 
F and a "Heidegger 11" are important: 
The distinction you make between Heidegger I and Heidegger 11 is justified only on the 
condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has 
thouAt does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger 11. But [the thought 
of] Heidegger I becornes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger 11. 
Meanwhile, every fon-nulation is open to misunderstanding. In proportion to the 
intrinsically manifold matter of Being and Time, all words which give it utterance (like 
Worhi, Finitude, Solitude. A transformed movement of thinking rooted in the historical unfolding of Being, 
embracing at the sanic time the insights gained on the fundamental-ontological approach to the question of 
Beiing, comes to light v., ith the lecture "On the Essence of Truth". Only with the availability of the 
Contributions to Philosoph 
, 
N, however is one able to see that the Being-historical approach had taken "full 
shaping" already in the thirties, something that is hardly visible from the lecture courses of this period. 
Sections 132 and 134 of the Cott tributions give enough textual evidence to show that it is not the realization 
of the failure of his earlier perspective. but a new insight Heidegger gained into " the turn ing-in -Ere ign is" 
that leads to this change. It is no longer a question of transcending beings to the horizonally projected- 
opened Being in the manner of' transcendence: what counts is to "leap" over the so conceived difference 
bemeen Being and beings and transcendence in order to inquire inceptually from out the event of Being as 
Ercignis. See Martin Hc1LJc, _-_, cr, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enownina), trans. Parvis Emad and 
Kenneth Maly, (Bloomington -. Indiana University Press, 1999); hereafter cited as CP. 
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reversal, forgotteness and mittance) are always ambiguous. Only a [commensurately] 
manifold thought succeeds in uttering the heart of this matter in a way that cor-responds 
* 46 to it. 
Heidegger's advice to Richardson, his assertion that only a "manifold thought" succeeds 
in getting to the heart of what is involved in speaking of a Heidegger I and a Heidegger 11, 
belong within the context of what, in the lecture first published in 1966 "The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, " he will write regarding the ongoing attempt to 
subject his thought to an "immanent critique". I shall look in some detail at the 
significance of what is involved in this attempt below, but let me say straightaway it leads 
us into the dynamic "path way-character" of Heidegger's thinking, and to an apprehension 
that it is the dynamic unfolding of technology which from the beginning claims his 
thought and gives it its movement as Lin originary experience of Being as dif-ference. 
(c) At the technological end (the origin of thought) 
Now, having stressed their distinction, it is apparent that the two contexts I have just 
marked-die Kehre and the transformation of Heidegger's thinking-are nonetheless 
conjoined, although, as David Krell has noted, one glimpses the relation only after a great 
47 deal of study. What needs to be emphasized here and constantly borne in mind for what 
follows is that it is within the deep strata of these two interconnected matters that the 
question of technology is located in Heidegger's work and the ambiguity of his thinking 
becomes clear, insofar as it is clear, only if it is understood from out of this relation. Such 
identity-in-difference shows that the Kehre and the transformation that Heidegger's 
thought undergoes in its thinking/saying of this turn stand as explaining each other and as 
belonging-together in dynamic co-implication. Just as the turn is one name for the 
4,1 Cf. 01). Cit., n 45 at p. xxii. 
47 See David Farrell Krell, Intimations ofAfortalify Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of 
Being. (The Pennsylvania UnIversiIN Press. 1991), p. 95. 
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dynamic event like character of Being itself, so the transformation or change in 
Heidegger's thinking is the attempt to say this matter in an ever more profound fashion 
and in a manner that is not thought by philosophy as metaphysics . 
48Again, Why is the 
turn present alongside the key moments of Heidegger's thinking? Answer: because the 
turn opens up the horizon of thought against the horizon of the technological outcome of 
metaphysics. Heidegger's whole work is the thinking out of this event that is (not even 
his own) thought, but which emerges at the end of metaphysics in that topos which is our 
own. Understood in this way die Kehre articulates the opening for a "task of thinking" 
that takes up "afirst possibility for thinking apart from its last possibility, " a "possibility 
From which the thinking of philosophy would have to start, but which as philosophy it 
could nevertheless not experience or adopt. , 49 Thus, the task allotted to thinking gives 
rise to a questioning of the essence of modern technology as the matter (Sache) to which 
thinking explicitly turns insofar as technology is both that into which the history of the 
"first beginning" of philosophy as metaphysics is resolved, and that from which the 
undecided future of the "other beginning" is to take its start. This locks us into the 
defining problem of our age which is now no longer the question that metaphysics asks, 
How does it stand with Being, but rather, the more radical question How does it stand 
with technology? And like the Being question this can be parsed in many ways since 44 [t[o 
this [belongsleverything involved in differentiating the guiding question and the 
0 
gi-ounding question-, responding to the guiding-question and actually unfolding it; 
,, 50 crossing to the grounding question . 
49 There is ail instructive passage in CP in which-as is to be expected from everything that we have said so 
I'ar-that movement which characterizes Heidegger's ongoing and ever renewed thinking return to the same 
.. matter" is seen to be ground in the "turning in Ereignis". Such a grounding evcii means to include the 
hernicnuetic circle that characterizes the temporal-existential analytic of Dasein. This passage reads: 
"JEreignis] has its innermost occurrence and its widest reach in [die Kehre]. The turning that holds sway in 
[Ercignis] is the sheltered ground of the entire series of turnings, circles, and spheres, which are of unclear 
orwin, remain unquestioned, and are casily taken in themselves as the "last" (consider, eg.. the turning in 
the jointure of the guiding-questions and the circle of under- stand i ng). - See CP,. p. 286. 
49 Martin Heide-ger, "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" in Basic Writings, trans and ed. 
David Farrell Krell, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 431-449. p. 435; hereafter cited as EP. 
50 CP., P. 119. 
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Let me give what is being said here greater specificity. As Heidegger's text makes 
clear, without the emergence of modem technology metaphysics cannot signal its end, 
and the question of Being cannot come into its own without the offering of a wider 
historical orbit which permits its more radical reformulation as the Being-historical 
thinking of Ereignis. In asking the question concerning technology, Heidegger no longer 
merely asks the "guiding question" of metaphysics, i. e., the traditional question of Being 
which metaphysics has answered by way of a series of assertions about beings in terms of 
their thatness (existence), whatness (essence), and howness (mode). Nor does he ask the 
phenomenologically reinterpreted question whereby Being is thought from out of the 
significance, understandability or usefulness of beings, their presence to and availability 
(is equipment for possible human engagement and inspection-their humanly specific 
("ad hominem") giveness and accessibility. Rather, in asking the question of technology 
Heidegger delimits the achievements of metaphysics (including his own fundamental 
ontology) and asks the "grounding question" of metaphysics, the question about its 
unthought essence. In this way technology brings into play the Kehre and provides the 
opening for Heidegger to be able to traverse metaphysics in its historical unity and see it 
for what it is and always already was-the "destining" or "sending" of a series of distinct 
epochs which nonetheless belong-together insofar as they are all characterized by an 
i ii strumental -tech ni cal relation to beings that conceals or obscures the dynamic event like 
inatter to which his thinking attends. If this is so then technology does not appear simply 
. is one amoii(, the arrangement of phenomena that have come to presence and had 
Currency in the West, nor is it simply one issue or theme among others of Heidegger's 
text. On the contrary, technology is that which guides and gives direction to the entire 
enterprise of the destruction or dismantling of this arrangement and for its overcoming. 
As such, it is the central problematic of Heidegger's text. The important point to be made 
liere is that it is technology and only technology that opens Heide ()', cyel-' s thinking to that 
niatter (Sache) which by remaining unthought has always dominated the metaphysical 
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tradition. In a word, modern technology, its unfolding, is always already the provocation 
and starting point for Heidegger's ongoing attempt to pose the traditional Being question 
anew; it is the decisive condition-as yet not explicitly recognized and elucidated-from 
which Heidegger thinks from Being and Time and related texts on. 
The ambiguity of technology (Dreyfus's thesis: part 2) 
Now, having said this much my argument is running ahead of itself since the 
significance of these remarks will surface and be unpacked as I proceed. At this point let 
me return to Dreyfus's reading of Heidegger which I took up above. I have cited his 
questions regarding the relation of Being and Time to Heidegger's so-called "later" 
thought. More specifically, I have noted the ambiguity Dreyfus encounters with regard to 
Heidegger's analysis of equipmentality in its relation to the later texts on technology. "It 
is not clear, " Dreyfus writes, "whether Being and Time opposes technology or promotes 
it. Now, it is worth noting that in commenting on how Heidegger's occasional 
retrospective rernarks on Being and Time are mostly limited to pointing out the way this 
text is already on the way to overcoming metaphysics, Dreyfus alludes to the introductory 
remarks made by Heidegger in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, " with 
regard to the attempt at an "immanent criticism". Such remarks point to what was said 
above regarding the identity-in-difference of die Kehre and the change in Heidegger's 
thinking. If we take this immanent criticism seriously, that is, if we pay close attention to 
what is involved, we see that Dreyfus succumbs to the same tendency towards the 
obfuscation of the performative difficulty of Heidegger's thinking that can be seen to 
characterize Badiou's text. Like Badiou, Dreyfus becomes overly fascinated with what 
Heidegger says, with the content of his texts, and misses what is involved in how it is 
said. By extracting, examining, and comparing key "doctrines" and "themes, " attributing Cý 
them in the process to different periods of Heidegger's career therehN, adopting what 
Heidegger on occasion called the "short winded consideration" of a "chronological Z7,17 
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approach, " Dreyfus subjects Heidegger's thinking to a restriction that obscures the 
peculiar movement which articulates the link between thought and technology as the turn 
out of metaphysics. In this case, Dreyfus is blind to the immanently transformed 
emergence of Heidegger's thinking as it attempts to say its central topic across and 
beyond the purview of the philosophical gaze as traditionally instituted. The important 
point to be made here is that Heidegger's response to technology does not revolvc around 
an alternative; it is not "the task of thinking" to oppose technology-nor of course to 
promote it-but to be open to it. Such openness indicates that what endures in 
Heidegger's thought is only a passage (Ubergang), path, or way-trace (Wegspur) such 
that what concerns thinking is a "matter" (Sache) whose "contour remains obscure, " 
whose "coming remains uncertain, " is "only of a preparatory, not founding character, " 51 
and which "is still controversial for thinking and is the controversy" 52 What is involved 
here, what we now must become involved with, comes into view at the very outset of 
"The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" 
Tracing die Sache: immanent criticism 
The opening sentence of "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" 
Heidegger needs, as John Sallis points out, to be taken with the utmost seriousness: "The 
title names the attempt at a reflection that persists in questioning". 53 As Sallis is keen to 
stress, it is not only a matter here of recognising the seriousness with which in this text 
Heidcoger persists in questioning, for instance, in the sense of posing questions ever 
anew, seeking thus to avoid closing off interrogation, nor is it only a matter of 
reproducing such persistence as one reads Heidegger's text; rather, it is a matter of letting 
the persistence itself remain open to interrogation, of not too facilely-or, rather, too 
EP. p. 436. 
Ibid., p. 437. 
53 Hc1dc-, cr quotcd by John Sallis. "Echoes: Philosophy and Non-Philosophy after Heidegger, " in 
Continental Philosoj)h 
'y1: 
Philosoph 
'v 
and Non-Philosophy since Mcrlcau-Pont)-, ed. Hugh J. Silverman, 
(London: Rout lecloc, 1998), pp. 84-105. p. 90. ZI 
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seriously-assuming that it is obvious just what it means to persist in questioning. At the 
outset, in the brief untitled introduction of his text, Heidegger provides a certain 
indication of how questioning is to be carried out. The attempt named "The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" is placed within a larger context, a more 
comprehensive attempt, which is described thus: "It is the attempt undertaken again and 
again ever since 1930 to shape the question of Being and Titne in a more originary 
fashion". 54 The attempt is-literally-to shape the Fragestellung, i. e., the way the 
question is posed, set up, deployed; and to do so in a way that is more originary. To 
persist in questioning would be to sustain this attempt to shape questioning more 
originally, to deploy the question in a way that is more in accord with what it is that is 
questionable. 
What form does this more originary deployment assume? The introductory section of 
Heidegger's text gives a further indication: it is the attempt "to subject the point of 
departure of the question in Being and Time to an immanent criticism". " At the end of 
philosophy, that is, at its completion where it is "gathered into its uttermost possibilities" 
a situation which proves to be "the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a 
scientific-technological world and the social order proper to this world, "" the thinking 
now at issue is thus critically engaged with its beginning, with the question of Being as 
this is posed in Being and Time. In this regard, as David Krell has noted, in enacting an 
"irrinianent criticism" of Being and Time, composed some forty years earlier, Heidegger's 
essay is provocative, it seeks to inquire into the "fundamental matter" underlying that 
book, and the aptness of its "formulations" without however abandoning the question of 
Being. " Accordingly, we are told "the name of the task of Being and Titne will change". 
Heidegger has of course exercised such criticism before, for example in his Contributions 
to PldlosophY, and has in fact done so from within the very pages of Being and Time 
54 EP. p. 43 1. 
55 Ibid., p. 43 1. 
'6 Ibid., p. 435. 
57 Krell's comments appear in his introduction to Heidegger's essay. Cf. op. cit., n 49 Lit p. 428. 1 Z, 
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itself. " Such a move on Heidegger's part, which marks not so much a play on words or 
change in terminology as a transformation of the orientation of thinking, invites us to 
consider that the posing of what during his entire life-span he always insisted was his one 
and only question is prepared in such a way that it can be said to unfolding in a dynamic 
that constantly circles back and gathers itself in the same matter even as it exceeds itself 
and moves forward to this matter saying it in an ever more original way. Just as it returns 
to the beginning so it emerges or discovers itself thrown or sprung forward into the 
future, into a new beginning. As such it overturns the usual chronological sense we have 
of the development of intellectual thought and works against any finite distinctions that 
might separate an "earlier" from a "later" Heidegger in a strict chronological fashion. 
Hence, it radically resituates not only how we are to comprehend Heidegger but how we 
are to evaluate the "correspondences" of his various philosophical moments. In this 
connection John van Buren's remarks are instructive. As van Buren points out, so radical 
was Heidegger's repetition of the metaphysical enactment of the Being-question that he 
eventually stopped using the term "Being" (Sein) as a designation for what he was 
attempting to retrieve from traditional metaphysics. The appellation reiterated throughout 
Heidegger's thinking from his student days through to his latest texts was in fact the word 
Sache, which can be variously translated as matter, topic, question, provocation, 
controversy, confrontation, discussion, or point of dispute. " Here, although Heidegger 
liked to appeal to the word's original sense, namely court case or legal battle whereby the 
word ranges from outright conflict to the settling of accounts, he also maintained that the 
58 See Martin Heldegger, Being and Time, trans. John McQuarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), Section 83, hereafter cited as BT. As Jean-Luc Marion has pointed out, several arguments 
would confirm that idready in Being and Tinie we are dealing with a self critique and that the last two pages 
of the text as it \ýiis published puts radically into question the initial decisions for the construction of the 
Scinsj'Mge. For Marion's remarks and elaborations on this see his Reduction an(I Giveness: Investigations 
of Ht isserl, Hei(legger and Piz enomenology, trans. Thomas A. Carlson, (Evanston: No rthwestern University 
Press, 1998) especially p. 135-40. Also, at the N cry outset of BPP a course given in the summer semester of 
1927, that P, in the Nvork that immediately follows BT Heidegger notes that the text represents 1. a new 
elaboration of division 3 of part I of Being and Time"; at p. I- 
59 See John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Runiour of the Hidden King, (Bloomington: lndiana 
Universiiy 13ress. 1994), p. 28. 
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conflict and difference involved here are not initiated by the belligerence of human 
thought. Rather, the "Sache", the disputed or controversial case, is in itself a dis-pute or 
dis-cussion. " Understood in this way the word Sache coincides with another of 
Heidegger's oft used term s-A us -e inande r-se tzung which in its root components is a 
setting (Setzung) out and apart from (aus) one another (einander). The Setzioig of 
Auseinandersetzung is itself a laying out and setting forth that dif-ferentiates. Likewise 
the sameness of the Sache, its unity, contains difference in itself and is thus not to be 
confused with abstract identity. As Heidegger puts it in IdentitY and Difference, a text I 
shall return to below, "the same [das Selbe] is not the merely identical [das Gleichel. In 
the merely identical, the dif-ference disappears. In the same dif-ference appears, and 
appears all the more pressingly, the more resolutely thinking is concerned with the same 
matter in the same way". " 
As van Buren says, Heidegger often used subjunctive phrases such as what is to be 
thought (das zu Denkende), what is to be said (das zu Sagende), and what is worthy of 
question (das Fragwurdige) as synonyms for the Sache. This nameless name was not 
supposed to name anything actual or determinate, but rather invoked a possibility, an 
indeterminacy that allows itself to be reiterated and reinscribed in different and often 
clashing ways. Heidegger's topic is not then an answer, it is not an "accounting for, " a 
providing of grounds and reasons that is characteristic of philosophy as metaphysics, but 
12 is essentially a question that gets articulated over and over on different thoughtpaths. 
Consequently, Heidegger eventually gave up the term "philosophy" and preferred to 
speak rather of "paths" of thinking into the topic. The non-philosophical name that he 
gave to his thinking was precisely the word Weg, way or path. Though he continually 
60 Ibid., p. 2S. I follow van Buren's use of hypenation here to emphasize the dynamic character of what is at 
I Ssue. 
t1i 1D., p. 45. 
62 This can be undcrstood from the pcrspective of the difference Heidegger draws between metaphysical 
questioning understood as guiding and questioning understood more originally as grounding. In this regard 
see Heide,,, -, cr*s Nietzsche Volume 
H: The Eternal Recurrence of the Saine, trans. David Farrell Krell Z" 
(HarperCollins Publishers. 1984). pp. 192-197. 
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placed the same topic in discussion (er5rtert), his paths never stepped in to the identical 
topos twice. In short, and in van Buren's words, "[t]here never was a single Heidegger, 
Heideggerian topic or philosophy since these are pluralized and differentiated into 
Heideggers, topoi, and thoughtpaths. "" Always dis-puted die Sache leaves behind in 
language Spuren, traces, tracks, signs, remnants that point to the double absence of its 
having-been and of its coming, its no-longer and not-yet, its departure and deferral to a 
future return. Die Sache is not therefore supposed to name anything with positive content 
as the abstract unity of a thing with itself (where A=A an idea amenable to 
representation), but rather functions only as a formal indication (formale Anzeigen) that 
allows itself to be re-iterated and re-inscribed along a dif-ferential track. ' Thus the matter 
of Heidegger's thinking (die Sache des Denkens), formulated the inatter of thinking is, as 
a "way" of thinking, traced across many and various elemental terms all of which despite 
their distinct contexts of inscription "belong-together" and say fundamentally "the Same" 
Sinn des Seins, Wahrheit des Seins, Ortschaft des Seins, Da, Welt, das Offene, Seyn, 
Teinporalität, Zeit-Ralun, Anwesenheit, Entwurfsbereich, Lichtung, aletheia, phusis, 
Ereignis, die Kehre, Unter-Schied, das Zivischen, Wesung and the list goes on. " I 
emphasize: this whole network of terms comprise something like an infrastructural chain 
which remark in varying contexts the open but comprehensive fund of die Sache. In each 
of these instances that are traced across the expanses of Heidegger's thoughtpaths the dif- 
(, I Cf.. op. cit., n 59 at p. 28. 
64 Formal indication, a notion first developed in Heidegger's work of the early twenties (insofar as this is 
coriccriled with the possibility of philosophy as a nonobjectifying science), indicates or points to what is still 
absent in die Sache selbst, what is still to be thought and is on the way to language. In fact this pointing is at 
bottom the \, cry matter of thinking itself, since, die Sache articulates its ever-repeatable fulfillment and 
diff6-critiation in historical situations. As such a formally indicative approach to Miat is to be thought is 
diclated by the need to develop a mode of expression that articulates the essentially dynamýic structure of 
this matter and marks an attempt to maintain an opening or direction that prevents the tendency towards 
objectivc dicniatization. See cspccially Heidegger's discussions in his 1921-22 text Ph enotn etiological 
Interpretations (ýf 4ristolle. - Initiation into Pherionzenological Research, trans. Richard Roj'cewicz, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) and his 1923 Ontology-The Hermen eu tics of Facticity, 
Iran,,,. John \, an Burcn. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). Theodore Kisiel also offers a good 
account of what is involvcd here in his The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Titne, (Berkeley. Calif.: 
Unk-ersity of California Prcss. 1993). 
65 This i's a point argued by Sheehan. Cf. op. cit., n 43 at p. 9. 
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ferentiating of die Sache is inscribed. In short, die Sache is taken up as the matter of 
thinking and thereby as the matterfor thinking. Thus, Heidegger's way of thinking is not, 
as it is sometimes taken to be: monolithic. On the contrary, the various paths he traveled 
in turning out of metaphysics were always for him, and still are for us, open to 
deconstructive redraftings pursuing the matter in different contexts. 
Now, to the extent that for Heidegger thinking at the end of philosophy comes 
increasingly into question as it articulates-via the necessity of an immanent criticism 
ever more profoundly its initiative to have been a repetition of a determination to question 
(that is to say, finds in questioning that it is given to question), then to that extent, the 
matter of Heidegger's thinking is a clifference-difference itself-that brings 
questioning back to itself even as it carries it beyond itself as the philosophic opening of 
thought. To enter into the openness of questioning, as an articulation of such difference, 
is for Heidegger the "task of thinking" in the age of technology. Indeed, this peculiarity 
has been perceptible from the first line of "The Question Concerning Technology" 
Heidegger begins not by highlighting technology its how, its about or wherefore, but by 
reflecting on his own project of questioning on or after technology. This for Heidegger is 
because "Questioning builds a way of thinking"" and what is to be built by way of this 
thinking is an appropriate response to the matter than captures it and carries it beyond 
itself. Heidegger's project of "questioning concerning technology" thereby seeks to 
4, prepare a free relationship" to technology where the freedom of this relationship is 
determined in terms of a thinking response to technology thought in its essence. 
Mode of disclosure: the non-technical essence of technology 
Heidegger's quest for essence appears to be truly philosophical. In "The Question 
Concerning Technology" Heidegger accepts remaining Platonic in appearance but such an 
appearance is just that since he makes it quite clear that the thinking of -essence" (11 esen) 
66 QCT, p. 4. 
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in the phrase "the essence of technology" is not at all to be understood in the 
metaphysical sense of essentia, namely, substantive being or whatness. Nor is essence in 
this phrase that which remains distant from phenomena. The word Wesen, rather, is to be 
understood verbally as that which accords with die Sache of Heidegger's thinking as I 
have presented it above, that is, as a conflictual differing in the sense of setting apart and 
opening up. In this connection technology is above all a highly controversial and 
provocative matter. Indeed, we are told "it is technology itself that makes the demand on 
, 67 LIS to think in another way what is usually understood by "essence" . 
What demand does technology make upon thought? As is well known, Heidegger 
invokes the ancient Greek understanding of techne as pertaining to poiesis. As poetic, 
techne involves the movens of a phenomenon, its "cause, " not to be sure in the sense of a 
mechanical antecedent that would generate a certain effect, but rather in that sense of 
indebtedness Heidegger attributes to the Greek word translated by "cause": aitia. The 
word, he asserts, designates a relationship of "being-due-to" (Verschuldestem). This in 
turn involves not merely a privative or negative relation: to be "due to" is to appear, to be 
"brought into play (ins Sped kommen) thanks to" something. Through this movement of 
being "due, " something is "brought forth" (hervorgebracht), that is, brought from a kind 
of concealment out into the open. It is this process of bringing-out or bringing forth that 
Heidegger associates with the Greek word, poiesis, usually translated as "making" or 
11 producing" 
Understood in this way techne is a "bri ngi ng- forth" that lets something come forward 
in its presencing (Anwesen). That is to say, techne comes to pass as a dif-ferentiating that 
starts something on a way from concealment out into its arrival in the open (aus der 
Vei-boi-genheit in die Unvei-borgenheit). Recalling the likewise co-ordinate and broad 
senses of techne and episteme as original names for a knowing that "prov, des an openling 
up, " Heideoger states that "Techne is a mode of alctheuein. It reveals whatever does not 
67 Ibid., p. 30. 
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bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before US.,, 
68 Thus, "[t]echnology is- a mode of 
revealing. Technology comes to presence [West] in the realm where revealing and 
,, 69 unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens. 
In opening onto the essence of technology as a mode of revealing Heidegger valorizes 
neither machines nor technical procedures, neither does he devalorize them-, rather, what 
is identified as "the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology" is put in 
question and rendered, in principle, untenable. Questioning the traditional adjectival force 
of essence as whatness, reveals the instrumental and anthropological to be manifestly 
related terms. According to the former, technology merely embodies neutral "means" 
used for "ends" projected by human beings. In line with this, the latter states that 
technology is nothing but "the doing of human beings" who invent, put to use, and 
control instruments and machines for human goals. For Heidegger, then, the instrumental 
definition is anthropological and vice versa-, it defines both technology and, as homo 
faber, the human being. Now, insofar as it fixes on something pertinent about how 
technology is commonly understood, Heidegger acknowledges that this definition "is in 
obvious conformity with what we are envisioning when we talk about technology". 
Indeed, it is "so uncannily correct it even holds for modern technology, of which, in other 
respects, we maintain with some justification that it is, in contrast to the older handwork 
technology, something completely different and therefore new. ""' That said, to follow this 
path and consider technology exclusively in its obviousness is to conform to technology 
in its most assured and "outward" aspect: it confirms metaphysics in its actuality as that 
which fixes its gaze only on beings in their representability. Such a relation to technology 
I'ails "to hear the claim of [die Sache] which speaks in the essence of technology" In a 
word, it denies that there is anything controversial, provocative, and thereby questionable, 
about technology. Consequently, Heidegger will famously assert that "the essence of 
68 Ibid., p. 13. 69 
Ibid. 
70 1b5. 
71 
11)., p. 34. 
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technology is not anything human. The essence of technology is above all not anything 
technological. The essence of technology lies in what from the beginning and before all 
else gives food for thought. "" 
For Heidegger, it is because "technology is nothing of the order of a machine" that 
we remain barred from experiencing the provocation of our contemporary situation, 
remain barred, that is, "so long as we merely conceive and push forward the 
technological, put up with it, or evade 
it. -73 Indeed, we are excluded from anything like a 
question concerning technology, that is, from an opening to what precisely happens or is 
disclosed there, exactly when we conceive technology as the technological. In other 
words, because for Heidegger the essence of technology is not technical, the dynamic and 
open relationship of thinking to technology is not equivalent to the technical facility or 
experience with technology so often evoked by commentators arguing against or on 
behalf of Heidegger's text. Eschewing the calculative and representationalist thought that 
are the trademarks of this experience, Heidegger points up the need to avoid the staking 
out and reckoning of his formal indications into fixed positions and demarcations along 
any given set of lines. For Heidegger, questioning is not so much about outcomes but 
only starting points that are to be critically repeated and followed up in independent 
thought toward a renewed discourse about the matter itself. Consequently, the ergon at 
work in Heidegger's questioning, is not to be understood in terms of the different results, 
the logoi, which it initially seems to entail. Nor following this is Heidegger's questioning 
to be reduced to a writing and talking "about" technology, an approach that would 
enunciate theses, offer simple inspections, or tell stories about it. To question: neither an 
attitude nor a rhetorical formula, but this remarkable "preparatory exercise" which will be 
maintained at all costs by Heidegger, separate from all the "operations and programs" 
cherished by those not accidentally given over to the demands and dictates of 
72 Martin Heidcogcr, What i's Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Grey, (New York: Harper & Row. 1968), ZI- 
ý-22, hereafter cited as WCT 
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contemporary scholarship. Any opinions either for or against technology as this presents 
itself in Heidegger's text is a convicted relationship to technology that condemns C', 
Heidegger's question to nothing more than a common, mundane, academic experience of 
Being, that is, to calculative statements about beings. 
If in the midst of Heidegger's many extraordinary claims, we are advised therefore to 
"pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics". " 
This remark suggests that we do not begin to read Heidegger-enter into the matter of 
thinking-until the surface intelligibility of the language is shaken and we follow not the 
content, a series of propositions, (or even a series of what may seem to be poetic 
figures). " Such a reading fragments Heidegger's work into a set of texts with which we 
can become ever more familiar in their particularity. Rather, in an effort to draw us 
beyond the conceptual and figurative levels of thinking we are advised to pay heed to the 
very tnovement of thought as this is enacted from out of the openness of the question, an 
openness which articulates the immanent transformation of the Sache as a tracing of dif- 
ference. Following this, if within the actuality of modern technology questioning has 
become nothing other than the organizing of opinions-scholarly or otherwise-and the 
dissemination of what is "commonplace, " we need to pose Heidegger's question once 
again, to repeat it. We do not do this by questioning technology but byfollowing the trace 
(Spur) of questioning as this builds a way of thinking into the essence of technology as a 
revealing of dif-ference. 
Having said this, I have now reached the end of the first section of this chapter. By 
\vay of an examination a number of appropriations of Heidegger's text we have seen what 
the question is not and have opened onto what the question is. As I move to the second 
section of this chapter my task is this: In order to fully understand the originality of 
Heidegger's wsponse to modem technology I must confirm and deepen what was said C- 
74 
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above with respect to the dynamic aspect of Heidegger's thinking. That is, I must follow 
Heidegger's questioning. In order to follow this questioning, I must traverse the openness 
of the essence of technology as a revealing of dif-ference insofar as this designates die 
Sache des Denkens, the matter for thinking. This entails I get on the track of what 
happens in the text on technology and become open for that which essentially comes to 
pass in the Ge-stell as the achievement of metaphysics. In this connection, I will trace the 
relation that Heidegger forges between the questioning into Ge-stell and the turn of 
thinking to Ereignis with the aim of showing why the completion of metaphysical 
thinking in technology can, indeed must, at the same time open onto a thinking of dif- 
ference as such. 
Part 11. Technology as the Opening of Dif-ference 
As was mentioned above, in "The Question Concerning Technology" Heidegger states it 
is modern technology itself that demands us to think essence in another way than in terms 
of the traditional thought of essentia as substantive being or whatness: "It is, " he writes, 
"precisely [technology] and it alone that is the disturbing thing, that moves us to ask the 
question concerning technology per se. "" As we have seen, in responding to this demand, 
and by way of the resources of Pre-Socratic thought, Heidegger maintains that "[w]hat is 
decisive in techne does not lie at all in making and manipulating nor in the using of 
nicans, but rather in revealing ... It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne 
is 
a bringing-forth. "" Nothing is said yet about the essence of modem technology 
understood as Ge-stell. It too is a mode of revealing but one which articulates an 
unprecedented transformation of the Greek understanding of techne as a poietic bringing- 
t orth. Heidegger's questioning opens on to what he names a "challenging-forth" or rý, 
"challenging-revcaling". This challenging is said to be a -destining- or -sending" 
ý" QCT.. p. 13 
77 Ibid., p. 13. 
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(Geschick) which provokes man and starts him "upon the way of that revealing through 
which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing-reserve (Bestand)"' 
In this case, Ge-stell constitutes the reciprocal provocation of nature and humanity I 
through ordering, manipulation and calculation. So defined the essence of technology is 
the "supreme danger". The danger that Heidegger speaks of is not singular but a 
multifarious danger-that reducing the real to a standing reserve "threatens man with the 
possibility that it could be denied him to enter into a more original revealing... "" If 
modern technology nevertheless remains a danger, it constitutes what is most properly to 
be thought. It corresponds to the matter of Heidegger's thinking, which when formulated 
as the matter of thinking, translates die Sache as what is provocative or controversial, as a 
difference, setting-apart or opening that captures thought and carries it beyond itself. 
Viewed from this angle, Ge-stell emerges more clearly for what it is: not simply a 
determinate historical order of production and existence, but rather the "first oppressing 
flash of Ereignis". "' 
Now, in order to fully appreciate what is said here we must follow an important 
transformation of Heidegger's thinking which articulates a radicalization and translation 
between certain texts written in the 1930s and 1940s (mostly notably those lectures 
devoted to Nietzsche and to "The Age of the World Picture") and the decisive essays of 
the 1950's onwards (mainly "The Question Concerning Technology, " "The Turning" and 
those texts published as Identio, and Difference). In the differential economy of 
Heidegger's thought the former set of texts open onto the emergence of technology via 
the deconstruction of the history of nihilism as found in Nietzsche and by way of essential 
reflection oil modern science while the latter alone provide the decisive context in which 
Heidegger raises the question of the essence of technology as precisely that provocative 
niatter which is revealing of difference. It is important to recall the movement of thought 
78 Ibid., p. 24. 
79 Ibid., 1). 28. 
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in these earlier texts since, as I said at the beginning of this chapter, a dominant 
interpretation has arisen which says that Heidegger's meditation on essence of modern 
technology is primarily a discourse on the metaphysics of representation, a discourse 
which takes the so-called "subject-object" scheme as decisive and which emphasizes a 
static conception of Being and thereby of thinking. This interpretation does not go far 
enough. It reduces Heidegger's various thoughtpaths to a restricted economy that amounts 
to a letting fail his surpassing of metaphysics. The failure to give full development to this 
aspect of Heidegger's thought is a limitation of his text that blocks the turn of 
Heidegger's thought, its immanent transformation, and so accomplishes and upholds the 
technological appropriation of Heidegger's text which is manifest in the way it becomes 
present today. Although this restricted economy is indeed contained in the former set of 
texts mentioned above it is superseded in certain important respects by the question of the 
essence of technology thought in terms of the Ge-stell. To say straightaway what I shall 
discuss below, the most important aspect of the transformation of Heidegger's thinking 
lies in this: under the unfolding of technology as Ge-stell the "modern" apprehension of 
the world as "view, " as "object for a subject, " is itself dissimulated in the process of 
taking all that is as "on reserve" for infinite manipulation. In this case, as Heidegger says 
"[w1hatever stands by in the sense of standing reserve no longer stands over against us as 
object. "" This shift articulates the whole drama of the Heideggerian text since it is in this 
i-novernent of thought from the restricted economics of representationalism to the 
objectless field of a generalized machinism that Heidegger's attempt to elaborate a 
nonmetaphysical thought of Being as difference is played out. In this case, the bifocal 
functioning of Heidegger's thinking-in one focus recapitulating the articulations of the 
metaphysical field in its entirety, and in the other focus anticipating those of a 
contemporary potential-originates frorn the double functioning of technology, according 
to way Hei(lc,,,,, cr thinks the relation between Ge-stell and Ereignis as the opening of 
81 Ibid., 1). 17. Nly emphasis. 
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thought to the self dif-ferentiating event of Being. More deeply, to think the essence of 
technology as something non-technical signifies seeing in Ge-stell a cipher of Ereignis. 
Here, the single philosophic importance of Heidegger's question concerning technology 
can be seen to lie in the way in which it effectively articulates the relations between 
technology and philosophical thought, between philosophical thought and 
representationalism, between representationalism and the contemporary technicization of 
the world, and between contemporary technology and the non-philosophy of the event 
and difference. 
Science and representation 
Let me turn then to the those early texts in which the emergence of technology comes 
to the fore from out of the question of nihilism and of modern science. I shall begin with 
Heidegger's text on Nietzsche. As is well known, those lectures devoted to Nietzsche 
concern themselves with demonstrating that and how Nietzsche's self proclaimed 
overcoming of nihilism-his "revaluation of all values"-rernains entrapped within 
metaphysics occupying the "penultimate stage" in the unfolding of the technological 
determination of Being. In this regard, Heidegger makes Nietzsche's basic words-Will 
to Power, eternal recurrence of the same, nihilism, revaluation, "justice, " and overman- 
Ilis own whilst making Nietzsche the spokesman for technology. As Rainer Schijrmann 
has remarked, "[Heidegger's texts] speak formalýy about Nietzsche, but materiallY about 
technology; they describe technology as the closing field in the history of presence, as 
"the release of Being into machination, " but they do so with the help of the vocabulary 
taken from Nietzsche. 1182 The Will to Power denominates "the fundamental character of 
entities, " "the reality of the real, " in short, "the Being of that which is. "" These equations 
speak primarily of the technological epoch. They signify that it is the will which sets up 
82 Rainer Schiji-mann, Heidegger On Being andActing: From Principles to Anarch. v, trans. ChristIne-Marle 
Gros, (BloomingtonIndiana Univcrsity Press, 1990), p. 1K. 
93 Martin Heidc,, vcr, "The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead" in QCT pp. 53-112. 
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subjectivity as the unassailable metaphysical principle. Those equations signify moreover 
that the technological subject wills something. It wills power, a possibility which requires 
a self-positing which anticipates its own overcoming. Power is power only if it pursues 
more power, only if it posits the conditions of its own preservation as conditions of its 
enhancement, and vice versa. "Power enhancement is, then, in itself at the same time also 
the preservation of power. " In this conneczion, to understand the Heideggei-ian concept of 
Will to Power is to speak not only of the technological triumph of "subjectness" 
(Subjektitat) but also of reification, the triumph of representing and objectification. 
Indeed, the essence of subjectivism is objectivism insofar as for the subject everything 
turns into an object. As a metaphysical event, the emergence of "subjectness" is not a 
consequence of the supposed "priority of the ego" as an epistemological given. Instead 
the latter, and with it the "subject-object relation, " has its condition in the will to make 
certain, to secure to respond to the claim of power. With this "what is" is secured in the 
"assault" of technology: 
Everywhere the Being of what is lies in setting-itself-before-Itself and thus in setting- 
itself-up. Man, within the subjectness belonging to whatever is, rises up into the 
subjectivity of his essence. Man enters into insurrection. The world changes into 
object-The earth can now show itself only as the object of an assault that, in human 
W111111"', establishes itself as unconditional objectification. Nature appears 1ý 
cverywhere ... as the object of technology. 
84 
Tcchnology as it appears here in Heidegger's text is not thought as the consequence, but 
as the condition, for the way in which beings are given in their Being as "either the object 
ofthe sub lect or the subject of the subject. "" 
Ibid., p. 100 
Ibid. 
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This movement of thought is also traced in Heidegger's 1938 essay "The Age of the 
World Picture. " Here the task for thinking is to question into the "metaphysical ground" 
of our age by way of a reflection on one of its most essential phenomena: modem science. 
Now, though technology is mentioned as an "essential phenomenon" of the modern age, 
the relationship between science and technology is not investigated here, nor are the 
results of the metaphysical inquiry into science applicable, without further ado, to the 
question of technology. The Stellen and Vor-stellen at issue in this essay are still thought 
on the basis of "subjectness, " a term which is in certain essential respects superceded by 
the meditation on das Ge-stell. That said, the thinking at work in the essay does open onto 
technology in its meditation on representation as the condition for the transformation of 
science into research via the projection of object-spheres, the demand for exactness and 
the challenge of ongoing activity. 
What distinguishes modern science is that "the essence of what we today call science 
is research. , 86 In this connection, Heidegger argues that the essence of science as research 
consists in "the fact that knowing establishes itself as a procedure within some realm of 
what is, in nature or in history. , 87 The fundamental event in research is the opening up 
and defirnitation of an object-sphere by means of projection. For example, "the 
corporeality of bodies, the vegetable character of plants, the animality of animals, the 
humanness of man , 88 are projections that determine the objects studied in physics, 
botany, zoology and anthropology respectively. 
To be specific about the case at hand, in modern physics a ground plan of nature is 
projected; nature is "the self-contained system of motion of units of mass related 
spaciotemporality". 89 Such a projection determines in advance the way in which 
knowledoc relates to objects. In this connection, Heidegger's insight is to point out the Cý 
relation between two senses in which science is mathematical. In a broad sense science is 
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projective; more narrowly science relies upon mathematics. In this case, science does not 
project because it measures; rather, it measures because it projects and thereby represents 
nature in advance as quantifiable. Beings as quantifiable objects must conform to the 
requirements of the modern researching mind which in turn has to adapt itself to its own 
results a possibility which circumscribes its methodology as "ongoing activity" [Beitrieb]. 
Accordingly, human being continually places itself in the scientific, experimental picture 
in precedence over whatever is. Such "setting before" is an objectification in 
representation that secures for the researcher a certainty with respect to the object so 
represented. Representation is complicit in science as research, for the representation of 
nature as a calculable coherence of forces determines the rigor of science as exactitude. 
The representation of the objects of science determines the object-domain of each 
specialized science and the certainty with which those objects are known. Heidegger 
argues that science becomes science "when and only when truth has been transformed 
into the certainty of representation". 90 For Heidegger, it is this scientific representation of 
beings that is the key to the essence of the modern world as picture where "world" refers 
to beings as a whole in relation to their ground, and "picture" means, not a copy or 
imitation, but the way in which the world is set before us as something familiar and ready 
to be acted on: 
Hence world picture, understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world, but 
the world conceived and grasped as a picture. What is, in its entirety, is now taken in 
such a way that it first is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, who represents 
and sets forth. Wherever we have the world picture, an essential decision takes place 
regarding what is, in its entirety. The Being of whatever is. is sought and found in the 
representedness of the latter. 9' 
W Ibid., p. 127. 
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Representing beings as picture means relating them back to human beings, presenti . 11g, 
setting them up, and systematically bringing them to stand in precisely this way. 
However, as Will McNeill points out in his analysis of Heidegger's text, it is not simply 
the human being that is decisive here, at least not if by human being we mean an entity or 
individual subject. Rather, it is this particular form of relationalitY that becomes the 
definitive or, in Heidegger's words, "normative" realm that provides the measure for the 
modern understanding of the Being of beings. The modern human being does not 
understand him- or herself as an already existing "I" or ego, but as an already existing 
field for every possible making present of beings. It is this total identification of ourselves 
with the measure of Being itself, this relationality of making things present, of setting 
things up before us as objects that constitutes, as we have already seen with respect to 
Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche, the essence of the modern human being as 
4'subject" or "subjectity". " 
Beyond representation: das Ge-stell and the transitivity of Being 
The above brief sketch has done no more than mark motifs" that Heidegger's 
questioning into modern technology in the sense of Ge-stell will transform in a significant 
way. Let rne then return to this thought. Ge-stell attempts to state in one word the 
principle and destined unity of modernity. That is not so easy. I have already cited 
Heidegger's advice that we should not get "caught up in isolated sentences and topics". 11 
Such advice is especially pertinent when considering the matter of thinking that is das 
Ge-stell. In using this word to say and think the peculiarity of the modern world 
Heidegger risks arresting the self dif-ferentiating dynamic of die Sache into which his 
question concerning modern technology is built. In this connection, we would do well to 
Q2 See William McNeill, The Glance of the E' ve: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theorý-, (Albany: 
Stme University of New York Press. 1999), p. 171. 
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heed the words of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe who writes, "we must not be too quick to 
translate the word Ge-stell. We know, moreover, that it is nearly untranslatable. But e%-en 
if we could find an approximate equivalent for it-even if we could succeed, as has been 
the case for quite some time, in convincingly "glossing" the word, we would still not have 
gained very much. It is not a question of knowing here what Ge-stell "means. " Or, at 
least, this is wholly secondary. The real question is one of knowing how the word Ge-stell 
works, how it functions-what use it serves. "" 
How, then, does Ge-stell function? What happens with Ge-stell? In the first place, 
this: since Ge-stell is above all the name for the essence of technology, which is to say a 
provoking or "challenging-revealing" it marks the inconstant, mobile and transitory Being 
of entities as they enter into the "standing-reserve". To think into technology as such, it is 
necessary to work on the construction of its "fluctuating" (schwebend) edifice; Ge-stell 
indicates a world determined solely by surface fluctuations. This understanding, however, 
flies in the face of what Lacoue-Labarthe tells us takes place. Noting that the analysis of 
the constellation or chain of terms that can be derived from Ge-stell-in current German 
the term carries the meaning of frame, a scaffold, a structure, but Heidegger treats it as a 
composite of Ge and stell where the prefix Ge signifies "that which gathers" and the root 
Stellen (which is consonant with Ve-stellung) diverges simultaneously toward Be-stellen 
(to set in order, to command), Her-stellen (to produce, to reproduce, to make) and Vor- 
stellung (to represent)-has been gone over so much that it is perhaps unnecessary to 
rehearse it any further, Lacoue-Labarthe then goes on to state, 
[I]t will undoubtedly suffice to retain from [this chain of ten-ns] (but everything is in this 
statement) that the essence of technology entails. by way of Be-stellen, a sense of Being 
as stance, stature, station-as, in "Greek, " stasis or stele-which is and which has 
Awavs been, in the West, the sense of Being itself. "Being" (as it happens this word has 
94 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typograph 
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been written ester) means to stand. Installation, in technology, is therefore both 
provocation and stele. And it is this double sense, at least, that one must understand Ge- 
stell (literally the shelf, the pedastal) if, besides the Ge- of "gathering- and "collection, " L- 
besides even the relation that Ge-stell entertains with the principle of reason ... this word 
is supposed to "account for" provocation [challenging] insofar as it "sets upon [stellt] 
man to order [bestellen] the real as standing reserve [Bestand]. " But it goes without 
saying that this double sense is double only inasmuch as we try to make audible in 
provocation [challenging] a defon-ned echo of the Greek production, of poiesis. What 
predominates and what joins poiesis (or even techne) and technology-in a common, 
though unequally, unthought of aletheia-is precisely the static deten-nination of Being. 
Ge-stell is primarily and fundamentally the stele. " 
Now, I have quoted at some length here since Lacoue-Labarthe's interpretation of Ge- 
viell in terms of static determination of Being is precisely what Heidegger's thinking 
works to surpass. As I noted earlier, this understanding does in fact function in the most 
commonplace account of Heidegger's thinking on technology and consequently, in this 
aspect as least, Lacoue-Labarthe's otherwise impressive reading risks a reduction that 
places him in the realm of such an account. " 
In speaking of Ge-stell Heidegger "dare[s] to use this word in a sense that has been 
thoroughly unfamiliar till now. "" According to its common sense and usage the word 
Ge-stell means some kind of apparatus, e. g., a bookrack. Ge-stell is also the name for a 
45 Ibid., p. 68. 
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skeleton. And the employment of the word Ge-stell that is now required seems -equallý, 
errie" since Heidegger's use of Ge-stell places considerable emphasis not just on Being as 
that which is brought to stand, which is set in place or installed as it were (although it 
obviously does this), but also attempts to articulate a tension between noun and verb that 
resounds in the German and that points to a strange, indeed uncanny, mixture of stasis 
and movement. This tension resounds in the word Enframing" proposed by William 
Lovitt and others to render Ge-stell, as it does in Samuel Weber's preference for "goings- 
on". 99 1 would like to mobilize another possibility, however, one that brings into play the 
German Enteignis and which has the virtue of articulating the dynamic that Heidegger's 
thinking undergoes in the movement whereby Ge-stell opens onto Ereignis. I would like 
to use the word Ex-appropriation. If I prefer this word to those others, it is because it 
articulates not so much the setting up and representing character of modern technology as 
it points into the specificity of challenging-revealing as that which opens up the thinking 
of die Sache precisely in the manner I have continuously indicated, that is, as dif-ference, 
opening, etc. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the clarification of this 
matter. 
As is apparent, Ge-stell retains a serniological link with the thinking of subjectness in 
which "what is" is experienced as an object of representation. It therefore retains a link 
with scientific thought. However, in the Ge-stell considerably more is at stake than what 
is said to be the case in those essays discussed above since, as Heidegger explicitly states, 
what is revealed within modern technology is no longer uniquely articulated within the 
horizon of representation and so is foreign to the schemes of the "rational animal". " The 
" The English translation "Enfrarning" for Ge-Stell is intended to suggest, throught the use of the prefix L- 
en-, " something ol'the activc meaning that Heidegger gives to the word; Cf. QCT p. 19-20 and note. 
(, X) See Samuel Weber, "Upsetting the Set Up: Remarks on Heidegger's Questing After Technics" in Modern 
Longuage Notes, vol: 104,1989. pp. 977-9 1. 
I ... ) AIVP docs in Lict mark the shift away from representation when Heidegger proposes that "everywhere 
and in the most varied forms and dl,,,, -ILIISeS the gigantic 
is making its appearance. " As the optimization of 
calculation, the gigantic implicates a "peculiar quality" wherein the modern world "projccts itself into a 
space wlthdraNNn from representation and so lends to the incalculable the determinateness peculiar to it, as 
wc1l as a historical uniqueness. " See pp. 135-136- 
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technical world described as Ge-stell is indeed the world of self-assured planned 
production, served by knowledge as representation and it is undeniable that command is 
privileged here, but to find in the tracing of Ge-stell only a generalization about the 
category of representation would mean to limit oneself to the technicality of technology. 
We go beyond this if we grasp in its depth what is alluded to by the provocation of Ge- 
stell, namely, the transitivity of Being. In this case, if the institutionalization of the 
subject/object relation, i. e., the matrix of scientific-representationalist thinking, is a result 
of the challenging of modern technology, then that very same challenging undermines the 
objectivity upon which that matrix depends since what is foremost in the modern 
44sending" is the exigency that requires all beings, including humans, to enter into this 
general framework of command-resource-production-consumption. Science becomes 
almost entirely subservient to the essence of technology, to the technological 
configuration of revealing. Both the represented character of Being and the representing 
l'unction of the self-certain subject are now seen to be taken up, transformed, and finally 
dispossessed by the unlocking and exposing of beings as "stock" or "standing reserve" 
This term, Heidegger notes, does not merely refer to supply or the available since "[t]he 
[Ge-stell] concerns us everywhere, immediately. [The Ge-stell], if we may still speak in 
this manner, is more real than all of atomic energy and the whole world of machinery, 
more real than the driving power of organization, communications, and automation. ""' 
Ge-stell "assurnes the rank of an exclusive rubric" and "designates nothing less than the 
way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing. 
Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as 
object ...... 
2 In this connection, Heidegger's thought traverses the way the modem 
apprehension of the world as "view, " as "object for a subject, " is itself supplanted by an 
interlinked series of operations that manipulate "what is" in terms of an ongoing ordering 
that sccures itself'within an immense network that relies on storage: 
101 ID., p. 35. 
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The revealing that rules throughout modem technology has the character of setting upon. 
in the sense of challenging-forth. That challenging happens in that the energy concealed 
in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, 
what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever 
anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, and switching about are ways of revealing. But 
the revealing never simply comes to an end. Neither does it run off into the 
indetenninate The revealing reveals its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through 
regulating their course. This regulating [Steuerung] itself is, for its part, everywhere 
secured. Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics of the 
challenging revealing. 
103 
This network is a system of the self-regulative circulation and exchange of what is as 
revealed; its concrete form, as Heidegger insists, is cybernetics. The science of self- 
regulation, cybernetics, derives from the Greek Kubernetes, which means pilot or 
governor. The field of cybernetics involves the establishment and investigation of 
regulatory processes in mechanical, electronic, and biological systems. Insofar as it is 
based on the instrumentalization of informative messages and on the strictly operational 
character of every process, cybernetics constructs closed systems through which 
information acts on information to form feed-back loops that generate increasing 
complexity. The goal towards which cybernetics advances is the organization of the fields 
of objectivity so as to be able to dispense with every ontological relation, every reference 
to a grounding. Tcchnology has an essential need of cybernetics so that it can completely 
detach the "reservoir" from any relation to ground, or to the fundamental. 
Let me reiterate what is said here in Heidegger's vocabulary. Understood in terms of 
the Ge-stell the chain of cognates built around Stelle, "place, " emphasizes the centrality 
of a conception of placing: setting things in place, holding them in place, ordering thern 
103 Ibid., p. 16. 
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into place, securing their place within a system of placement where everything is posited 
and has its place (thus technological thinking remains thoroughly representational). But 
this placing, positing, and delimiting of everything within the system entails precisely a 
displacement from the immediate field of what is brought to stand. Here we can 
understand Heidegger's assertion that the "end" of metaphysics is not to be understood in 
a negative sense as mere cessation, as lack of continuation; rather, in being gathered into 
its "uttermost possibilities" metaphysics is unleashed in its unconditionality. The 
inconstancy that the "release of Being into machination" entails is what marks it as 
different from mere objectivity. Within the technological system both natural and human 
"resources" are integrated into a network or relay which intimates the mutual gathering 
and dispersal of subject and object in a relation of reciprocal provocation whereby they 
challenge, determine, and secure each other in such a fashion that the network itself 
reserves priority over both subject and object, which are "sucked up" into a "reservoir" of 
differing and deferred availability. Defined by its availability for consumption, the entity 
as standing reserve, strictly speaking, has no Being or essence in the traditional sense of 
these terms; it lacks the signature of an identity and the identity of a signature. Lacking 
tile presence of an object or subject it functions in being simultaneously used up and 
reserved for use. What was still essential to that calculative-representationalist thinking 
concerned with objects, viz., the establishing of "Identity conditions, " the pursuit of the 
essential constitution and limits of the object qua object, gives way to an erasure of 
11 proper" differences, an obliteration of contours such that, via a project of a generalized 
machinism, beings are nothing other than "variables" and are treated as processing 
niaterials and as decomposable projections from which "effects" can be extracted through 
appropriate treatment. The transformation of the "object" to "energy" in contemporary 
physics, a transformation which guides Heidegger's own reflections, is but the most 
obvious manifestation of this system. Here, a new basic attitude is assumed the key word 
tI or which is IIIJ, 01-Illatl . on, whereby Heidegger remarks somewhat cynically that we have 
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to hear the word in its American-English accent. This information, as for example the 
bio-chernical data encoded in DNA which can be mobilized to facilitate the 
transformation of living beings into organisms and then into production sites and 
-molecular machines" can, as Samuel Usseling remarks, "be understood neither as 
subject nor consciousness nor as object nor matter. It is neither the same, as was the 
Platonic eidos nor the Aristotelian morphe norforma. All of our philosophical categories 
are drained of all ontological content. It is a monstrous uncanny possibility, a "most 
extreme" possibility that all our philosophical concepts have become mere ciphers, 
monadic carriers of information, units of cybernetic science. This possibility belongs to 
the essence of the end of philosophy. "" 
Now, having emphasized that Heidegger's questioning into modern technology is to 
think it in its essence as that which comes to pass as a "revealing" that "extends into a 
space withdrawn from representation" and thereby into a space that opens up a possibility 
beyond the terrain of traditional thought, this is equally to point out that, as if in spite of 
itself, the advent of calculation effaces or overwhelms all its limits and gives way, 
precisely, to the incalculable, to what is beyond measure. In this regard technology is "in 
a lofty sense ambiguous. " Such ambiguity "points to the mystery of all revealing". "" It 
expresscs technology precisely as a provocation which calls for thinking: "Because we no 
longer encounter what is called [the Ge-stell] within the purview of representation which 
lets us think of beings as presence-the [Ge-stell] no longer concerns us as something 
that is present-therefore [the Ge-stell] seems at first strange. It remains strange above all 
because it is not an ultimate, but rather first gives us That which prevails throughout the 
constellation of Being and man. ""' In this connection, if on the one hand, and in response 
to the demand that technology itself (as challenging-revealing) issues to thinking, 
Heidegger identifies modern technology as equal to the Ex-appropriatIon of beings as 
104 Cf. op. cit., n2 at p. 194. 
105 QCT.. p. 33. 106 
ID., p. 35-36. 
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well as the condition of the crisis and dissolution of traditional thought, on the other hand 
this same technology is thereby that place or site (Ort) around which a potential turn in 
the historical constellation of Being is announced such that technology articulates a 
transition or passage into the unthought essence of metaphysics. In short, modem 
technology is the evocation of that dif-ferential openness which traverses metaphysics in 
its very possibility and which, at the completion of metaphysics, is manifest as the 
opening of a possible thinking entry into that radically singular event which is called in 
the strict sense of the term Ereignis. In Identity and Difference where perhaps the most 
concise statement regarding this matter is given, Heidegger says everything that is 
decisive regarding this point: 
The belonging together of man and Being in the manner of mutual challenge drives 
home to us with startling force that and how man is delivered over to the ownership of 
Being and Being is appropriate to the essence of man. Within [die Ge-stell] there 
prevails a strange ownership and a strange appropriation. We must experience simply 
this owning in which man and Being are delivered over to each other, that is, we must 
enter into what we call [Ereignis] ... What we experience in [die Ge-stell] as the 
constellation of Being and man through the modern world of technology is a prelude to 
what is called [Ereignis]. This event, however, does not necessarily persist in its prelude. 
For in the [Ei-eignls] the possibility arises that it may overcome the dominance of [die 
Ge-stell] to turn it into a more original appropriating. 'O' 
Usually translated as event of appropriation and, more recently as enowning, Ereignis is, 
as Schurmann remarks, "the most tenuous issue for philosophy ever and therefore a 
tenuous thought, only to be hinted at. " 108 It is the incidence whereby Being relates to man 
by way of -appropriation, " cigen meanin "proper". As Heidegger thinks it, with the 9 t7 
0- Ibid., p. 36-37. 
108 Cf. op. cit., n 82 at p. 219. 
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eventuation of Ereignis man is appropriated (vereignet) to Being, while Being is 
consigned (zugeeignet) to man. The reciprocal provocation in which man and Being are 
related in the challenging-revealing of the technological world is the event of the 
reciprocal trans-propriation of man and Being. To think man and Being in the manner of 
appropriation, and no longer in terms of subject and object, is thereby to discover both as 
transitive-the "is" here speaks transitively, in transition whereby Being becomes 
present in the manner of Ubercommnis, the overwhelming coming-over or transition to 
beings-and this discovery happens in the Ge-stell and nowhere else. 
Technology as the site of the event: das Ge-stell and Ereignis 
Despite its perpetual concern with Being and beings, metaphysics has persistently 
forgotten the event in which one constantly goes over to the other in a movement that is 
not regulated by a telos that would act as a arche in the sense of onto-theo-logical 
constitution. If we ask what Being is, we see that Being is what beings are, it is the Being 
of beings, while beings in their turn are to be defined only as the beings of Being, those 
beings that have Being insofar as they are. What is clear in this transit, is "that when we 
deal with the Being of beings and with the beings of Being, we deal in each case with a 
difference [Unter-Shied]. Thus we think of Being rigorously only when we think of it in 
its dif-ference with beings, and of beings in their dif-ference with Being. The dif-ference 
thus cornes specifically into view. "' 09 In this connection, if, as Heidegger says, the history 
of metaphysics is the history of the oblivion of Being as dif-ference, thus of Being as 
Ereignis, it appears to be so onlY when looked at from the dis-location in which Ge-stell 
locates us*, there is no thought of dif-ference as such without that revealing which 
completes and finally determines the history of metaphysics in its "uttermost possibility" 
Consequently, the as yet unthought nexus between Ge-stell and Ereignis underlies the 
connection between difference as a distinction between Being and beings Lind dif-ference 
109 ID., p. 62. 
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as precisely that dif-ferentiation which is the essential origin of this distinction. If this is 
so then modern technology proves to be the decisive condition which, from the 
beginning, provokes Heidegger into raising the traditional question of Being to the status 
of die Sache des Denkens. That is, Heidegger's thinking, its immanent transformation, 
originates from within technology which (transformation) is the onset of the thinking of 
Being as difference. Indeed, as Gianni Vattimo has pointed out, Heidegger is able to 
perform a repetition of the metaphysical thinking of Being only because and to the extent 
that Being occurs in the manner of Ex-appropriation, that is, in the manner of Ge-stell. 
Nor, as Vattimo further remarks, could we, with Heidegger, take up the matter for 
thinking if we were not interpolated by Ge-stell. 110 
Turning, motion, change, trans-formation, differentiation: these characterize the 
matter of thinking that is technology. To be more precise, if we are to understand why 
modern technology is indeed the decisive condition that opens up die Sache of 
Heidegger's thought, we need to bear in mind this mobile and transitive character of 
Being as affirmed in (the opening of) Ereignis, and we need to refer it (without reducing 
it) to the challenging-revealing that is th2 essence of modern technology. Here we can 
again turn to Vattimo for guidance. As I have noted, the most commonly stressed account 
of Heidegger's questioning into modern technology, an account routinely regarded as 
neinitive and sometimes as demonic, is the governance of representing, objectifying and 
potentially total organization. However, to grasp in its depth what is alluded to in 
Heidegger's thinking of Ge-stell is to trace the event-ual nature of Being, its being given 
tinder marks that are different every time. As a revealing which opens out beyond the 
frame of representation Ge-stell is subordinate to an urging as incessant change and dis- 
location, as suggested by Heidegger's use of the various compounds of stellen and his 11 
choice of the other term Herausfordern, challenging. The call of technique in Ge-stell 
111eans that "[o]ur whole human existence everywhere sees itself challenged-now 
110 Gianni Vattirno, TheAdventure of Dýfference: Philosoph), after A'ictzsche and Heidegger, trLins. Cyprian 
Blarnires and Thomas Harrison, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 170. 
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playfully and now urgently, now breathlessly and now ponderously-to devote itself to 
the planning and calculating of everything", persisting with this planning "past all 
bounds. " As Vattimo remarks, we could call this the "shaking" in which beings find 
themselves caught in the Ge-stell and it is this shaking that makes Ge-stell the "liminal 
appearance" of Ereignis. 111 That this transitivity is predominant in the liminological field 
of technology is confirmed by other elements, especially the way in which a whole group 
of terms is employed in those texts that make up Identity and Difference, in particular the 
whole discourse on Schwingen or oscillation: "The Ereignis is that realm, vibrating 
within itself, through which man and Being reach each other in their nature, achieve their 
nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them. "' 12 
Furthermore, ideas like that of the Sprung (leap) and the Schritt zuruck (step back) are 
linked to this mobility in IdentitY and Difference; these are features of that thinking- 
questioning which responds to the demand of technology itself in its essence and thus 
enters into Ereignis as a sphere of oscillation that intimates a post-metaphysical economy. 
At bottom this transitivity or oscillation is not to be wholly identified with the 
ongoing manipulating, trans-forming, and switching about that violently dis-locates 
beings and man as materials caught in the processes of technology and production. 
Although it is decisively linked to this world as one of its possibilities, the Ge-stell is the 
undertow of all surface fluctuations such that oscillation is "something all-pervading 
which pervades Beings destiny from its beginning to its completion. " 113 Oscillation, 
fluctuation, and the shaking of the challenging revealing of Ge-stell means that beings 
come to be or occur and that their occurring is their giveness from out of and across a 
process of expropriation-appropriation (hence Ex-appropriation). In this connection, to 
respond to the provocation of technology and thereby accede to metaphysics in its 
completion will mean to turn to (lie Sache as a "sphere of oscillation". It is to attend 
III Ibid., p. 173. 
112 Ibid., p. 37. 
113 Ibid., p. 67. 
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above all to the constellation of an ever shifting event-like network of relations that 
scatters the general, disregards the particular, and fragments any thought-content other 
than this or that revealing singularized by its distinct absencing. Such plurification is 
impossible to transcend and is thinkable only as the dif-ferential movement of opening. 
For Heidegger, to trace this opening as opening is the "task of thinking" at the end of 
philosophy and marks its future possibility. 
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2 
Transition: Re-routing Heidegger 
Introduction 
One of the central assertions of the last chapter was that any appropriation of 
Heidegger's work that becomes overly fascinated with what it says, that is, with its 
ý4 contents" and "themes"-an approach which is irreducibly bound up with all the sites of 
institutionalization and of techno-media(tiz)ation, that determine the way in which this 
work becomes present for us today-must quickly be perceived to be inadequate since 
what such an approach underestimates or obscures is the performative difficulty that one 
must engage if one is to follow Heidegger's response to modern technology (as the 
opening of difference). In this connection, I emphasized the path way-character of 
Heidegger's thought in its capture by the self-dif-ferentiating and indeterminate matter 
(Sache) that allows itself to be reiterated and reinscribed in different and clashing ways. 
As I said, this movement radically resituates not only how we are to comprehend 
Heidegger but also how we are to evaluate the various "correspondences" of his thought 
as a whole in its various philosophical moments. Or, to cite van Buren again, "[t]here 
never was a single Heidegger, mens auctoris, topic, Heidegger's philosophy, since these 
are pluralized and differentiated into Heidegger's, topoi, and thoughtpaths. " 
Passing as we now are from Heidegger's "thinking" to Derrida's "text" such plurality 
and differentiation, along with the interpretative problems it gives rise to, is only 
intensified. Indeed, I agree with Marc Fromment-Meurice who remarks that "if there is 
indeed sorne sense in speaking of passing "from" Heidegger "to" Derrida, it is more 
difficult to assert if this passage would constitute a progression, and in what sense or 
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direction. "' 14 In a way, the Heidegger that I have presented anticipates Derrida's since it 
points to the necessary dissemination of Heidegger's thought, to its "tracing" or 
"inscription". However, Derrida subjects Heidegger's already differentiated text to a 
program that complicates matters considerably. Functioning according to an injunction to 
choose among several possibilities of an inheritance, Derrida's writings re-InscrIbe 
I leidegger's various thoughtpaths producing a text that radically puts into question and 
displaces the chronology and thetic ideology underwriting traditional intellectual history. 
Here the law that is tradition-the assumption of philosophy's internal homogeneity, and 
of its history, as a continuum and record for the development of its idea, of its tensions 
and contradictions-is not enough to explain everything, and especially cannot bring back 
the passage to the comforting scheme of filiation and genealogy. 1 15 
Writing with Heidegger against Heidegger 
How does it stand, then, between Derrida and Heidegger? As is well known, the 
peculiarity of this relation is evident in the way in which Derrida strategically inscribes 
his own text at the margin of Heidegger's thought via a double or cl6tural gesture which 
articulates the paradox that Derrida. writes with Heidegger against Heidegger. Such a 
move radically puts into question and displaces the chronology and thetic ideology 
underwriting traditional intellectual history by articulating a complex interplay of 
proximities and distances. Indeed, as Arklady Plotnitsky has remarked, between Derrida's 
114 Marc Frorrinicrit-Mcurice, That is to Saw Heidegger's Poetics, trans. Jan Plug, (Stanford University 
Press, 1998), p. 204. 
11.5 Even though it is rarely remarked upon this chapter revolves around the question of inheritance, the idea 
A' what comes, is transmitted or destined and which is not reducible to receiving. In Spectres of Marx 
Derrida speaks of an injunction to choose on those who inherit. He writes: "An inheritance is never gathered 
toklethcr, it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if there is one, can consist only in the injunction to 
reaIrtrin by choosing. "One must" means one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort out several different 
possibles that inhabit the same injunction. And inhabit it in a contradictory fashiori around a secret. If the 
readabilitv of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal, if it did not call for and at the same time 
def'), interpretation, wc would never have anything to inherit frorn it. We would be affected by it as by a 
cause-natural or genetic ... 
The injunction itself (it always says "choose and decide from among what you 
inherit") can only be one b\, dividing itself, tearing itself apart, differing/deferring itself, by speaking at the 
same time several tirnes-and in several voices. " See Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, 
trans. Pe-gy Kamuf, (London: Rout I edge, 1994) p. 16, hereafter cited as SM. Z1_ 
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text and the text of Heidegger, there is, together with a radical displacement, a much 
closer, even infinitesimal proximity. 116 On the one hand, the challenge which Derrida 
issues to Heidegger is, or intends to be, utterly devastating. Although involved in the 
same philosophical enterprise of questioning Western metaphysics, Derrida not only puts 
into question the very terms of Heidegger's conception of metaphysics as revolving 
around the repetition of the inaugural question of Being, but he also opens up an entirely 
different level of debate and practice of philosophizing in the process. Heidegger 
challenges metaphysics about its failure to question into and thereby think the Being of 
beings, for forgetting the ontological difference, for remaining riveted to beings, for not 
asking after the "meaning ... .. truth, " or "history" of Being, and, most decisively, for not 
questioning into the essence of technology as the necessary prelude to the thinking of the 
event of appropriation (Ereignis). But Being, ontological difference, meaning, truth, 
essence, man, and appropriation, along with the concomitant privileging of questioning, 
authenticity, nearness, unity, owness, property, origin, and primordality which so 
punctuates Heidegger's text are, for Derrida, so many indices that despite its radicality, 
and perhaps precisely because of its radicality, Heidegger's thinking remains in nostalgic 
complicity with the metaphysical system whose "end" he had proclaimed. Even granting 
the many complex and multiple readings of Heidegger's text that he has produced over 
the years, readings that necessarily are in a state of strategic incompletion or suspension, 
Derrida's work points back to, builds upon, and translates a major reservation that can be 
sirnply put: having delimited the value of the present as the fundamental but nonetheless 
withought presupposition of metaphysics Heidegger's project appears to be content with a 
re-evaluation or re-valorization of presence, with re-thinking it rather than radically 
displacing it, a move which only reinstates and affirms metaphysics in its instance of the 
logos and truth. 1 17 In Derrida's words, "the Heideggerian problematic Is the most 
"' Cf. ol). (, It.. n7 at p. 46. 117 Although in its widest scopc Derrida's deconstruction of "the metaphysics of presence" Is by noý\ ýkcll 
known it is nonctlicless useful to to be prccise about definitions. As Leonard Laýý lor points out in his recent 
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"profound" and "powerful" defense of what I attempt to put into question under the rubric 
of the thought of presence". 118 Recognizing that for Heidegger, BeIng is not some 
ultimate signified but is "rooted in a system of languages and a historically determined 
-significance ...... 
19 Derrida argues that Heidegger's thinking of (the presence of ) Being as 
the difference (between Being and beings and as Unter-Schieaý is itself a metaphysical 
determination because, in Heidegger's own account, such a system effaces difference. 120 
"In order to exceed metaphysics it is necessary that a trace be inscribed within the text of 
metaphysics, a trace that continues to signal not in the direction of another presence, or 
another form of presence, but in the direction of an entirely other text". 121 Derrida's point 
is that if difference cannot be named or thought-Being is nothing but the difference 
between Being and beings-then what has been forgotten in the history of metaphysics 
and the determination of Being as presence and of presence as present is not difference, 
which is always determined by the metaphysical order, but the trace of difference, which 
"is neither perceptible nor imperceptible. " It is neither an essence nor something 
phenomenonolizable. It is nothing present nor absent but produces its own erasure. "If 
one recalls that difference (is) itself other than absence and presence, (is) (itself) trace, it 
is indeed the trace of the trace that has disappeared in the forgetting of the difference 
book on Derrida and Husserl, presence, for Derrida, consists in (a) the distance of what is over and against 
(object and forni, what is iterable), what we could call "objective presence, " (b) the proximity of the self to 
i(self in its acts (subject and intuition or content), what we could call "subjective presence, " and then (c) the 
unification of' these two species of presence, that is, presence and self-presence, in the present (in the "form 
of the living present, " which Derrida will explain mediates through the voice). "The metaphysics of 
presciicc" then, for Derrida, consists in the valorization of presence (as defined in this way which can 
account for both ancient and modem philosophy), that is, it consists in the validation of presence as a 
foundation. As Lawler correctly remarks it is important to point out that Derrida never contests the founding 
validity of presence; there can be no foundation without presence. Yet, for Derrida, there is a non 
foundation, or, what we could call, following what Dcrrida says in "Violence and Metaphysics, " the "non- 
Greek" non-foundation. The metaphysics of presence, however, has decided that the meaning of Being is 
presence either as sub_icct or object or as their unity. See Leonard Lawler, Derrida and Husserl: The Basic 
Probleni of Phenonienology, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 2. 
118 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: The Univcrsity of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 55ý 
hereafter cited as P. 
I it) OG., p. 23. 
120 See especially Heldcoocr's "The Anaxiniander Fragment" in Ear1v Greek Thinking: The Dawn of C11t, C-1 Western Philosol)h 
* 
v, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, (San Francisco. Calif.: Harper & 
Row, 1984), pp. 13-59. 
121 Jacques Derrida, "Ousia and Graninie: Note on a Note frorn Being and Tinie" in Margins oJ'Ph11oso1)h. y, 
trans. Alan Bass. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1982), pp. 29-67. p. 65- Z, 
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between Being and beings"' 22. The ontico-ontological difference is not originary but is 
derivative of the trace of diff9rance. The notions of trace and diffýrance belong to a 
complex of differentiation, differing, deferring, and so on, that compromise all essences 
and idealities. Derrida exposes an aporia in Heidegger's claim that the ontological 
difference is not thinkable as such. The claim that the difference cannot appear is 
contradicted by Heidegger's naming the "ontico-ontological difference. " This difference 
must be derivative of something "older" and more "originary, " something that erases 
itself in the metaphysical text-the trace. Following the trace of this trace Derrida's 
radicalization of Heidegger's insights leads to the demonstration that the "source" of all 
Being beyond the horizon of Being is a generalized, or rather, general, text or writing, 
whose essential nontruth and nonpresence is the fundamentally undecidable condition of 
possibility and impossibility of presence and thereby of the meaning, essence, and truth as 
thought by Heidegger at the "end" of metaphysics. The "source" of Being and beingness 
is, for Derrida, the system or chain beyond Being of the various undecidables- 
dýffi-', rance, trace, iteration, inscription, gramme, grapheme, etc. -that will sufficiently re- 
mark Heidegger's Seinsfrage in a way that will take it into account, will re-count it and 
will integrate into an economy of which it would be an "intrametaphysical effect". With 
the introduction of the general text Derrida elaborates a discourse that, although it repeats 
the question of Being it reinscribes it and thus remains altogether extraneous to this still 
philosophical question. 
On the other hand, although Derrida has never stopped insisting upon the distance "in 
i-clation to the Heideggerian problematics" that he has marked in all the essays he has 
published, a distance that is marked both in content and form, so that in reading only one 
of these texts we can see that "it does not look like a text with "Heideggerian 
t iliation, "' 123 readers of both Heidegger and Derrida will not be able to avoid recognizing 
the striking structural similarities between writing and Being, between text and Being, 
122 Ibid., p. 65-66. 123 P p. 7 1. 
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and between the differential dynamics that articulate their respective conceptions of 
difference. Indeed, as the above suggests, and as Rodolphe Gasch6 remarks, "Derrida has 
made it clear that the word "text" can be substituted for the word "Being". "Text" is a 
translation (without translation) of "Being"' 24 Through this translation the legitimacy or 
even necessity of Heidegger's "uncircurriventable meditation" is not denied nor is the 
passage through the question of Being dismissed. On the contrary, Derrida has claimed it 
to be indispensable to place oneself within the opening of Heidegger's questions and that 
"from the moment one is having it out with [s'explique avec] Heidegger in a critical or 
deconstructive fashion, must one not continue to recognize a certain necessity of his 
thinking, its character, which is inaugural in so many respects, and especially what 
remains to come for us in its deciphering. "' 25 By intervening in the opening of 
Heidegger's text and remarking its idiom Derrida maintains the momentum of 
Ileidegger's delimitation of metaphysics producing a supplement that beckons towards 
something new, something other. In this sense, I agree with Gasch6 when he discusses an 
argument of John Caputo, according to whom Derrida produces "an altered reading of 
Heidegger which shows that the dissemination and delimitation of the thinking of Being 
has already taken place in Heidegger's text. " As Gasche says, Caputo does not mean to 
say that Derrida has reinterpreted Heidegger's text in a more fundamental manner, 
showing that there was always more to him than previously believed, or that Derrida has 
developed his own thought by couching it in Heidegger's language. Rather, what he 
sLio(yests is that in drawing on Heideggerian resources to delimit the question of Being, 1ý ý 
Heidegger and Derrida as specific philosophical voices, figures, or authorities, dissolve 
and can be no longer held apart. ' 26 In this connection, Derrida's deconstructive 
124 Rodolphe Gasch6, '*Joining the Text" in Of Minimal Things: Studies on the Notion of Relation, 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 221-241. p. 241. 
125 Jacques Derrida, "Heideg-er: The Philosopher's Hell" trans, Peggy Kamufin Points ... 
Inten, ievvs 1974- 
ý Z-1 1994., trans. P. Karnuf ct al. ed. Elizabeth Weber, (Stanford, Callf.: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 
181-190. P. 18-1. 
126 Rodolphe GascW, Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida. (Cambridge, Mass.: Havard University 
Press. 1994), p. 71). 
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reinscription of Heidegger's text treats it in such a way as to release its critical energies. 
Acknowledging its fecundity and recognizing that Heidegger's thinking remains multiple, 
enigmatic, provocative, and "still to come, " Derrida's "exhorbitant" method, as he 
himself requires of method, performs an operation that produces a writerly graft (as we 
shall see, actually a machinic parasite) which attaches itself to the Heideggerian path and 
not simply to one of its scholastic effects. Releasing it from itself and from its reduction 
to a self-evident commonplace, Derrida writes in continuation and extension of 
Heidegger's work translating and reworking the critique of presence as it makes its way 
even into Heidegger himself, thereby keeping his thought-paths and way-traces 
unterwegs, en route, differentiated, on the way beyond the metaphysical presuppositions 
and desire for presence even as that requires a double signing, countersignature or 
contract without exchange that makes of Heidegger's text a singularity and which gives it 
its noncalculable future. 
127 
The "switch point" 
If in reinscribing Heidegger's (already differentiated) thought it is obvious that the 
Derridean text aggressively eludes the kind of theoretical referentiality to precursors 
typical of many other philosophical critiques, and if Heidegger and Derrida. as specific 
philosophical voices can no longer be held apart, how, then, is one to speak, or rather 
write, of the relationship between Heidegger and Derrida, a relationship that absorbs 
sevei-al of Derrida's "own" books and many articles and, in a certain sense, all of his 
work" The problems posed would be unsurmountable even if one could speak of their 
relationship as established or establishable, rather than as mobile, and at points, 
Undecidable, which is in fact the case and which makes one think of this passage or 
127 .. There is as it were a dual of singularities, a dual of writing and reading, in the course of which a 
counters w nature comes both to confirm, repeat and respect the signature of the other, of the "original" 1- 4-- \\-ork, and to Icad it o elsewhere, so running the risk of betraving it, having to betray it in a certain way so 
as to respect it. through the invention of another signature *ust as singular. - See "This Strange Institution i- 
Called Literature: An Interview with Jacques Derrida" in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, (London: 
Routledge, 1992), pp. 33-75. p. 69. 
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relationship as what Derrida in his 1980 text The Post Card ten-ns "correspondence" or 
"the postal system"-an immense and interminable network or open matrix of 
telecommunications comprised of transmissions, relays, delays, dispatches, deferrals, 
exchanges, and translations that bring the Derridean text into conjunction with 
Heidegger's thinking of Being even as "by means of a switching point" this thinking is 
subjected to various re-inscriptions that re-route it and send it elsewhere. 
Apropros The Post Card one could hardly find a more suitable description for what is 
involved here since using the post allows one to make points amidst the impossibility of 
making points, maintaining a fixed thesis, basis of comparison, or, more generally, 
proceeding along the lines of positional (oppositional and juxtapositional) logic. The 
"logic" of the postal would displace the logic of the position without substituting itself for 
this logic, and above all without being opposed to it; rather, it opens another relation, a 
relation without relation, or without a basis of comparison. To say it again, the thetic 
(from the Greek for "to place, " which is ponerelpositum in Latin), representing a pose or 
a position, is a function of the postal that the Derridean text deconstructs. The thesis thus 
suspended, one has a glimpse of what concerns all posts and correspondences, and, in the 
particular case that concerns us here, the relationship between Heidegger and Derrida 
where this turns on the question of technology. Indeed, what for a moment will be called 
the postal "analogy" is in fact apposite with regard to what is at issue in this study since 
part of Derrida's interest in talking at length about the postal network is that through it the 
at once "infinitesimal and decisive diffýrance" between his "own" text and Heidegger's is 
(i-e)inarked and in such a way that it becomes apparent that this difference involves and 
revolves around the question of techne and technology. 
The problernatic nature of Derrida's Post Card, like that of any text, exists in 
conjunction with other texts, which may also be described as post cards. "A post card, " 
Derrida explains, "is never but a piece of a letter, a letter that puts itself, at the moment of 
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pick up, into pieces. " 128 The letter that deconstructs itself is part of the postal systems 
technology. So if we are to pick up on what is involved in the diffýrance just mentioned, 
it is fitting we do so through its pieces. In this regard, in this chapter I shall assemble 
several fragments from The Post Card and related texts which will allow me to broach 
the non-positional, that is, a-thetic, structure of the Heidegger-Derrida relation with a 
view to marking the connection or site of passage at which it converges toward its most 
simple, most economical, and most formalizable statement concerning what is at stake 
here. As we shall see, in these texts Derrida lets the postcard, the post, and the card 
become the (no longer metaphorical) organizing figures for a discussion and 
deconstruction of the tele-techno-media apparatus of inscription and transmission not 
only as these bear upon the assumptions at work in any delivery system, but also as they 
affect the Heideggerian text in one of its central and most decisive aspects-his thinking 
of the destiny or sending of Being and its technological end. 
Proceeding from the postes 
Without further ado let me turn then to the The Post Card. As is well known, in this text 
or, to be more specific, in "Envois" which is the first of four parts that comprise the text 
issued under this title in its English translation, the deconstruction of the ontological and 
logocentric systern of metaphysics along with the concomitant turn towards the general 
textual economics of "writing", diffirance, the trace, iteration, etc., elaborated by Derrida 
in the now "classic" texts of the period 1967-72 is re-invented and carried over into a 
performance-that is, the writing and sending of letters-wherein the closure of the 
problem or question of destination is marked. Opening the text Derrida suggests we 
might want to read this text as "the preface to a book I have not yet written". 129 ., Envois- 
is, then, an advance on a book that has not yet arrived, which is to-come (advient). Its 
domains of address include that of the constitution and structure of the sender/receiver, 
12s PC.. P. 67. 
121) Ibid., p. 3. 
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emitter/transmitter/ receptor system, and thus of the dispatch or send-off and the message 
(in all its forms and in all of its substances-linguistic or not, serniotic or not), 
distribution, transmission and delivery in all its forms, the operations of technology in Z-- ý 
general and the relaying of communications in particular. As Derrida's tells us "It would 
have treated that which proceeds from the postes, postes of every genre... [referring] to a 
history and a technology of the courrier, to some general theory of the envoi and of 
everything which by means of some telecommunication allegedly destines itself. " 130 
According to Derrida's conceit, "Envois" consists of the "remains of a recently 
destroyed correspondence" which elaborates a whole series of paradoxes that both 
construct and deconstruct the postal as a concept. Neither the sender nor the addressee 
remain singular identities. In the case of the sender there are frequent allusions to this 
effect, to the possibility for instance that the letters are addressed by their author to him- 
or herself as addressee. Assuming that there is a separate addressee, a more obvious 
structural paradox occurs. The letters, written on the back of postcards, articulate the 
event of the separation of the correspondents from each other and written against the 
event of their coming together, for such an event would negate the functioning of the 
letter. Yet they act as a set of promises, entreaties and arrangements concerning the 
togetherness that they also ward off. These mechanisms are extremely complex and I 
cannot in the space of this chapter explore them in the detail they demand. That said, the 
purpose of my raising them is to underscore what has already been said with regard to the 
di mice between Heidegger and Den-ida. As I now want to show, this diffirance ffj 
concerns Derrida's own reception of Heidegger's texts. The "correspondence" between 
Heidegger and Derrida becomes problematic as both the question of a scripts sending and 
its placement and/or misplacement becomes an issue. 
As Derrida's text demonstrates, the placing of posts, the possible and necessary 
marking of points in a system of relay or transmission, is the condition of the possibility 
130 Ibid. 
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of the postal, of any system of addressing or sending. At the same time. however, since 
the post marks a halt that is also a destination, it succumbs to the structural necessity of 
non-arrival or "adesti nation, " that is, to misroutings, tonal shifts, elliptical retreats of 
meaning, cancellation, abrasion and so on. Hence sender and addressee are but the effects 
of such erratic turnings and routings, effects of the inclinations or directions established 
through the process of a messages transmission. Said otherwise, there are no pre-existing -- I 
phenomenologically intact subjects located at either end of the postal network, no solitary 
agents that approach and use the post as a reliable means for establishing a communion of 
minds. And even if such mental units existed, they could not communicate themselves or 
a piece of their mind to a predestined addressee, not only because such a predestination 
from same to same effectively contradicts the transcendence of difference that the postal- 
communicative act is said to accomplish, but also, and more fundamentally, because the 
very act of writing, signing, communicating a message can take place only under the 
necessary condition of going astray. As soon as the arrival or thereness of the letter is 
asserted there is the undecidability, differing or deferring of diffýrance- 
Derrida's text was galvanised by a chance encounter with a post card on sale at the 
Bodleian Library. This card reproduces a thirteenth century engraving from a fortune 
telling book by Matthew Paris in which, much to Derrida's delight, Plato stands behind a 
seated Socrates (apparently) dictating what he shall write. Such an "old cartoon of 
deconstruction" as one commentator puts it 131 vividly illustrates Derrida's notion that 
knowledge constantly creates its own presumed origins. The importance of this scene is 
that it de-monstrates with one stroke, as it were, the truth of tradition: "everything in our 
bildopedic culture, in our politics of the encyclopaedic, in our telecommunications of all 
oenres, in our telematicornetaphysical archives, in our library ... everything is constructed C, 
on the protocolary charter of an axiom, that could be demonstrated, displayed on a large 
Mile, a post card of course, since it is so simple, elementary, a brief, fearful 
III Richard Dienst, "Sending Postcards in TV Land" in Deconstruction and the VlsualArts, ed. Peter 
Brunette and David Wills, (Carnbridge University Press, 1994). pp. 296- 307. p. 301. 
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stereotyping. iq 132 The axiom is, of course, that Socrates comes before Plato, that the order 
between them is the irreversible sequence of heritage. Derrida's card however, its image 
like the idea it marks, challenges this axiom, and along with it the usual concepts of 
transmission-concepts that are an aspect of the post card itself quite apart from its 
image. For any post card is part of a apparatus or technics for carrying and dell ing ver 
meaning. We take for granted this institution taking "what everybody believes they 
understand under this heading" simply as a service, a technology extending in its history 
from the ancient runners of Greek or Oriental antiquity to the state monopolies using 
aeroplanes, the telex, the telegram, e-mail, the different kinds of mailmen and delivery 
etc 
As Derrida asserts, the entire history of the postal techne rivets "destination" to 
identity such that identity in all its aspects functions as a "postal principle". On this view 
the very post and the postal are emblematic of the very idea of "logocentrism" (a 
synonym for the "postal era") and of the metaphysics of presence. Indeed, at one point all 
of culture is cast by Derrida as an immense number of postal transmissions each stamped 
by authorization and tradition, each cultural artefact/card taking a "position" by imposing 
itself', even superimposing itself, on the others. ' 33 By subscribing to the notion of 
destination, subsuming that of the message with the guarantee of presence illustrated by 
the card or letter, one simply perpetuates the postal principle as what Derrida refers to as 
"the great cpoch (who's technology is marked by paper, pen, the envelope, the individual 
Subject, addressee etc. ) and which stretches from Socrates... to Heidegger. " 134 But what, 
we might ask, takes place or happens to this great epoch of the post in the shift beyond it, 
to which a radical change in communications technology makes a decisive contribution 
(such as for example the shift from the book to the internet)? Derrida's reinscription of 
Heidegger's text attaches specifically to this question. Z71ý1 
13, 
'PC., P. 20. 
1.1.1 Ibid., p. 100- 10 1. 134 
Ibid., p. 19 1. 
86 
Deconstructing the Geschick of Being 
Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger is both theoretically set out in his 1980 paper 
"Envoi, " which has been translated into English as "Sendings: On Representation, " 135 and 
performatively practised in the "Envois" to The Post Card. At the time of writing-the 
letter which concerns us here is dated 6 September 1977-what is being simultaneously 
articulated and subverted is Heidegger's "Being-historical" claims regarding the 
unfolding of metaphysics, its technological completion, along with the thinking of the 
withdrawal or "epochality" of Being. In order to see the significance of Derrida's move 
let me briefly sketch what is involved as this is played out in Heidegger's text. 
According to Heidegger, throughout the course of our Western thinking Being has 
been granted in different ways, the different modes in which Being has been granted 
reflect themselves in the changes which have taken place in the various metaphysical 
concepts of Being. The unfolding of the fullness which shows itself in these changes 
manifests at first sight as a history of Being. This is not what we ordinarily think of as 
history, though it may look like it. Heidegger writes: "Being does not have a history the 
way in which a city or a people have their history. What is history-like in the history of 
Being is obviously determined by the way in which Being takes place and by this 
alone ... What is historical in the history of Being is determined by what is sent forth in 
destining, not by an indeterminately thought up occurrence. , 136 Always attentive to the 
clYmology of words, Heidegger understands history (Geschichte) and destiny (Geschick) 
in tile verbal sense of sending (schicken). Being for Heidegger is not outside time and 
history determining what it means to be for beings and humans, but Being is the 
dispensing or sending of history itself. Understood in this way, one may say that Being 
ývhich is granted is that which is sent, and which (as sent), remains in each one of its 
1.15 Jacques Derrida, "Sendings: On Representation, " trans. Mary A. Caws, In Social Researcll 49, no. 2 
(1982), pp. 294-320, hereafter cited as SOR. 
Martin Heidegocr, On Time and Being, trans. ; oan Starnbau h, (NcNN York: Harper & Rm%, 1972), pp. zlzl 9 hereafter cited as OTB. 
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modifications which we find in history. The history of Being is therefore more properly 
thought as the sending of Being. As sent, Being offers itself to us in the presencing of 
beings, but it does not, over and above this presencing, show itself as separate from 
beings. Being in its disclosure of beings withdraws or holds itself back. Heidegger writes, 
"the history of Being is the Geschick of Being that offers itself to us in the withdrawal of 
its essence. " 1 37 How can we understand this withdrawing or holding back of Being 
ýIiowing itself in the presencing or dispensing of beings? Heidegger attempts to connect 
the withdrawal of Being in its presencing of beings and the history of Being, for it is 
precisely the withholding that allows for the sending of beings and the sending of history. 
This notion of simultaneous sending and holding back, allows Heidegger to articulate 
sending around the various "epochs" of Being. Heidegger writes: 
To hold back is, in Greek, epoche. Hence we speak of the epochs of the destiny of Being. 
Epoch does not mean here a span of time in occurrence, but rather the fundamental 
characteristic of sending, the actual holding-back of itself in favour of the discernibility 
of the gift, that is, of Being with regard to the grounding of beings. 138 
Thus, for Heidegger, each historical epoch, in which beings come to presence differently 
according to the sending of Being, has the dispensation of beings because of the 
withholding of Being. 
Having offered this all too brief sketch of Heidegger's thinking let me now turn back 
to Derrida. His intervention into Heidegger's text opens up two linked questions that 
intend to display a certain "foreclosure" of thinking at work in Heidegger's thinking of 
epocality. To be(yin with there is the question that leads through the epochal schema itself 
and the way it preserves traces of what Derrida calls, a little provocatively, the narrative 
I Ity Martin Heidc,,,,, ci-, The Pfinciple of Reason, trans. Re., -, Iilald 
Lillý, (B loonli ngton: Indiana UniNcrsi zlý I I: - 
I t7 
Press. 1991). p. 61. 1.19 0 TB,. P. 9. 
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order. In relation to this, there is the question of the way epochality displays what can be 
called Heidegger's "protectionist" gesture, which Derrida takes to be a rigorous desire to 
avoid contamination. I shall come to the latter question below. At this point I want to take 
up the former. 
By edging into the Heideggerian sense of the terms Geschichte-Geschick-Schicken 
(history, destiny, sending) Derrida pushes us into another reading of Heidegger by 
suggesting that Heidegger's thinking, along with his parcelling out of Being into various 
epochs presupposes the being-together or grouped indivisibility of an original envoi of 
Being, an assemblage which, although it does not have the unity of a totality or system 
and is not teleologically ordered, preserves traces of such a scheme insofar as it is still 
part of the same delivery system and thus can be deciphered and spoken of (For Derrida 
Heidegger's is an apocalyptic utterance spoken with "eschatological eloquence"). 139 
Whence, for Derrida, Heidegger's history of Being belongs to the problematic of 
destination in general and therefore within the framework of the postal system. As 
Derrida sees it "To coordinate the different epochs, halts, determinations, in a word the 
1.1t) INerything turns here on what DeFrida calls "the unity of a destination, or rather of a 'destinality' of 
Being, " in which an escatological unity is at work, one that is not only apocalyptic in tone but that is to be 
distinguished from teleology. As John Caputo has made clear in a close study of what is involved here, for 
Hcidegger an original sending of Being is driven into the extremities of oblivion through a series of epochal 
configurations which, by a logic of repetiton, occasion a new dispatch, a new beginning that would come 
again at the cnd. Eschato-logy means that the beginning overtakes the end, that everything withheld and 
hidden in the interval between the beginning (arche) and the end (eschaton) is gathered together and pushes 
the end beyond itself, outdistances and outstrips it (iiberholt) and precipitates the transition to a new 
beginning. This gathering-together (logos, legein) of the whole history of Being in the end- whereby the 
eschaton repeats the arche- is the eschatology of Being. Understood in this way eschato-logy is 
essentially different from teleo-logy. Tele-logy is a rule governed process in which there is a linear 
development from the beginning to the end, a progressive dynamic in which the accumulated potencies of 
the Western tradition reach their l'ulfillment and put an end to the beginning. In eschatology by contrast the 
heoinning ovcrtakes the end and puts an end to the end; in teleology, the end fulfills the beginning and puts 
an end to the beginning. The very circularity of eschatology which is the code of repetition explains 
Heide-, er's claini that das Gestell and Ere ign is-d anger and saving--converge. Such circularity is 
cssentially hernicneutical, it demands the ability to read traces retrace the withheld and long forgotten 
(C f. 1), p. 24-25), to understand how the first beginning communicates what is coming and hence to Cý 
read the "First flash of Ereignis" in the dangerous unfolding of technology as the transition to a neýý 
beginning. Heideggarian thinking knows how to dccipher; it knows the danger is the saving spelt 
back-ýý, ards. For Derrida such "eschato logical eloquence" does not make thinking any less metaphysical, on 
the contrary it betrays an apocalyptism--talk about the end of this and the end of that-that follows the 
lotl c of the postal principle. See Chapter 6 of John D. Caputo's Radical Hernieneutics: Repetition, 
Deconstruction and the Hernieneutic Project, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 153-186. 
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entire history of Being with a destination of Being is perhaps the most outlandish postal 
lure. " 140 
What is problematic for Derrida is the Ge- of Geschick and its gathering value, by 
which in destination Being destines itself were the unified subject of destination. 
Derrida's move here is a repetition of what he has repeatedly marked since his earliest 
encounter with Heidegger and attaches to the question of the latter's complicIty with the 
metaphysics of presence. More specifically, it attaches to what Derrida considers to be the 
"subtle, hidden, stubborn privilege" in Heidegger's thought of the values of gathering 
(Versammlung), nearness, togetherness, properness (propriety, propriate, appropriation, 
the entire family of Eigenlichkeit, Eigen, Ereignis) where these work against the threat of 
dispersion. What is at issue here about Heidegger's fundamental commitment to presence 
is reiterated and brought out very well by Christopher Fynsk who writes, 
One has to work terribly hard in each case to bring out the dispersal, the dispersion, or 
the dissemination... [I]n each case my sense is that one has to work against enormous 
resistance; and, in that sense, I would be more inclined to stress the kind of structural 
tendency in Heidegger towards reconstruction of the same. It is still one thing, in itself, 
still a certain oneness, or a certain privileged unity, which is reaffin-ned from beginning 
to end. 
141 
140 PC_ p. 66. It should of course be noted that as is typical of his undecidable reinscription of Heidegger's 
text the "scilding of Being" is not entirely for Derrida a postal concept. In this regard, Derrida has written 
"Howevcr wc intcrpret them, and whatever credit we grant this thought or this discourse we should pause 
bet'Ore this marker: the "destinal" significations (sending or sendoff, dispensation, destiny of Bei 
ing, Schickting, Schicksal, Gabe, "es gibt Sein, " ctc. ) do not seem to belong to the within of onto-theological 
philosoplicines any longer, without bcing "metaphors" or empirical or derivcd concepts either. " For these 
rciiiarks and others \\ hich are pertinant to what is under discussion here see Jacques Derrida, "Sendoffs, " 
trans. Tom Pepper, in Yale French Studies: Reading the Archive: On Texts and litstitutions, 77 (1990), pp. 
7-43. 
41 Christopher F\nsk, cmract from Discussion on Heidegger and Derrida in Research in PhenomenologY, 
VO I-X VI 1,198 7, p. 114. 
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For Derrida, the value of gathering and the desire for the proper "occurs along the 
Heideggerian pathways by means of what we might call a magnetic attraction" such that 
the "continuous depth" at which it operates decides the general ofientation of Heidegger's 
thinking from beginning to end. In "The Ends of Man" where he gives what remains his I 
most explicit and detailed reading on this point, Derrida asserts that this privilege touches 
almost every aspect of Heidegger's text such that "the distinction between given periods 
of Heidegger's thought, between the texts before and after the so called Kehre, has less 
pertinence than ever. " 142 Heidegger's restoration of essence (Wesen) with respect to its 
metaphysical restriction is also the restoration of a dignity and a proximity-the co- 
responding dignity of Being and man, the proximity of Being and man: "Whence, in 
Heidegger's discourse, the dominance of an entire metaphorics of proximity, of simple 
and immediate presence, a metaphorics associating the proximity of Being [to man] with 
the values of neighbouring, shelter, house, service, guard, voice, and listening. " 143 
To bolster his reading that this tendency for proximity and "gathering" determines 
Heidegger's thinking of the epochality of Being, Derrida turns to "The Age of the World 
Picture" and to Heidegger's discussion of the vast difference between the original Greek 
reception of Being understood as translating Anwesenheit or presence, and the modem 
technological one in which representational i ty (Vorgestelltheit) comes to dominance as 
the fulfilment of metaphysics and as the oblivion of Being. For Derrida, these terms 
translate each other and dictate the law of Heidegger's thinking which "does no more than 
to redouble and recognise itself in the historical text it claims to decipher". Thus Derrida 
is led to write, 
In order for the epoch of representation to have its sense and its unity as an epoch, it 
must belonty to the grouping (rassemblement) of a more original (originaire) and more 
142 Jacques Dcrrida, "The Ends of Man" in Margins (? f Philosoph , v, 
trans. Alan Bass, (Chjcago: Unj%ersjty of 
Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 109-136. p. 124: hereafter cited as EM. 143 Ibid., p. 130. 
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powerful envol. And if there had not been the grouping of this envoi, the Geschick of 
Being, if this Geschick had not announced itself from the start as the Anwesenheit of 
Being, no interpretation of the epoch of representation would come to order it in the 
unity of a history of metaphysics ... It is 
in basing itself on this grouped indivisibility of 
the envoi that Heidegger's reading can single out (ditacher) epochs, including the most 
powerful, the longest and also the most dangerous of all, the epoch of representation in 
modern times. 
144 
Here is the most palpable articulation that for Derrida Heidegger's thinking remains held 
back within metaphysics. Taking his departure from the destiny and the destination of 
Being Derrida wonders whether a "postal" version of Heideggerian Geschick is one that 
is dependent on a particular historical location, on an epoche, a particular historical 
configuration and particular localisation, sufficiently determining an identity. What, 
Derrida asks, if this being-together is always already divided, discontinuous, unable to 
gather itself and unable to send to a particular destination, unable to secure the history of 
Being? By pointing to an idea of sending which did not as yet gather itself to itself and 
which would not be a pathway joining pre-existing point of origin and point of arrival but 
where the actual pathway would determine such points, Derrida opens up the idea of a 
network which avoids, as he puts it, "submerging all the differences, mutations, 
scýinsions, structures of postal regimes into one central post office. " 145 In doing so he 
transposes Heidegger's thinking of the destiny of Being, its withdrawal and appropriation 
(Ereignis), by inscribing it into a discourse that brings it into relation with the post 
understood in the usual or strict sense-"what everyone believes they understand under 
this heading--before submitting it to a more general economy. However, -NVould this 
satisfy Martin'? " Permit me to quote at length Derrida's ansýver: 
144 
SOR., p. 321-322. 145 
PC., p. 66. 
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Yes and No. No, because he doubtless would see in the postal determination a premature 
(? ) imposition of tekhne and therefore of metaphysics (he would accuse me, you can see 
it from here, of constructing a metaphysics of the posts or postality); and above all an 
imposition of the position precisely, of deten-nining the envoi of Being as position, 
posture, thesis or theme (Setzung, thesis, etc. ), a gesture that he alleges to situate, as well 
as technology, within the history of metaphysics and within which would be given to 
think a dissimulation and retreat [retrait] of Being in its envoi. This is where things are 
most difficult: because the very idea of the retreat (proper to destination), the idea of the 
halt, and the idea of the epoch in which Being holds itself back, suspends, withdraws, 
etc., all these ideas are immediately homogenous with postal discourse. To post is to 
send by "counting" with a halt, a delay, the place of the mailman, the possibility of going 
astray and of forgetting (not of repression which is a moment of keeping, but of 
forgetting). The epoche and the Ansichhalten which essentially scan or set the beat of the 
"destiny" of Being, or its "appropriation" (Ereignis), is the place of the postal, this is 
where it comes to be and that it takes place (I would say ereignet), that it gives place and 
also lets corne to be. This is serious because it upsets perhaps Heidegger's still 
"derivative" schema (perhaps), upsets by giving one to think that technology, the 
position, let us say even metaphysics do not overtake, do not come to determine and to 
dissimulate an "envoi" of Being (which would not yet be postal), but would belong to 
the "first" envot-which obviously is never "first" in any order whatsoever, for example 
in a logIcA or chronological order, nor even the order of logos (this is why one cannot 
replace, except for laughs, the formula "in the beginning was the logos- by "in the 
beginning was the post"). 146 
Now, I have quoted at length here because this extraordinary passage provides the nexus 
t oi- almost all that is of concern for us in this chapter. indeed, as Derrida tells us, "[t]his is 
146 
Ibid., p. 65. 
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very difficult but everything is played out here. " 147 Derrida's reading of Heidegger's text 
could not, it seems, be more decisive since it appears, all at once so to speak, to oversee 
the entire topology of what, on occasion, he refers to as Heidegger's "uncircumventable 
meditation, " taking into account both the epochal history of metaphysics in its 
technological outcome as well as the non metaphysical thought of Ereignis. What is 
central is the transposition of Heidegger's thinking into an economy that would be at once 
both more general and "originary" than the restricted ecomomics of Being, a by now 
familiar move which, crossing Heidegger's text at several decisive points, submits it to 
the deconstructive graphics of the general text. This means that, for Derrida, Ei-eignis 
occupies a place in Heidegger which is occupied in Derrida's own work by the quasi- 
transcendental chain of writing, diffýrance, trace, etc., which is the matrix within which 
all sendings, transfers, correspondences and communications take place. And the point is 
that this central processing unit has (always already) been decentered and transformed 
into a network or relay that can no longer secure the unity of the history of Being. To be 
more specific, Derrida submits Heidegger's thinking of the sending of Being to the 
thought of an "envoi in general. " As Derrida makes clear, this does not mean making of 
the post a "simple metaphor, " restrictive trope, or image of Being (thereby representing 
the sending of Being according to a thematic that would put it in its place so to speak). 
Rather, in marking his departure from Heidegger's text Derrida thinks on the basis of it, 
oil what it presupposes: "as the site of all transferences and all correspondences, " the post 
is "always already there, " it is "the "proper" possibility of every possible rhetoric. " 1-41S "By 
no longer treating the posts as a metaphor of the envoi of Being, one can account for what 
1.11 Ibid., p. 04. My emphasis. 
148 1. If I take my "departure" from the destination and the destiny or destining of Being (Das Schicken irn 
Geschick des Scins), no one can drearn of then forbidding me to speak of the "post, " except on the 
condition of making this word the element of an image, of a figure, of a tropc, a post card of Being in sonic 
Nvaý,. But to do it, I nican to ýiccuse me, to forbid me, etc., one would have to be naiN, cly certain of knowing 
what a post card or the post is. If, on the contrary (but this is not simply the conmirý ), I think the postal and 
(lie post card on the basis of the destinal of Being, as I think the house (of Beim-0 on the basis of Being, of 
langua. gc, and not the inverse, etc., then the post is no longer a simple metaphor, and is evcri as the site of all 
transferences and all cori-cspondences, the "proper" possibility of every possible rhetoric. " PC., p. 05. 
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essentially and decisively occurs, everywhere, and including language, thought, science, 
and everything that conditions them, when the postal structure shifts, Satz if you will, and 
posits or posts itself otherwise. " 
149 
The envoi that Derrida wishes to trace is, as it were, beyond Being, beyond its epochal 
history, because it does not gather itself together in its essence or it gathers itself only in 
dividing itself, in differentiating itself a specification that gives one "the possibility of 
assimilating none of the differences, the (technical, eco-political, phantasmatic, etc. ) 
differentiation of the telecommunicative powers. " 150 The significance of what is said here 
becomes apparent when we realise that the paradox that an idea of sending in fact 
depends upon is the simple fact that a letter cannot arrive. Not just the possibility that it 
may not arrive, that it may be diverted, delayed, or irrevocably lost-which would 
suggest that those occurrences were accidents that befell the operation or threatened it 
from the outside-but the structural necessity of non arrival built into the system of 
address: "Even in arriving (always to some "subject"), the letter takes itself awayfrom the 
arrival at arrival. It arrives elsewhere always several times"' 51 What is insisted upon here 
is that the event of addressing and sending can in no way guarantee arrival. The event of 
sending is permanently divided in its constitution. All this is elaborated in detail by 
Derrida in his debate with Lacan, who, in analysing "The Purloined Letter" concluded 
that a letter always arrives at its destination. But in The Post Card it becomes clear that 
the idea of spacing that Derrida thus introduces into the system of communication is all 
that is required to institute the necessity of delay, and hence the postal. Much hinges here 
on Derrida's use of the notion of "telecommunication" 
144 
Ibid., p. 66. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid., p. 123. 
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Writing and telecommunication 
Now what can this word signify in the context of Derrida's work? Not only does it 
appear on the inscribed, inverse side of The Post Card, but it occupies a crucial position 
in "Signature Event Context" the essay the closes Margins of Philosoph-v. Moreover, the 
term appears in many of Derrida's latest texts suggesting a continuity of interest. The 
most immediate point of reference is of course technological. That is, 
"telecommunication" refers us to technics, to tele-technologies, and to the 
(electronic)media in all is contemporary guises as this has come to pervade our world. 
Every theorist or philosopher who has addressed the role of these technologies in our 
contemporary situation, representing every shade of thought fi-om Walter Ong to Hans 
Ezenberger, from Marshall McLuhan to Jean Baudrillard, from Michel Foucault to Paul 
Virilio and Bernhard Stiegler, agrees that such technologies are bringing about a radical 
social, political, economic and cultural transformation whose imperatives in their inherent 
complexity can no longer be ignored. In this regard Derrida is not exceptional. 
Anticipating a more detailed discussion in Chapter 3, let me say that Derrida's work 
i-nust be interpreted as both a response to this transformation and as an attempt to think 
through the determining effect of the new technologies on the inter-text of those areas- 
philosophical and non philosophical-with which he continues to be engaged. In an 
interview given in 1996, for example, Derrida wonders how philosopher's might have 
responded to the computer. He writes, 
I am always wondering what would have happened to Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, 
and even Heidegger (who, basically, knew the computer without knowing it) if they had 
encountered this "thing, " not only as an available instrument but as a theme of reflection. 
From Pascal, Descartes, Leibniz to Heidegger, passing by way of Flegel, philosophers 
have, to be sure, meditated on machines for calculating, thinking, translation, on 
fonnalisation in general, etc. But how would they have Interpreted a culture that tends in 
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this way to be dominated, in its very everydayness, throughout the universe, by such 
technical devices for inscription and archiving? Because everything is at stake, from the 
relations of thought to the "image, " to language, the idea, archivinIc,, the simulacrum, 
representation. How would Plato have had to write what is called the "myth of the cave" 
in order to take account of these transformations? 152 
Derrida's comments here belong in a context which continues a project he has been 
involved with since his earliest writings, one that relates the question of the new 
technologies to that of the closure of Western metaphysics. As is well known, in these 
early texts, and particularly in Of Grammatology, Derrida develops a powerful reading of 
the tradition indicating the ways "writing" is not merely an artificial or technical 
appendage of language distinct from and devalued with respect to the spoken word, an 
instrument for human use, but is instead a perpetual production of differential marks that 
is the irreducible condition that articulates the difference in language between the 
i-natei-ialization of each phoneme or letter and the "acoustic sound' which they presuppose 
in order to be recognized as such, whatever the form of their materialization. It 
immediately turns out of course that language is not the only textual system nor even the 
primary one: writing overwhelms language and is seen to be the condition of the 
possibility of a general economy within and between all complex systems, an economy 
which is elaborated under the heading Pecriture, or, more properly, arche-writing, a 
catachretic term which articulates the infrastructural chain of quasi -transcendental 
"concepts" (Iiffýrance, trace, pharmakon, gramme, grapheme, etc., that are analysed 
seperately and in great detail by Derrida following the discovery of the problernatics of 
writill0l L, I 
For Derrida, the issue of the primacy of writing was not a revelation. However, the 
reason as to why it was only recently "in the process of making itself known as such and 
152 "Word Proccssing: An Interview Nvith Jacques Derrida" in Oxford bterarý, Review, vol 21,2000, pp. 3- 
17. p. 15. 
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after the fact" was. In this connection, Derrida has returned repeatedly to the question of 
how writing and the "book" are today going through a period of general mutation as a 
result of contemporary transformations in communications technology. As Derrida says in 
an interview collected in Positions, Of Grammatology can be read as "an inquiry into the 
current upheavals in the forms of communication, the new structures emerging in all the 
formal practices, and also in the domains of the archive and the treatment of information, 
that massively and systematically reduce the role of speech, of phonetic writing and the 
book. " 153 
This is not say, however, that Derrida means to make a positive, sociological or even 
philosophical statement regarding the changes now taking place: "Perhaps it is that too" 
Derrida says, but "very secondarily". In the first instance the accelerating rate and new 
rhythms of information and communication characteristic of the contemporary world 
constitute a "practical deconstruction" of the traditional assumptions at work in our 
understanding of mediation in general; they are part of an inventory of signs that solicit a 
new undertaking that exceeds the purview of the philosophical or theoretical gaze as it is 
traditionally instituted. 
Following upon developments in telecommunication and control systems which had 
developed so rapidly during and following the last war, one of the possible signs Derrida 
identified was the emergent field of cybernetics. Like the biological "pro-gram" the most 
11 elementary processes of information within the living cell, " the cybernetic program is 
also understood in terms of the general field of writing. Derrida asserts that cybernetics is 
one of the most recent, and most profound manifestations of a development which 
articulates a delimitation of "logocentrism" (the other factors being phonography, 
anthropology, linguistics, and the history of writing). As such, the "nonfortuitous 
conjunction of cybernetics and the "human sciences" of writing" represents a critical 
moment in the metaphysical history of the West. For Derrida, cybernetics is the drastic 
153 P., p. 13 
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instance of information production and retrieval that is no longer the -ý, vritten" translation 
of a language, the transporting of a signified that could be spoken in its integrity-, rather, 
cybernetics is an extreme demonstration that all writing, in order to be what is, must not 
only be able to function in the radical absence of every empirically determined scripter 
who, in a given context, has emitted or produced it, but also, by the same token, it must 
carry the force of breaking with its context, with that set of presences which organise it. 
In this connection, following the grammatological program set out by Derrida in Of 
Grammatology, arche-writing and inscription can be seen as essentially technical, 
technological, or even teletheoretical notions at root-albeit in a transformed sense. 
Writing is a machine Derrida suggests, or machinic function. But instead of faithfully 
capturing spoken language, representing it and preserving it for later use, the machine 
remains a signal of separation, of severance, of emancipation. It operates like a power of 
serial and prosthetic substitution in every mark or utterance, with or without the speaker. 
As Derrida says in "Signature Event Context": 
To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a kind of machine that is in turn 
productive, that my future disappearance in principle will not prevent frorn functioning 
and from yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and rewriting ... For the written to be 
written, it must continue to "act" and be legible even if what is called the author no 
longer answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have signed, whether he is 
provisionally absent, or if he is dead, or if in general he does not support, with his 
absolutely current and present intention or attention, the plenitude of his meaning, of that 
very thin,, which seems to be written "in his name. " 154 
The ideal of a perfectly functioning writing machine is the ideal of all communications 
theory a perpetual-motion machine in which expression-the material sign itself-would 
154 Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Conte\t- in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 307-330. p. 316-317 -, hereafter cited as SEC. 
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be self-sufficient, fully adequate to all its signifying values. But writing undermines this, 
or rather, is the condition for of both its possibility and impossibility. Whenever writing 
functions in such a way as to determine its own meanings, fix a representation of its own 
reality, or determine its own interpretations, it disrupts the restricted economies of 
meaning and broaches the general economics of writing, diffýrance, trace, etc., that 
carries with it a force of breaking with its context, that is, the set of presences which 
organise its inscription. This force of breaking is not an accidental predicate, an empirical 
contingency. It is the very structure of the written, of its quasi -machine-] ike survival. 
The implications of this are tremendous. With the appearance of the word 
"telecommunication" in "Signature Event Context" they come into view. As Richard 
Dienst points out, if writing is the movement of the text as it inscribes its signification, 
then "telecommunication" involves a movernent of transmission, so that the writing 
rnachine also becomes a mobile broadcasting device. ' 55 The word spells itself out: The 
prefix "tele" makes plain something what was the case all along, that "communication" is 
something that is always sent, or emitted, or diffused, or circulated. The notion of 
"sending" allows us to imagine a certain temporal and spatial gap in the movement of 
reference. The force of rupture is due to the spacing which constitutes the written sign: 
the spacing which separates it from other elements of the internal contextual chain (the 
always open possibility of its citation and grafting), but also from all the forms of a 
present referent (past or to come in the modified form of the present past or to come) that 
is objective or subjective. The sign, in other words, communicates nothing but a machinic 
repetition, a kind of cutting which is not so much effected by the machine (even though 
the machine can in fact cut in its turn) as it is the condition of the production of a 
inachine. The machine is cut as well as cutting with regard to an uncertain movement of 
reference. We can never be sure where it came from or where it is going. This spacing iý 
155 Cf. op. cil., n 13 1 at p. 3 17. 
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not the simple negativity of a lack nor is it, as Derrida insists, the work of the negative in 
the service of meaning (which remains reducible in the Aufehbung of dialectics). 
This theatre of the prosthesis, of the cut and the graft, is unthinkable outside a certain 
postal tele-technology, of its procedures of "routing" and of distribution, the paths of 
transmission. If the message involves transport or movement, if it can be diverted at any 
point or any number of identifiable material points throughout that movement, and if the 
fact of some material support, post or card, is the mark of that potential diversion as much 
as it might be the mark of some potential monumentality, then there can be no arguing for 
its indivisibility. The post or card becomes, therefore, the material mark of diffýrance in 
the movement of the message, of the possibility of delay and deferral which exists at 
every point from the conception of departure to the confirmation of arrival and which in 
turn means some sort of adestination, hence the postal principle. The post is thus a 
beautiful demonstration of the diffirance engine of writing. A type of postal diffýrence 
thus comes into effect within every conceivable event. For Derrida, there is not originally 
a sending from, because it is not single and nothing present precedes it; and it issues forth 
only in sending back; it issues forth only on the basis of the other, the other in itself 
without itself. In short: "[e]verything begins by referring back (par le renvoi), that is to 
say does not begin; and once this breaking open or this partitioning divides, from the very 
start, every renvoi, there is not a single renvoi but from then on a multiplicity of renvois, 
so many different traces referring back to other traces and to traces of others. "' 56 
Diffirance and the non-arrival of techne 
Having, said this let me now return to the main thread of this chapter. It is apparent 
that, for Derrida, if the post (technology, position, metaphysics) is announced at the first 
envoi, an envoi without identity or togetherness, then there is not simply as Heidegger Cý 
156 SOR., p. 324. 
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would have it "A" metaphysics, "A" history or destination of Being, nor even "AN" 
envoi. There is no one history or even general history (of Being) but only the diffýrantial 
matrix of "Ies postes et les envois" (the posts and dispatches), envois without destiny or 
destination. Indeed, 
As soon as there is there is diffýrance (and this does not wait language, especially human 
language, and the language of Being, only the mark and the divisible trait), and there is 
postal manoeuvring, relays, delay, anticipation, destination, telecommunicating network, 
the possibility, and therefore the fatal necessity of going astray, etc. 157 
This movement, which articulates the complex interplay between Heidegger's and 
Derrida's texts, seems to Derrida to be "simultaneously very far from and very near to 
Heidegger's". 158 It is very near to the extent that the very idea of destination, of holding- 
back (delay), of going astray and forgetting are precisely what is at issue in the 
Heideggerian schema of the epochality of Being in its technological outcome. As 
Rapaport has noted, through Derrida's writing Heidegger's thinking is dictating the script 
ýis well as its own self-consciousness about the technology of its correspondence as well 
as the capacity for its own deconstruction of its own thought. Indeed, I only need quote 
again Derricla's assumption that Heidegger "would doubtless see in the postal LI 
determination a prernature (? ) imposition of techne and therefore of metaphysics" to show 
that Derrida's deconstructive reinscription of Heidegger is an intensive adherence to the 
"letter" of Heidegger's thought that has already been displaced since such a version 
invokes the role of a form of technology, a communications technology, that Heidegger 
has delimited in advance. Consequently, and at the same time, the movement of Derrida's 
text is remote from Heidegger because the script that he has sent is being diverted, re- L- II 
routed to a new destination it can never reach. This is an "address" wherein filiation is at 
157 
PC., P. 66. 159 Ibid., p. 66. 
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once established and broken. It complements an understanding of Heideggerian thinking 
according to its own dynamic whereby its sending or delivery of Being (or genealogy, for Cý 
Derrida) is remscribed. To quote Rapaport: 
only by appropriating or holding on to Heidegger can Derrida demolish the historicity of 
this hold. But for this to occur, the addressee of Derrida's address must not only be held 
but held back, subjected to a withdrawal or concealment, so that he can be inscribed into 
his own problematic of how Being is withdrawn and disclosed at the same time. Given 
the "holding back" which occurs as Derrida lays "hold" of Heidegger, it is certain that 
the letter, dispatch, or postcard "sent" to Heidegger will miss its address, and hence 
Heidegger's philosophy, in being missed, will fail to reach its "destiny, " which is the 
philosophical afterlife it lays claim to in deconstruction. 159 
As Rapaport suggests, this is the event of an intellectual history in which Ex- 
appropriation takes place, the history or temporality of an Ereignis whose destiny thwarts 
the expectations and theses of academic philosophers for whom, despite the content of 
any philosophy, its history appears telelogically predetermined in a conceptual apparatus 
which from a Heideggerian perspective has been at once accomplished and surpassed. In 
this sense Derrida's reinscription is anything but unauthorised from the position of the 
legator, Heicicoocr. Rather, given the Heideggerian legacy, always already differentiated 
from itself, always already deconstructing itself as legacy, the philosophy of Heidegger is 
posed as problematic for the one who would wish to take up where Heidegger left off, 
since from the perspective of Heidegger's thinking it would be a metaphysical trap to 
inhent or lay hold of that in whose Ereignis such a laying hold (lesen) is undermined. 
This is a risk, however, Derrida recognises and is willing to take. If Derrida transposes the 
lettci- of Heidegger's sending into the transmission of a thinking through the techne of the L-4-- 
159 Cf. op. cit., n 16 at p. 197. 
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post, it is to demonstrate better the extent to which the Heideggerian notion of the sending 
of Being has been reconsidered from the perspective of the "post" of the philosophical 
correspondence. In this context one is so close yet at the same time so removed from 
Heidegger that the distance in which Heidegger himself has withdrawn gives another 
perspective on the technological outcome of metaphysics and its appropriation. Here 
Derrida pushes Heidegger's thinking to its extreme position and highlights the adventure 
that is always risked in using the post: 
now techne, this is the entire-infinitesimal and decisive-diffýrance, does not arrive. 
No more than metaphysics, therefore, and than positionality; always, already it parasites 
[contaminates] that to which he says it happens, arrives, or that it succeeds in happening 
to[arrive d arriver]. This infinitesimal nuance chances everything in the relation between 
metaphysics and its doubles or its others 160 
Here is the infinitesimal and decisive diffirance that Derrida wants to mark between, or, 
rather, within, his own text and Heidegger's. It is important to recoCTnise here the link that Zt7 
Derrida forges between techne and the differing-deferring economy of the post. As David 
Wills has pointed out, whereas on the one hand the postal, implying the materiality (and 
the divisibility) of the letter, exists as perhaps the most simple and obvious case of 
niediation as techne, at least within systems of communication that are the models for 
i-epi-escntationalist thinking, on the other hand it shows how techne in fact inhabits the 
most fundamental ideas of positioning such as identity, difference and so on. For if the 
postal as event, and as event of the techne, is always already divided by the event of non- 
arrival, then the concepts such as identity and difference that depend upon it are similarly 
divided. 161 in this context techne comes to be the trace of a operation that, crossing out 
all the epochal configurations in which Bting would destine itself, at once intersects with 
lt)o Ibid., p. 192. 
161 See David Wills, ScreenlPlaw Deri-ida aml h1m Theory, (Princeton Umverstý Press, 1989), P. 182. 
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and re-inscribes the instance which, for Heidegger, Being is dissimulated-the 
technological epoche. The postcard, then, however trivial it may at first appear, functions 
as a machinic supplement (can there be any other? ) to Heidegger's thoughts on the historý, 
of metaphysics and its technological completion. Indeed, the postcard is well suited to do 
so because the dispatch is a space that cannot be disentangled from the duration and tele- 
technical conditions of its being transmitted. Although for Derrida it is always the same 
card that is sent, in this identity there is a machinic iteration as the card is spaced, divided, 
mailed and cut off from its presumed sender. Situating himself at the margin of 
Heidegger's text Derrida takes into account Heidegger's thinking of the technological 
outcome of metaphysics only to take account of it, re-count it and re-mark it as that 
instance to which Heidegger's text itself must submit. Here, Derrida insists that it is the 
44 post" or "posting" which far from being implicated, as Heidegger would say, in the 
metaphysical technological destination and determination of Being, is in fact the rhythm 
of Geschick des Seins. So that when Heidegger makes techne and technology "derivative" 
(Derrida's word), some kind of dissimulation of Being in the final epoche of its oblivion, 
he forgets that the very closing into a linked epoch of his history is a postal idea and that 
always and already from the beginning there is techne and technical distribution, 
differentiation, going astray, etc. Indeed, Derrida counter-argues ("against -Martin .... ) that 
any text is determined by the conditions of its transmission and dispatch, and that one is 
\, cry much mistaken to isolate the message from the technology or relays of its delivery. 
The originary technical contamination of Being 
Derrida's cleconstructive reinscription here, as elsewhere, is intelligible as a 
problematizing of v,, hat he considers to be the Heideggerian desire for rigorous non- 
contamination. In this connection Derrida has on a number of occasions voiced his 
disquiet over what he considers to be the code, the logic, the recurrent formula or 
semantic regularity of Heideucter's repeated valorisation of essential Being (Wesen) over LýLý 
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that of which it is the essence. Derrida argues that when Heidegger thinks "essence" as 
being more primordial than the field(s) it engenders, the rigor and strate-2Y of such a 
thought is always generated by the desire to affirm and preserve the realm of essences in 
the science of ontology as well as in the thinking of Being from "contamination, " to keep 
the aboriginal essence separate and pure. 162 The Wesen is-its must be, that is what "Is" 
mean s-uncontam in ated by anything entitive or nonessential. Being is-it must be- 
uncontaminated by beings. About this deeply Heideggerian law which articulates the 
ontic-ontological difference as the truth of Being itself and as the sole matter for thinking, 
Derrida maintains that such matrix thoughts remain, at least in one aspect, classically 
philosophical: "It is in any case by a gesture of this type that Heidegger interrupts or 
disqualifies, in different domains, specular reiteration or infinite regress (renvoi a 
Vinfilil)" 163 
For Derrida, Heidegger's stratagem is most explicit in the typical and exemplary 
question concerning technology, the assertion that its essence is nothing technological. In 
Of Spirit where this problematic is tied together as one of the "guiding threads" (the 
others being that of questioning, animality, and epochality) that lead into the highly 
charged political question of Heidegger's "avoidance" and invocation of Geist, Derrida 
states his reservation in this way: 
The concern[ ... 
]was to analyse this desire for rigorous non-contamination and, from that, 
perhaps, to envisage the necessity, one could say the fatal necessity of a 
containination-and the word was important to me-of a contact originally impurifying 
thought or speech by technology. Contamination, then, of the thought of essence by 
technology, and so contamination by technology of the thinkable essence of 
IQ cT 's essentialism see John D. Caputo, 'zing Heidegw, ., er II 
Deinwholo i For in in-depth discussion of Hcidc,, -,,. g 
(Bloon-ungtowIndiana Univcrsity Press, 1993), pp. 118-130. 
163 1- SOR., p. 3 24. 
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technology-and even of a question of technology by technology. the privilege of the I 
question having some relation already, always, with this irreducibilitý of technology. 164 
For Derrida it would be a matter, then, of analysing the Heideggerian desire for rigorous 
non contamination, linked no doubt to the privilege of the question and to Dasein's 
factical existence in its constitutive openness to Being and its difference from 
technology. 1 65 Whereas for Heidegger the essence of technology is said to be nothing 
technological, is not this or that technical being, this or that piece of technological 
equipment, or even technical beings as a whole, for Derrida, the limit between what is 
technical and what is not technical cannot be maintained, it is not safe. There is no 
essence of technology. Nothing is purely technical either. It is here that one is able to see, 
from another angle, Derrida's arguments in The Post Card regarding the Heideggerian 
thinking of the history of Being. By organising this thinking around an epochal schema, 
that is, around an economy of withdrawal, withholding and reserving, Heidegger upholds 
the thought of the ontological difference as a metaphysical desire to protect Being from 
any slippage of dissemination in beings. In doing so Heidegger wants to guarantee the 
history and arrival of Being in its future possibility, he wants to keep Wesen safe from, 
and in excess of, the technological actualisation of metaphysics. To put it another way, 
164 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlb y 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 10. 
165 1 refer herc to Derrida's series of "Geschlecht" essays which, together with Of Spirit, form part of a 
network in which Derrida examines the status of bodily existence in Heidegger's work in connection with 
the privilege granted by Heidegger to questioning as the mode of thinking. In "Geschlecht IL Heidegger's 
Hand" Derrida considers the place of the human hand in Dasein's constitutive openess to the question of 
Being: "Thc hand reaches extends, receives and welcomes-and not just things: the hand extends itself , and 
recelvcs its own welcome in the hand of the other. The hand keeps. The hand carries. The hand designs and 
swils, presumably because man is a (monstrous) sign. [Die Hand zeichnet, verinutlich wed derAlensch ein 
Zeichen is]". (Heidec-cr quoted, Geschlecht 11, p. 168) Heidegger's argument with metaphysics situates L, I- 
qLICstioninty and thcrcby thinking in Dasein's being as factical existence. Thought is not cerebral or 
disincamate but a craft or Handiwork implicated as as the very condition of Being in Dasein's instrumental 
Invok-cment with its environment, in its I'actical Bemg-in-thc-world. Howevcr, as Derrida shows, hý 
conceiving thought in its facticity Heidegger articulates the desire to shelter thought from any contamination 
by technology. This desire appears in Heideg-cr's defense defence of handwriting, of language and thinkin, -, 
inade visible in the act of the hand, against the mechanized, deindividualized, script of the typc\kritcr. For 
Derrida, it is this bias that aligns Heldegger \ýitli logocentric metaphysics. See Jacques Derrida, "Geschlecht 
11: Heidegger's Hand, " trans. John P. Leavcy. Jr. in John Sallis, ed. Deconstruction and Philosophy 
(Chicago: Univcrsit\ ofChicago Press, 1987). pp. 161-197, hereafter cited as G11. 
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the withdrawal of Being even as it articulates the oblivion of Being in the Ge-stell would 
articulate the possibility of its re-turn out of technology into the thinking appropriation of 
Ereignis; the piety of questioning-thinking, its possibility and integrity is thereby kept 
apart from technology and preserved in its integrity as the opening of the future. 
Conversely, if, as Derrida asserts "techne doesn't arrive, " if it already and originally 
contaminates that to which Heidegger says it happens, then the "infinitesimal and 
decisive diffirance" that brings Heidegger and Derrida together in their separation, is 
seen to rest on on the way each responds to the originality, or not, of technology. 
The question to be posed here of course is whether Derrida is sufficiently sensitive to 
the subtleties of Heidegger's retrieval of the metaphysical conception of essence. 
Obviously, Heidegger opens up a radical redetermination of Wesen that is no longer a 
presence, a present, or a presentifiable essence: does not this entail a thinking of 
contamination? This is the question John Sallis raises in a discussion with Derrida at a 
colloquium held at the University of Essex in 1986. As Sallis says, 
[I]t seems to me that there is a thread in Heidegger's work that is not entirely different 
from the kind of contamination that you are sketching. What I am thinking of is the kind 
of development that one finds most succinctly in Voln Wesen der Warheit, though also in 
the 1937/38 lecture course, where Heidegger uses the phrase Wesenheit des Wesens. In 
questioning die Wesenheit, Wesen, and Wahrheit, what is perhaps most important is that 
"essence" comes no longer to be deten-nined in a way that simply excludes its opposite, 
or, I should say, its opposites, because there are several senses of opposition here [] 
Rather, essence is redetermined as involving Un-wesen. the Gegenwesen; that 
redeten-nination then leads into the question of die Irre, errancy, withdrawal so on []I 
think that in the notion of errancy there is precisely a necessary flowing of essence, as it 
weiv, ovei, into[ ... ]a kind of necessary 
blurring of the distinction between Being and 
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beings[ ... 
]It does seem to me there is something like a kind of contamination of essence 
going on here, something quiet different from the demand for purity. " 166 
In reply to Sallis, Derrida stresses that while he recognizes that for Heidegger Being's 
difference from beings is itself dissimulated in beings, and thus appears to be a kind of 
contamination, he does not believe that Heidegger would consider it to be impurity. As he 
wonders "Why does this blurring of the distinction have no general effect on all of 
Heidegger's discourse? Because, when you say the essence of technology is nothing 
technical [ ... ]then you cannot blur the distinction. But if, in errancy, there is a situation in 
which this blurring occurs not by accideat but unavoidably, this should have effects on 
the whole corpus, on the whole discourse. In that case you wouldn't any longer draw such 
a rigorous distinction between the essence and that of which it is the essence. So, you can 
imagine the consequences of this contamination. " 
167 
Despite Heidegger's insistence that Wesen is equally Univesen, that Wahrhelt is 
equally Unwarhrheit, that Ereignis involves Enteignis etc, and despite the radicality 
involved in the attempt to think the reciprocal inter-play, the difference (Unter-Scheid) 
between Being and beings, Derrida says Heidegger would insist that contamination is 
inerely an "ontic" scheme, a mere "metaphor"; he would insist contamination is 
something which affects onlY beings, and the language of beings. 168 This reversal or non- 
identity of essence with itself is not contamination: "It is still too pure, " Derrida says, 
"too rigorously delimited. " Derrida is not, of course, advocating the blurring of all 
distinctions, but he wonders whether anything in language and thought can be sheltered 
absolutely from contamination. As he puts it: "In the very will to protect oneself against 
166 See Jacques Dcrrida, "On Reading Heidegger: An outline of Remarks to the Essex Colloquium 11 in 
Research in Phenomenology, 17 1987, pp. 171-185. pp. 180-18 1. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid, p. 180. 
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44x" one is more exposed to the danger of reproducing 'Y' than when one tries to think 
contamination. " 
169 
Now having said this, reverting to the Heideggerian position itself, let me make this 
point, which will prepare far in advance a question in its turn on Derrida's reinscription: 
in order for the claims for the non arrival of techne and for originary contamination to 
stand, Heidegger's question concerning technology must be held onto or determined as a 
thesis and theme; literally, let me highlight again the fact that DelTida insists, or rather 
anticipates that in reinscribing the thinking of Being in terms of the post Heidegger would 
accuse him of "an imposition of position precisely, of determining the envoi of Being as 
position, posture, thesis, or theme (Setzung, thesis, etc. ), a gesture that he alleges to 
situate, as well as technology with the history of metaphysics. " The question is, then, 
how does this anticipation stand. Does it go to the heart of Heidegger's thinking or is it, 
perhaps, and given the reading of Heidegger I presented in the last chapter I will want to 
suggest this, too restricted in its scope to fully comprehend what Heidegger would insist 
or accuse Derrida of? I will return to my reservations over Derrida's reading in Chapter 
4. Let me now, however, conclude the concerns of this one. 
The consequences of Derrida's reinscription are indeed far reaching. By transposing 
Heidegger's ontological vocabulary into the context of the technics of a texts 
transmission, dispatch, or postal relays, one may deconstruct Heidegger's still 
metaphysical recovery of Being, his thinking of Ereignis, which accompanies 
Heidegger's questioning into the essence of technological completion of metaphysics. In 
this case, Derrida will point up the irreducibility and necessity of originary technical 
contamination. This deconstruction occurs, of course, the moment that Derrida receives 
the Heideggerian dispatch or missive, the moment that, in having He'decyger's thought 4-- 1 Z7 
delivcred to him, it becomes apparent that it has gone astray, has been re-routed, and 
cannot be disentangled from the effects of its being transmitted, which is to say written, Cý 
169 Ibid, p. 172. 
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sent, received, read and so on. In this regard the analysis and promotion of those machinic 
operators involved in the cleconstructive movement of reading, as in the rewriting of 
Heidegger's text, have been inscribed in the general program of Derrida's work from 
early on-in Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference, Dissemination and Margins of 
Philosophy. As I have already indicated above, within these texts, and within a very broad 
conceptual and historical matrix that has as one of its most decisive elements the new 
information and communication technologies developed in the post-war period, Derrida 
relates the question of techne and technology to the question of wi-iting, to its 
subordination to a secondary and derivative status as mere auxiliary technique and to the 
contemporary displacement of this subordination. Now it is precisely in this context that 
Derrida's reception of Heidegger's text along with its reinscription first takes hold. If we 
are to understand the implications of what has been said above we need to locate and 
develop what is said in Derrida's now "classic" works with regard to the emergence and 
articulation of writing as a supplement to Heidegger's thought. It is to these texts that I 
now want to turn. 
3 
Technics and the New Mutation in the History of Writing 
Introduction 
It has often been acknowledged that in his writings of the late 1960s and early 
1970s-Writing and Difference, Of Grammatology, Dissemination and Margins of 
Philosophy-the deconstructive elaboration of arche-writing, trace, diffýrance, etc., 
allows Derrida to assert that "writing opens the field of history, " and thus to explore the 
ways in which it is possible to glimpse the closure of that "historico-i-netaphysical epoch" 
he calls "logocentrism". The project Derrida is working on in these texts has been taken 
to be part of the programme of the period, that is, part of the movement out of 
structuralism (and its grid of binary distinctions) in micro terms and out of metaphysics 
(and its privileging of presence) in a large scale perspective. In the latter case, the 
question of the closure of metaphysics is part of the complex relation Derrida is building 
at this point between his own work and Heidegger's thinking of Being. Indeed, the 
peculiarity of Derrida's text is that the problem of metaphysical closure with which the 
deconstruction of logocentrism gets under way is a resource that Derrida finds chiefly 
within the Heideggerian thinking of the end of philosophy. That said, it is of vital 
importance to Derrida that his conception of the closure of metaphysics be distinguished 
from Heidegger's thought of its end. Although the Derridean concept of metaphysical lt: ý 
closure is not posulated in strict opposition to Heidegger's thinking, it nonetheless allows 
Derrida to situate Heidegger in a tradition whose end determines the possibility of his 
discourse. The DeiTidean notion of closure which reads the Heideggerian thought of end L- 
is, moreover, inseparable from the displacement of another Heideggerian concept; 
namelv, the history or sending, of Being. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's text as this is worked out in the 1980's, and 
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particularly in The Post Card and its supplements, opens up an infinitesimal but 
nonetheless decisive diffýrance which turns on "the presumed unity of a history of 
metaphysics or the West". What is being challenged by Derrida is the unilateralism of 
Heidegger's claim that there is a sending (envol; Schickung) of Being from the Greeks 
through epochs of increasing oblivion, which is gathered into the destiny or destination of 
Being (das Seins Geschick) at the end of philosophy. As Derrida reads it, for Heidegger 
the epoch of metaphysics is addressed by the Greeks, and destined for "us": the sending 
of Being is always assured of reaching its destination and arriving at its technological L- 
completion. Deconstructing this restricted economy Derrida releases a plurality of 
44envois, " inassemblable postcards that would be more "originary"-"older"-than the 
historical dispensation of Being and would be incapable of being gathered together and 
represented (appropriated) as a unitary epoch in which representation itself is actualized 
in the permeation of the world by technical relations. For Derrida, techne does not arrive. 
No more than metaphysics, therefore-, always, already it contaminatcs that to which 
Heidegger says it happens, arrives, or that it succeeds in happening to. 
The exorbitant 
Now, if it remains the case that Derrida's attempt to mark the closure of metaphysics 
lies precisely in this simultaneous comprehension and reinscription of Heidegger's 
thinking, there is, nonetheless, a complication involved which goes beyond the evident 
problems: where do we stand to make such a move; what can such a movement be and 
from where can it be charted? "' In the particular question that concerns us here Derrida 
speaks of wishing to obtain the "point of a certain exteriority in relation to the totality of 
the age of logocentrism, ""' the point that gives the leverage to make of metaphysics not 
Just a unified system but also a general text. There is here a certain exorbitance Which 
170 This is a point made by Marion Hobson. See Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines, (London: Routledge, 
1998), p. IS. 
I, [ OG., p. 16 1. 
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allows the history of metaphysics to appear in its closure beyond the restricted economy 
of Being. "' 
As is well known, in a number of places in his early writings Derrida pointed out the 
logic and risks-"false exits"-involved in the attempt to leave or transgress 
metaphysics. Two paths presented themselves: either a move that attempts an exit and a 
deconstruction from within, which risks endlessly confirming and consolidating that 
which one allegedly deconstructs and "sinking into the autism of the closure, " or an 
abrupt and discontinuous "change of terrain, " a move which risks "inhabiting more 
naively and more strictly that ever the inside one declares one has deserted. " Noting that 
the first path is "mostly that of the Heideggerian questions" while the second is mostly 
"the one that dominates "France" today, " Derrida affirms that such risks do not suffice to 
annul the "necessity for a change of terrain. " Consequently, "a new writing must weave 
and interlace these two motifs of deconstruction. Which amounts to saying that one must 
speak several languages and produce several texts at once. ""' By means of this double 
play, marked in certain decisive places by an erasure which allows what it obliterates to 
be read, violently inscribing within the text that which attempted to govern it from 
without, Derrida says I try to respect as rigorously as possible the internal, regulated play 
172 It might appear that the deconstruction of epochality that is oulined in The Post Card and adjacent texts 
inarks an advance on the historico-metaphysical notion of closure that informs much of Derrida's earlier 
work. Indeed, in Of Gi-aniniatology Derrida does speak of the "epoch" of logocentrism and of its "totality, " 
which would suggest his reworking of Heidegger's text has not Yet performed the reinscription of the 
unitary conception of metaphysics that Derrida thinks characterizes the thinking of Being. Coupled with 
this, though the word closure appears with some regularity in the texts of the texts of the late 1960s, it does 
not survive long after the end of that decade. In this connection, as Simon Critchley has asked "Might one 
not speculate that disappearance of closure from Derrida's conceptual vocabulary reflects his growing 
distance from the Heideggerian conception of the history of metaphysics which underpins the concept of 
metaphysical closure? Might not the disappearence of closure be linked to Derrida's renunciation of the 
history of Being. - To adopt this hypothesis would, as Critchley says, be to go too far. To begin with, such a 
vicw would ignore what is already said in both "Diff6rance" and especially "The Ends of Man" Mth rcgard 
to the concepts of epoch and epochality and to Heide-ocr's privaledging of a "metaphorics of proximit\. It 
would also overlook the fact that although the word closure disappears from Derrida's vocapular-y. this does 
not nican that the pi-oblein of closure ceases to be central to Derrida's work. In this conection the ultimate 
orientation of texts like The Post Card is no different from that of Derrida's earlier work. For Critchley's 
remarks see his The Ethics of Dcconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 
r-382. 
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of philosophemes or epistememes by making them slide-without mistreating them-to 
the point of their nonpertinance, their exhaustion, their closure. To "deconstruct" 
philosophy, thus, would be to think-in the most faithful, interior way-the structured 
genealogy of philosophy's concepts, but at the same time to deteri-nine-from a certain 
exterior that is unqualifiable or unnarnable by philosophy-what this history has been 
able to dissimulate or forbid, making itself into this history by means of this motivated 
repression. ""' "Mine then, " Derrida says, "is an excessivelY philosophical gesture: a 
gesture that is philosophical and, at the same time, in excess of the philosophical. And 
this raising of the stakes-how to be more than philosophical without ceasing to be 
philosophical ? -marks with its hubris all the themes I have dealt with. " "' 
Now, given what has been said so far in this study, it will be apparent that the 
Derridean gesture cannot simply be seen as one that takes as its philosophical leverage 
some point or position that would situate deconstruction with respect to the closure of 
logocentrism. More specifically, the exteriority that Derrida wishes attain with respect to 
metaphysics cannot be a possibility that lets itself be posed there, or exposed before you, 
gathered and represented as a theme or a system, a thesis or a synthesis ought to do. All of 
these values are disqualified by Derrida's text which makes of deconstruction an event or 
happening which, without being foreign to philosophy, exceeds the purview of the 
theoretical or philosophical gaze as it is traditionally instituted. The consequences of this 
must quickly grab our attention; they mirror those that I raised in Chapter I with respect 
to Heidegger. As I said, any appropriation of Heidegger's thinking that fixates on what it 
says, on its contents and themes, must quickly be perceived to be inadequate since such 
an approach obscures the peculiar immanent dynamic or movement of Heidegger's 
thinking that articulates his turn out of metaphysics. Similarly here, if we are to the follow L- 
the stakes that Derrida raises (how to be more than philosophical without ceasing to be 
I -. I P., p. 6. 
175 Jacques Derrida & Maurizio Ferraris, A Tastefor the Secret, trans. Giacomo Donis, ed. Giacomo Donis 
and David Webb, (Polity Prcss, 2001), p. 4, hercafter cited as TS. 
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philosophical) our reading cannot be one that relies solely on "expertise, " on an attitude 
or ability that indulges the competence to map only its theoretical conditions and 
accomplishments. On the contrary, one must have assumed or engaged, in advance as it 
were, those exigencies that led to Derrida's excessive gesture in the first place. This is a 
point made by Christopher Fynsk who, wondering what acts (of reading, of writing, or of 
speech) would allow one to "accompany" Derrida, asks "How many times has Derrida 
had to write that terms like diff9rance or "trace" are not philosophernes or conceptual 
topoi, that the exigencies to which they answer (and which they help to draw forth) 
escape the order of conceptual exposition? ""' No doubt, as Fynsk rightly points out, a 
reader will never grasp the transformative force of a term like diffiýrance without grasping 
the theoretical field within which it intervenes, a field that ranges from transcendental 
phenomenology through the thinking of Being to structural linguistics and beyond. This 
understanding can be as technically sophisticated as it will. But, and this is the important 
point, "the reader must also have grasped the thinking engagement that prompted Derrida 
to advance such terms if that force is ever to strike them. To engage the thought, they 
must have already been engaged by it-a relation must have opened, they must have 
assumed its engagements in some way as their own. " "' What then are the engagements 
that prompted Derrida to mark the closure of metaphysics and, if such engagements 
cannot simply given as a theme, how are we to think them? Here we must tum to the 
"historical" occurrence of deconstruction. 
The event: "it" deconstructs 
As Derrida himself recognizes, many of his texts may give the impression of being 
without preliminary justification, that is, they appear to begin without that still classic 
moment according to which one justifies and grounds one's Point of departure on the 
176 Christopher Fyilsk, "Derrida and Philosophy: Acts of Engagement" in Jacques Derrida and the 
Humanities: A Crt . tical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen, (C ambri dge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 152- 
17 1. p. 153. Many of the points Fynsk makes in this essay Nvill be threaded throughout this chapter. 
177 Ibid., p. Is -1 - 
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basis of a situation. (The systematic description of such a situation providing the terms of 
adequacy and adequation for beginning. )' 78 Indeed, Derrida's repeated assertions that the 
form of the systematic, encyclopaedic or circular book is impossible, that it is no longer 
possible to write a "great philosophical "machine"" with all the rhetoric of a classic 
introduction, are well known. 179 This is a circumstance that Derrida believes his 
microcommunity of readers recognise: "As I write for a highly restricted community of 
readers who I presume share a philosophical culture with me, I say to myself, also out of 
modesty: I'm not going to start all over again, I'm not going to open my text as The 
Critique of Pure Reason or Being and Time opens". 180 This is not to say, of course, that 
deconstruction cannot and does not begin. But its beginning is one that depends on an 
elliptic economy in which the presumed point of departure is inscribed in the process of 
deconstruction. 
Now, if in articulating the closure of metaphysics it is trivially obvious that Derrida's 
principle interests have been directed towards the great canon of philosophy (and at the 
same time towards the "minor" loci of their texts including their "literary, " "rhetorical" 
or "metaphorical" performance), it is equally apparent that the closure appears not just 
under the pressure of philosophical critique, but also by way of philosophy's exposure to 
events that are beyond the purview of traditional philosophy and which require new forms 
of philosophical response. In this case, deconstruction should not be taken, as it often 
appears to be, primarily a literary (as conventionally understood) or intraphilosophical 
occurrence, nor for that matter is it an organized body of easily reproducible means, 
reading techniques or techniques of critical textual interpretation that have acquired the 
status and dignity of a quasi-i nterdi scipli nary discipline. Such "transportable possibilities 
and powers" are, as Derrida insists, merely one of the forms or manifestations 
deconstruction has taken. However, they remain necessarily limited, determined by a set 
178 See TS., p. 8 1. 
171) See especially "Outwork" in Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson, (London: The 
Athlone Press, 198 1 ). pp. 3- hereafter cited as DIS. 
180 TS., p. 8 1. 
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of open contextual traits-respected within and appropfiate to an Anglo-American 
academy-that are carried and thus exceeded by "much broader, more obscure and 
powerful processes, between the earth and the world ...... More specifically, 
"deconstructions, " which I prefer to say in the plural, has doubtless never named a 
project, method or system. Especially not a philosophical system. In contexts that are 
always very determined, it is one of the many names for designating, by metonymy in 
sum, what happens or doesn't happen to happen, namely a certain dislocation that in fact 
is regularly repeated-and wherever there is something rather than nothing: in what are 
called the texts of classical philosophy, of course and for example, but also in every 
"text" in the general sense that I try to justify for this word, that is, in experience period, 
in social, historical, economic, technical, military, etc., "reality". 182 
More specifically still, deconstruction is one of the many names for something new that is 
taking place in the world (at least in the West), something that points to an unprecedented 
inutation in our contemporary situation, one that exceeds philosophy's 
"phenomenalizing" and "objectifying" potential. This is an important but often 
underestimated point that Derrida has made on many occasions. As he told Henri Ronse 
in a 1967 interview collected in Positions: "[deconstruction is] a writing interested in 
itself which also enables us to read philosophernes-and consequently all the texts of our 
culture-as kinds of symptoms[ ... ]of something that could not be presented in the history 
ot'philosophy, and which, moreover, is nowhere present. Since all this concerns putting 
into question the major determination of the meaning of Being as presence. ""' Pointing 
to his concern at the time with the traditional treatment accorded to writing as a 
181 Jacques Derrida, "A "Madness" Must Watch Over Thinkinc., " in Points-hiterviews, 1974-1994., ed. 
Hlizabeth Weber, trans. Peggy Kamuf et al. (Stanford. Cal if.: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 339-364. 
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particularly revelatory symptom, Derrida goes on to note "And if this symptom is 
revealed today, it is not at all due to some ingenious discovery initiated by someone here 
or there. It is due rather to a certain total transformation (a transformation that "can no 
longer even be called "historical" or "worldwide, " because the transformation infringes 
on the security of such si gnifi cations). 
91194 
Almost thirty years later these remarks are reiterated and expanded upon in a 
discussion with Gianni. Vatimmo. Vatimmo has just posed the question of what has 
become of certain important justifications, referring to the circumstances and the time of 
its writing, that Derrida advances at the beginning of Of Grammatology for the necessity 
of the closure of logocentrism. In reply Derrida's states that, 
I try to place myself, or find myself placed, before the question: what is going on today 
[qu'est-ce qui se passe], what is happening [qu'est-ce qui arrive]? If I am to speak and 
write publicly, I have to take into account the singular and distinctive happenings of 
today[ ... ]despite the enon-nous tradition going back thousands of years something 
singular is happening today, of which there are a great many signs in the world. 
Something completely new, to which we have to respond and with respect to which we 
have to situate ourselves [ ... ] Faced with the singularity of the world event, I 
have to 
respond to it singularly, with my signature, in my own way, not as an aesthetic fetish, but 
to take a responsibility. It happens to me [(a m'arrive] and I have to respond, me, with 
rny age, my history, my ductus, my way of writing, of making the letters, even if it is 
illegible. 
185 
Having said this, and by way of clarification, later in the same interview Derrida adds "I 
ought to have specified that what happens deconstructs itself in the process. It is not I 
who deconstruct; rather, something I call "deconstruction" happens to the experience of a 
18' Ibid., p. 7. 
185 TS., pp. 78-79. 
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world, a culture, a philosophical tradition; "it" deconstructs, ýa tie va pas, there is 
something that budges, that is in the process of being dislocated, disjointed, disajoined, 
and of which I began to be aware. Some thing is 'deconstructing' and it has to be 
answered for. "' 
As these comments make clear, since 1967 Derrida has elaborated deconstruction 
within the context of a singular historical event. A situation in which a 66certain 
dislocation" of the present is regularly repeated. "Deconstruction, " Derrida says, "is 
anachronism in synchronism, it is a manner of attuning to something that is out of joint 
and out of tune". 1 87 While developing over four decades through an astonishing array of 
styles or strategies, performative experiments, and targeted interrogations, Derrida's work 
has been entirely consistent with a movement of thought which pays the greatest attention 
to the event, to what is happening, as, precisely, that which is dislocated and disjointed, 
which is not gathered together in its place, and which does not await the deliberation, 
consciousness, or phi losophico-theoretical organization of a subject, or even of 
modernity. This itinerary, which Derrida admits is "guided by a certain insistence that 
others may find downright monotonous, " is, as one commentator points out, an assumed 
paradox: the event of deconstruction, the deconstructive event is unique and the making 
of an institution, an archive, at the same time. The event, to be worthy of its name, must 
be both unanticipated and remarkable, that is, capable of being remarked and identified or 
distinguished from other events. The event then is marked by this compromise, it gives 
itself as singular and unique and it betrays itself by instituting a system of marks that 
deniand a response. ' 88 This is the point Derrida makes when he says "Every time I write 
something, I have the impression of making a beginning-but in fact that which is same 
in texture is ceaselessly exposed to a singularity which is that of the other (another text, 
sorneone else, another word of the language). Everything appears anew: which means 
86 Ibid., pp. 80-8 1. 
: 
87 Ibid., p. 82. 
188 See Joseph G. Kronick, Derrida and the Future of Literature, (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1999), p. 32. 
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newness and repetition together. "189 This "singularity" of writing, its exposure to the 
other, means above all, that deconstruction corresponds to the irreducible transformation 
of a certain context, a context that is as contextualizing as it is contextualized. In this 
connection, deconstruction proceeds from a gesture that has been characteristic of many 
of Derrida's initiatives: an enumeration of the historical symptoms or signs that call for 
the initiative in question. In the present context under discussion such signs are 
symptomatic of the closure of the logocentrico-metaphysical era as this is outlined in 
Derrida's early work and belong to a field of transformations which articulate the shift 
from "language" to the more general notion of "writing". As Derrida tells Vatimmo in the 
discussion cited above, "In beginning Of Grammatology I set out from a sort of 
observation: today language is no longer a region, it has won the totality of space, its 
reign now has a sort of extension without limits; and, simultaneously, language becomes 
writing, with an invasion of the graphic structure of experience. I gave a certain number 
of examples of all of this, in current life, in political life, in genetics, in 
telecommunications, a sort of photograph, an image of the world and of a world in the 
process of changing, and thus of "deconstructing". "' 90 
Derrida's observation, his enumeration of the historical signs of the shift from 
language to writing and thereby of a world in the process of deconstructing, marks in 
clear fashion those imperatives that prompt the "excessively philosophical gesture" that 
emerges in Derrida's work in the late 1960s. Such signs point to the critical interaction of 
Derrida's text with a general epistemic shift towards the scriptural and the informational, 
a move which itself is inextricably implicated in the more general techno-scientific 
development of Post-war culture. As was said in the previous chapter, this context 
constitutes for Derrida something like a "practical deconstruction". What I want to do 
is makc good the promise to discuss this matter in some detail. In this Chapter I 
shall therefore be concerned to show that deconstruction, as it is formulated in Derrida's 
I TS., p. 47. 
190 Ibid., pp. 80-8 1. 
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early works and understood in terms of the problematic of the closure of metaphysics and 
of writing, is elaborated and is organized around a context that generates a thinking of 
technics, of tele-technologies, and as a thinking of tele-technologies, of the "media" in all 
its contemporary guises. As we shall see, this thinking of technics is not merely incidental 
to the Derridean text, as if it were one of its many themes. Rather, in accordance with 
what I shall take to be the "method" of deconstruction, Derrida's thinking is subject to a 
necessity that will situate technics at the very heart of his enterprise. In order to 
understand what is at issue here it is necessary to take account of the clear set of 
intellectual, disciplinary and institutional stakes of deconstruction that emerge in 
Derrida's work of the period and which manifest themselves in the attempt to rethink 
philosophy through a redistribution of its relations with its outside along zones of 
implication rather than confrontation. In this connection, the relation that Derrida 
negotiates between philosophy and the then triumphalist discourses of that loose 
confederation of disciplines designated in France the "sciences humaines" is important. 
One of the essential outcomes of these discussions, which take place under the aegis of 
structuralism, was the development of the methodological thrust of deconstruction which 
enacts a displacement and reorganisation of the metaphysical opposition between the 
transcendental and the empirical, opening up an aporetic and undecidable "position, " 
neither in philosophy (as it is traditional organized)nor outside it. Asserting the necessity 
and irreduciblity of this double impossibility, Derrida. demonstrates how it both obliges 
philosophy to entertain an open matrix of transversal relations with emergent forms of 
knowledge and their technical elaborations, whilst pressuring the latter to come to terms 
with its "transcendental contraband". As I will show, thinking this necessity means 
thinking the inescapability of writing or inscription in general where this means thinking 
the "ori(-Ylnary" co-implication between writing and technics. As part of an attempt to 
come to terms xvith the difficulty of what Derrida thinks here I shall conclude the chapter 
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with a consideration of certain ambiguities that are inherent in his attempt to elaborate a 
system of technical differentiation that would mark the closure of logocentrism. 
(The disavowal of) writing 
In order that we might advance to these matters let me proceed by offering an account 
of the arguments and claims that Derrida advances with regard to the traditional treatment 
of writing as well as his formulation of a generalized writing which displaces this 
treatment. These arguments, which merge with and co-articulate Derrida's attempt to 
mark the closure of metaphysics, have often been recounted becoming in the process 
something of a deconstructive commonplace. That said, it is necessary for what follows 
that I trace their main outline. 
To state it boldly, for essential but determined reasons, and throughout its history, 
Western thinking has taken writing, the letter, the sensible inscription, as the body and 
matter external to spirit, to breath, to speech, to memory, to truth, in short to the logos. 
For the early Derrida such an attitude amounts to a disavowal or "motivated repression" 
of inscription and constitutes something like the major decision of metaphysics which 
institutes and maintains itself in the oppositional axiomatic-sensible/intelligible, 
soulibody, nature/culture, universal/particular, infinite finite, etc. -that governs it in its 
very possibility. It is speech which allows for this illusion of transcending inscrIption 
because "the system of "hearing (u riders tan di ng)-oneself-speak" through the phonic 
substance ... presews itself as the nonexterior, nonmundane, therefore nonempirical or 
noncontingent signifier. " 191 Hierarchically subordinated writing is confined to the 
opposite role as derivative, accidental, particular, exterior, (outside and below) doubling 
of the signifier, as a mere technical artifice and auxiliary instrument, a representative of 
speech that has no constitutive meaning of its own: "The epoch of the logos thus debases 
writing considered as mediation of mediation and as the fall into the exteriority of 
'91 OG., pp. 7-8. 
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meaning. To this epoch belongs the difference between signified and signifier, or at least 
the strange separation of their "parallelisin, " and the exteriority, however extenuated, of 
the one to the other" 192 Consequently, "[w]riting will be "phonetic, " it will be the outside, 
the exterior representation of language and of this "thought- sound. " It must necessarily 
operate from already constituted units of signification, in the formation of which it has 
played no part. " 
193 
In his work of the late 1960's and early 1970's Derrida illustrates again and again this 
history with a series of examples that will take writing to be not merely derivative but 
more seriously as that which "menaces ... .. corrupts, " and "contaminates" the purity of 
life; writing is an "evil" or "perversion" that "engenders monsters" and is a "deviation 
t'rom nature" from which "spontaneous life" must be protected. Tracing the origin of this 
stance from its ancient Greek roots through certain historians of writing to its latest 
showings in Husserl, Heidegger, Hegel, Rousseau, Saussure, Levi-Strauss and others 
Derrida asserts that: 
We already have a foreboding that phonocentrism merges with the historical 
determination of the meaning of Being in general as presence, with all the 
subdeten-ninations which depend on this general form and which organize within it their 
system and their historical sequence (presence of the thing to sight as eidos, presence as 
substance/essence/existence [ousia], temporal presence as point [shgmý] of the now or of 
the moment [nun], the self presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co- 
presence of the other and the self, intersubjectivity as the intentional phenomenon of the 
ego, and so forth). Logocentrism would thus support the determination of the being of 
the entity as presence. '94 
]()I I d., P. 12. 193 Ibid.. p. 3 1. 194 
Ibid., p. 12. 
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Having opened up the disavowal of writing to inspection, linking it in the process to 
Heidegger's insight into the metaphysical determination of Being as presence, the history 
of metaphysics is then, for Derrida, more precisely the history of phono-logo-centrism. 
Now, by calling this tradition into question Derrida's ambition is not simply to 
rehabilitate and endorse writing as against the superior truth claims of speech: "It has, " he 
says, "never been a case of opposing a graphocentrism to a logocentrism ... it is not a 
question of returning to writing its rights, its superiority or its dignity. ""' The order of 
dependence between speech and writing cannot be argued. As long as one thinks of 
speech and writing in conceptual terms, writing must efface itself before speech as its 
truth. Nor, following this, can the concepts of speech and writing, taken in their common 
and "literal" sense, serve to explain what Derrida attempts to think here. Rather, Derrida's 
analyses pursue a different goal, aiming to both establish the law that explains why and 
how what is presumed to be pure, ideal, transcendental and so on is necessarily 
interwoven and contaminated by what is taken to be its opposite, and why speech in its 
purity cannot be thought except by referring to writing. To deconstruct the subordination 
of writing to speech is thus to construct the universal and irreducible economy that 
accounts for both exclusion and contamination. The name Derrida gives to this economy 
is the arche-synthesis of "Vecriture, " or, more properly, inscription in general or arche- 
writing. Inscription has, he says, nothing mundane about it, it is beyond Being, epekeina 
tes ousias. In short, writing, in the sense of inscription, has little or nothing to do with the 
(anthropological, subjective, and so on) act of writing; it is not determined by what it is t: ý 
about, nor has it anything essentially in common with the signs present on the page. Nor 
again does it coincide with the (literary or philosophical) production of these signs. 
Without worldly value and essence inscription is, as Rodolphe Gasche has famously 
pointed out, "only, if one may say so, the quasi -transcendental synthesis that accounts for 
195 P., p. 12. 
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the necessary corruption of the idealities, or transcendentals of all sorts, by what they are 
defined against, and at the very moment of their constitution. ""' 
As quasi -transcendental, inscription is not a "theme" of deconstruction, a point, 
identity, or simple position: it is rather that of which every position is of itself 
confounded ... inscription, mark, text and not only thesis or thenie-inscription of the 
thesis. Position here translates the Hegelian concept of Setzung, the determination of one 
with regard to an other, or to something in contrast with it. Position is thus a form of 
constitution by means of which something becomes what it is through its relation to 
something other. As Gasche points out, inscription, however, does not signify such a 
relation; on the contrary, it is the determination of positional constitution, of the relation 
of the same and the other, for it demonstrates that this relation refers to something that 
cannot in any case be posited-the alterity of the other-since this alterity is itself the 
ground of possibility of a positing self. Inscription in this case refers to an irreducible 
reference to other, anterior to an already constituted subject that presupposes this 
reference as well as that which such a subject constitutes through positing. This implies 
the relation of philosophy to its others cannot be one of opposition. "' 
If it is not reducible to a theme or thesis how, then, are we to characterize the 
achievements of inscription? Recognizing the specificity of Derrida's reconception of 
writing in terms of this system of relations-as "quasi -tran sen dental synthesis"-entails 
an initial account of the "instituted trace" : 
Even before it is linked to incision, engraving, drawing, or the letter, to a signifier 
referring in general to a signifier signified by it, the concept of the graphie [unit of a 
possible graphic systern] implies the frame work of the instituted trace, as the possibility 
common to all systerns of , ignification. 
"' 
196 Rodolphe Gascliý, The Tain of theAfirror: Derrida and the PhilosophY of Reflection, (Cambridgc, 
Nlass.: Havard University Press, 1986). p. 274. 
97 Ibid., p. 158. 
'), S OG., p. 46. 
126 
The exemplarity of the instituted trace lies in its capacity to play with all the marks and 
non marks of the other. We are familiar since Of Granimatology that the mark or trace is 
the visible sign of the absent other, but the substitution of trace for other depends upon 
the instituted trace, the absolutely other that is not the absence of a presence. The 
instituted trace is the possibility of all systems of signification both graphic and phonic. It 
is, as Derrida says, unmotivated, in the sense that it is not intentionally or naturally linked 
to the signified. The trace is not something created, installed, or instituted in the 
conventional sense, it exceeds the opposition between nature and culture and cannot be 
thought outside a system where "difference appears as such. ""' The appearance of 
difference as such means the appearance of difference, the other, as "self-occultation. 
When the other announces itself as such, it presents itself in the dissimulation of itself 
that is to say the dissimulation of its "as such, " has always already begun and no 
structure of the entity escapes i t. 
-2M Hence, "the trace can only imprint itself by referring 
to the other, to another trace. "2... In short, the trace can never appear and manifest itself in 
its phenomenon. 
Given the solidarity between tracing and dissimulation, it follows that it is impossible 
to ask what the trace is, because this would imply that it could appear, come into view, in 
its essence. To ask what the instituted trace is is to presuppose a difference, between 
appearance and essence for example, which the trace is intended to explain. How then is 
one to speak of the trace? Here we can again turn to Gasch6. As he rightly points out, 
ývhat is at issue here can be made more precise by determining it in terms of what Derrida 
calls a "structure de renvoi generalisee" The notion of structure de renvoi translates the 
German I'Criveisimpstruktur and has been rendered by its English translators as 
i-clCrential structure" or "structure of reference. " The trace is the minimal structure of 
199 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
Ibid., p. 47. 
201 1) , P. 331. 
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generalized reference, whereby reference must be understood in the broadest sense of 
referring, as alluding or pointing to something other. The trace is a minimal structure of 
referral to the extent that it constitutes an economy of difference between terms of 
entities. 202 In this connection, because "this trace is the opening of the first exterloritY in 
general, the enigmatic relation of the living to its other and of an inside to an outside: 
spacing, ' 
2111 it iS the origin of space. Moreover, because the doubling characteristic of the 
structure of referentiality is a process of temporalization as well, the trace is equally to be 
seen as the primordial constitution of time. The trace is thus the constituting possibility or 
"originary synthesis" of the differential interplay which intimately affects everything that 
enters in to a relation of difference or opposition-presence and absence, self and other, 
living and non living, indeed of all alterity between terms and entities. All this comes into 
f0cus when Derrida writes: 
These oppositions have meaning only after the possibility of the trace. The 
"uni-notivatedness" of the sign requires a synthesis in which the completely other is 
announced as such-without any simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or 
continuity-within what is not it. Is announced as such: there we have all history, from 
what metaphysics has defined as "non living" up to "consciousness, " passing through all 
levels of animal organization. The trace, where the relationship with the other is marked, 
articulates its possibility in the entire field of the entity [6tant], which metaphysics has 
defined as the bcing-present starting from the occulted movement of the trace. The trace 
must be thought before the entity. But the movement of the trace is necessarily occulted, 
it produces itself as self-occultation. When the other announces itself as such, it presents 
itself in the dissimulation of itself. "" 
202 Cf. ol). (-it., il 19 at p. 190. 203 0G., p. 70. 204 
Ibid., p. 47. 
128 
At this point I have said enough about the trace to allow us to conclude that inscription in 
general or arche-writing is something "older, " more "originary, " than writing as material 
production or the production of signs. As the minimal structure of all difference, and 
hence of all alterity between terms and entities, it points to the irreducibility of inscription 
in general. When we speak of arche-writing we refer to the cluster or "unity" of the 
infrastructural chain of quasi -transendental s diffýrance (spacing/temporalization, 
differing/deferring), repetition, reserve, iteration, mark, pharmakon, gi-anune, grapheme, 
etc., that Derrida analysed separately following his discovery of the problernatics of 
arche-writing. Inscription in general is therefore to be considered as the specificity, so to 
speak, of the clustered synthesis of arche-writing. It is the feature common to a variety of 
infrastructures linked together in what is called general writing. As "originary" syntheses 
the quasi -transcendental s constitute the medium or "open matrix" between the binary 
oppositions of metaphysics and between metaphysics and its others, as well as the non 
simple element that encompasses these coupled terms. Finally, let me recall Derrida's 
assertion that the infrastructures were to be understood as "undecidables". As he says, to 
call ii1frastructures undecidables is to stress that they are "unities of simulacrum, [of] 
"false" verbal properties (nominal or semantic) that can no longer be included within 
philosophic (binary) opposition, but which, however, inhabit philosophical opposition, 
resisting and disorganizing it, without ever constituting a third term, without ever leaving 
woni for a solution in the form of speculative dialectics". 205 In sum, insofar as it is a 
ocneral theory or system, arche-writing explains the necessary inscription of all of I- 
philosophy's axial concepts (and of what they designate) within differential structures or 
systems. The instituted trace as writing articulates the same "logic" that also organizes 
Derrida's later works: an -originary complication of origin" and a "law of differential 
contamination" that precedes the opposition between nature and convention, symbol and 
sion, etc., it therefore accounts for the binary axiomatic (including the constitutive Cý -- 
205 P., p. 43. 
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contradictions it engenders) of the metaphysical text through a series of terms that 
represent laws of distribution and disposition. If it allows for the articulation of difference 
as such, the trace both accounts for the logic of logocentric metaphysics and exceeds it. 
Having offered this succinct account of Derrida's philosophy of writing as this 
emerges in the early work, let me turn to the main concerns of this chapter. I will now 
take up the issue of Derrida's negotiations between philosophy and the "sciences 
humaines" under the aegis of structuralism. This episode is an essential preface to the 
question of the implication of the Derridean text in contemporarly techno-scientific 
culture, as this forms a major part of the context in which his first major works are 
published. Indeed, as Derrida reports in "The Ends of Man, " the "dominating and spell- 
binding extension of the "human sciences" within the philosophical field" was one of the 
decisive traits that contributed to the questioning of humanism and thereby to the marking 
206 
of the closure of metaphysics . That said, while Derrida recognises the importance of 
structuralism to a certain phase of French thought, he is also strongly critical of it, 
questioning not only its linguistic reductionism and systematic pretensions but more 
ociierally the discourse of the human sciences, a discourse insufficiently cognisant of its I- 
metaphysical roots. 207 As I now want to show, Derrida's deconstructive inheritance of 
some of the central tenets of the structuralist program can be seen as exemplary of a 
ccrtain style of philosophizing which is both characteristic of the period and carries with 
it a clear set of institutional and disciplinary stakes that articulate a "trembling" of the 
horders between disciplines. 
206 El I., p. 117. 
207 Sec Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences", In jý, j-j, tj, jj9 
and I)iýfercnce, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), pp. 284-285, hereal'tcr cited as SSP 
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Deconstructing structuralism: Levi-Strauss and techno-science 
It is now generally accepted that there was a significant reorientation in French 
philosophical thought during the 1950s and 1960s, characterized by a shift of attention 
away from a philosophy concerned with consciousness, perception, and Being-the 
44 subject" in history-to a discourse centred on the analysis of structure and language. 
This episode, commonly referred to as the "linguistic turn, " has been well documented 
and discussed in standard critical accounts of the period, but, as Christopher Johnson has 
pointed out in a number of important studies, less attention is normally given to the 
renewed dialogue with science and technology implicit in the structuralist program. 208 
The normally accepted genealogy of structuralism traces a single line of descent from the 
structural linguistics of Saussure through to Levi-Strauss's structural anthropology and 
the various structuralist approaches it inspired in other disciplines, from psychoanalysis 
and Marxism to literary criticism and cinema studies. Certainly the reference to Saussure, 
in particular, is an important component of the theoretical edifice Levi-Strauss constructs 
under the name of structuralism. It is also the case that for those in the human sciences as 
a theory of natural language the linguistic model was, and remains, intuitively the most 
assimilable illustration of the structuralist method. However, as Johnson notes, to treat 
the linguistic component of structuralist theory as absolute, or even predominant, would 
be to ignore the context in which the theory was embedded, more specifically, the 
discourse of the then new technologies of information and the sign sciences of 
information theory, molecular biology and cybernetics without which the structuralist 
209 
"cvolution would have been, quite literally, impossible. A strong characteristic of the 
departing humanist-existential philosophy that had dominated the previous period was of 
cow-sc the general lack of such a dialogue, no doubt, as Johnson says, due in part to 
208 See Christopher Johnson, SYsteni and Writing in the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida, (Cambridge 
Univcrsitý Press, 1993); "Derrida and Science" in Revue Internationale de Philosophic 3/1998, n' 205. 
pp. 477-493: and "Ambient Tcchnologics, Uncanny Signs" in Oxford Literary Review, Vol 21,2000. pp. 
117-133. NIN reading ot'Derrida in relation to the human sciences \kill draw heavily on these texts. 2og Johnson (2000) Cf. op. cit., n 2208 at p. 
2. 
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existentialism's rejection of the neo-Kantian epistemology of its immediate predecessors: 
"a philosophy of the concrete and of the vecu had no need of a transcendental idealism 
predicated on the example of scientific thought". 210 Coupled with this phenomenology's 
desire to demarcate an originary site for human being in its phenomenal or factical 
existence culminates in Heidegger's most radical developments on Being and his blunt 
assertion that "science does not think". 211 Very much in contrast to this were the 
aspirations of structuralism to an objective and scientific status beyond philosophy and 
ideology, a methodological efficacy in the study of man comparable to that of the exact 
sciences. In this connection, in an attempt to fuse nature and culture the structural 
anthropology of Levi-Strauss itself claimed inspiration from the then dramatic advances 
of a number of auxiliary models with a techno-scientific component-biology, 
cybernetics, information theory-in addition to, and often inseparable from, the 
fundamental contribution of linguistics. In this respect it is very instructive to read the 
introduction to Norbert Wiener's Qybernetics, published in 1948. The first thing that 
strikes the reader of this introduction is just how wide Weiner's conception of the field of 
cybernetics is. In a sentence which must have provided inspiration for Levi-Strauss, 
having indicated the potential of cybernetics in the fields of physiology, neurology and 
psychology, Wiener extends the possible interdisciplinary applications of the discipline 
into the social and human sciences: "As to sociology and anthroplogy, it is manifest that 
the importance of information and communication as mechanisms of organization 
proceeds beyond the individual into the community. 99212 Whatever Wiener's subsequent 
i-esei-vations about the applicability of cybernetics to the social sciences, 213 it is clearly his 
idea of information as a mechanism of regulation that informs Levi-Strauss's thought. 
210 Idid., p. 2. 211 1 VCT, p. 3 4. 
21-1 Norbert Wiener, The Human ust, of Human Beings 
Sýotllswoode. 1950), p. IS. 
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Now, however limited the substance of its claims might appear in retrospect, at least 
one effect of the structuralist adventure was the opening up of French philosophy to a 
greater degree of interdisciplinary exchange both within and beyond the traditional circle 
of humanistic disciplines. In this regard Derrida's deconstructive reading of Levi-Strauss 
and the scientistic claims of structuralism should not be seen as a rejection of the renewed 
dialogue with techno-science implicit in the structuralist programme. Rather, it is a 
displacement of this programme in response to the very specific historical circumstance 
involving the limitation and decentering of the structrality of structure and a change in 
emphasis from the restricted economy of "language" to the more general economy of 
44writing": "This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the 
i-noment when, in the absence of a centre or origin, everything became discourse- 
provided we can agree on this word-that is to say, a system in which the central 
signified, is never absolutely present out side a system of differences. The absence of the 
,, 214 transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely . 
This shift from "language to "writing" had a double effect. First, "Man" was irrevocably 
displaced as a possible object of knowledge, which is to say becomes an object known 
scientifically as an effect of structure; second, the universals of Western thought were 
confronted with the enigma of their outside and other. The spreading impact of the human 
sciences on philosophy, and the resulting collapse of philosophy's traditional "over- 
arching" position as arbiter of rational enquiry, exposes it to the necessity of rethinking its 0 
i-clation to the multiple orders of knowledge and practice. 
This brings me to what is one of the most discussed moments of the period, what is 
now conventionally presented as a minor epistemic shift occurring within structuralism, 
or between structuralism and post-structuralism (or ultra-, neo-, or superstructural ism), 
but which is actually much more complex . 
215 The different humanist reactions to 
SSP.. p. 280. 
For a wide ranging discussion of the cornplcxities involved here see Tilottarna Rjan, Deconstruction 
an(I the Reimainders of Phenomenology, (Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002 
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structuralism could be characterized as a rearguard action of a more traditional 
philosophy that has registered the trauma of its subjection to the rapid transformations of 
post-war techno-scientific culture, but had never assimilated or accepted the lessons of 
the human sciences. On the other hand, certain figures of French philosophy, and 
particularly Derrida, had both assimilated the lessons of structuralism and were prepared 
to take them a step further. 
As is well known, Derrida initially offered grammatology as "the science of 
textuality, " claiming that it "must go beyond metaphysical positivism and scientism, and 
accentuate whatever in the effective work of science contributes to freeing it of the 
metaphysical bonds that have borne on its definition and its movement since its 
,, 216 beginnings . Furthermore, he proposed that "grammatology must pursue and 
consolidate that which, in scientific practice, has always already begun to exceed the 
logocentric closure". 217 By this he means scientific practices that take logos as central, 
which assert the prevalence of the spoken word, need to be examined and explored at 
their Ili-nits. Grammatology takes up the question of science as logos and considers the 
extent to which it can take itself as a science. Grammatology "Inscribes and delimits 
science"218 That is, grammatology writes or rewrites the features or conditions of a 
particular science and at the same time demonstrates the limits, margins, places of closure 
which that particular science or even science-in-general sets for itself by its very practice. 
Such a move is evident in Derrida's encounter with Levi-Strauss. For as Derrida 
effectively shows, however radical Levi-Strauss' work may appear, there is a conceptual 
threshold that he is unwilling, or perhaps simply unable, to cross. In this case, Derrida's 
deconstructive reading of the structuralist programme articulates what inay be seen as a 
central paradox in Levi-Strauss's thought: that while he is impeccably inodern in his 
niediation of the science and technology of his time, he is at the same time entirely 
216 
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traditional in his failure to think through the implications of this ambient culture. Thus, 
while Levi-Strauss draws on both the information sciences and the cybernetic model his 
thinking is symptomatic of the metaphysical impulse that Derrida articulates through his L- 
elaboration of the traditional treatment of writing. This is apparent from Derrida's now 
classic reading in Of Grammatology. 219 Gathering a series of remarks and narratives from 
Levi-Strauss's work, Derrida underlines how the anthropologists distinction between 
primitive and civilized societies depends upon a distinction between speech and writinc, L- 
that is derived from the concepts and values of metaphysics. More specifically, Levi- 
Strauss's unarticulated use of this distinction is predicated on the logocentric disavowal 
or inscription whereby writing is primarily seen as an auxiliary technology, an instrument 
or too] with respect to speech-where speech precedes writing and the two are distinct. 
Levi-Strauss's apparent exit from philosophy through the human sciences naively repeats 
traditional philosophical values in producing itself through schema that are complicit with 
the very discourse from which he wishes to wrest himself. When least metaphysical 
Levi-Strauss is at his most metaphysical. The naivety of Levi-Strauss's enterprise is not, 
however, a historical contingency, nor can it be reduced. As Derrida says: 
This necessity is irreducible, it is not a historical contingency; we should carefully 
consider all its implications. But if no-one can escape it, if no-one is therefore 
responsible for giving in to it, however little, this does not mean that all ways of giving 
in to it are equally pertinent. The quality and fecundity of a discourse are perhaps to be 
measured by the critical rigour with which this relation to the history of metaphysics and 
inherited concepts is thought through. This Is about a critical relation to the language of 
the [hurnan sciences] and a critical responsibility of the discourse itself. It is a question 
of explicitly and systernatically posing tne problem of the status of a discourse which 
219 
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borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage 
itself. A problem of economy and strategy. 
220 
Of economy and strategy and, therefore, we might want to say, of the calculation of 
writing and the stakes of deconstruction. What I want to do now is examine these stakes 
in more detail as they emerge from out of Derrida's entry into the debate between 
philosophy and the human sciences, a context which, as will now be apparent, points to 
the interaction of Derrida's work with a wider contemporary episteme, and, within that 
episteme, the singular discourses of the sciences and new information and tele- 
communication technologies. 
Aporetic middle ground: reinscribing Husserl 
As I have said, Derrida's negotiation between philosophy and the human sciences 
along with his deconstruction of the structuralist program carries with it and develops a 
clear set of intellectual, disciplinary and institutional stakes. Such stakes, which have 
often been ignored or underestimated by Derrida's interpreters, go to the heart of his 
articulation of the closure of metaphysics and of the elaboration of general or arche- 
Nvi-iting. On the one hand, Derrida wishes to show that it is impossible to dominate 
philosophical concepts from outside philosophy, since the attempt meets an essential 
limit in the very philosophical nature of the terms being used to dominate it. In this case 
Derricla's patient interrogation of, for example, the terms of propriety embedded in the 
discourses of linguistics, poetics, rhetoric, anthropology, sociology, history, even 
psychoanalysis, involves demonstrating that in every case the very concepts supposed to 
operate the reduction of traditional philosophical problems to various positive conditions 
ýu-e themselves blindly and uncritically inherited from the philosophical tradition. Here, 
according to a mechanism Derrida will later describe as "transcendental contraband, " the 
120 SSP., p. 282. 
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very concept supposed to reduce the transcendental claims of philosophy itself comes to 
occupy a transcendental position which the discourse in question has no further means of 
understanding, just because it is premised on the claim to reduce the transcendental 
claims of philosophy to more "positive" realities of whatever order. In the absence of 
critical analysis of this mechanism in general, the human sciences and indeed science per 
se remains in thrall to the very metaphysical concepts it claims to reduce. On the other 
hand however, and for the same reason, philosophy is incapable of dominating the 
"empiricity" or "facticity"-that is, their inscription-of these same discourses since this 
empiricity and facticity inform its very gestures when it is least aware of it. 221 The 
consequent negotiation between philosophy and the human sciences enacts a 
displacement and reorganization of the "metaphysical" opposition between a 
transcendental approach and an empirical approach opening up an aporetic and 
uncontrollable "position" that privileges neither the inside nor the outside, but analyses 
what constitutes the very possibility of these oppositions by placing the opposites back 
into the transductive relation in which they are compounded with one another. What is 
important is that, for Derrida, it places us in a middle ground, neither suspended in the 
transcendental nor rooted to the empirical, neither in philosophy nor any empirical 
negotiation of the world that refuses to pass through the transcendental. 
The preceding is intimately informed and corroborated for Derrida by a fundamental 
hisight achieved in the late work of Husserl. His previous radicalization of the Husserlian 
insi, ght in both The Problem of Genesis in the Philosophy of Husserl and his introduction 
to The Origin of GeometrY as well as the elaboration of the trace in Speech and 
Phenoinena form the background to immense weight of Derrida's argument showing how 
it is both "possible" and irreducible thereby connecting it to the problematic of writing. 
Derrida's arguments herc are well known but in the context of the above argument with 
regard to the structuralist programme it will be useful to briefly refer to them in turn. 
12 ,1 For a fuller account of this pervasivc structure in Derrida's writings see "Dcrridabase, " in Geoffrey 
Bennington and Jacqucs Derrida, Jczcques Derri&i (Chicago: Chicago Universitý Press, 1993), pp. 267-284. 
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For Husserlian Phenomenology the difference between the transcendental and the 
empirical assumes the form of, on the one hand, ideal objects-attained through what 
Husserl calls the phenomenological reduction, "bracketing" or epoch6 of the life world 
with all its variations and contingencies-and, on the other, the world in its difference 
and empiricity. In Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry" this difference was radicalized 
when he derived the possibility of the phenomenological reduction of the world-and the 
accompanying access to transcendental ideality-from writing; for Husserl, ideality must 
be embodied and repeatable to escape the limitations of a unique present. This 
understanding derives from an "intentional analysis" that preserves writings relation to a 
pure consciousness and disregards writing's "factuality, " its worldly existence. However, 
thereby lies the paradox of the Husserlian text and what I said above with regard to Le-vi- 
Strauss's relation to the modern techoscientific world-he is both modern and 
traditional-can equally be said of Husserl with the difference that whereas Levi-Strauss 
would wish to effect the reduction of philosophy Husserl works in the opposite direction 
seeking to protect the philosophical gaze from an empirical and historical outside to 
which it opens itself. With an increasing incisiveness Derrida analyses the Husserlian 
corpus in terms of the evasions and substitutions used to achieve this. He takes up 
Husserl's anxiety over "a certain technicist and objectivist irresponsibility" in the practice 
of science and philosophy, along with a -historicism blinded by the empirical cult of fact 
and causalist presumption. 222 At the risk of oversimplification let me say Husserl 
worried over the circumstance that geometrical theorems can be deduced algebraically- 
iii effect that Euclid can be replaced by a machine. Technicization, as the repeatability of 
or rnanipulation of marks not ground in some conscious intuition, is presented as a loss of 
nieniory. Husserl agonized about the power of calculative formulations in philosophy and 
in the sciences generally. He argued that hypomnesic calculation had come to determine 
the essence of modernity, usurping the originary eidetic intuitions upon which certainty of 
III Jacques Derrida, E(Imund Husserl's Origin of Geometty An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavy, Jr. 
(1-incolmUniversm of Nebraska Press. 1989), p. 26. hereafter cited as 10G. 
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deduction in geometry should have been founded. Trying to trace the historical genesis or 
constitution of ideal meaning Husserl insisted upon the "Imperative of univocity, " that the I 
same idealities bear the same meaning across time, that later generations be able to repeat 
on and reactivate exactly the same sense, in order thereby to allow communicati and hence 
progress among generations of investigators. 
In deconstructing Husserl, Derrida does not renounce the constitution of meaning and 
scientific ideas, even while he emphasizes the inscription of ideality in the flux of writing. 
In an often quoted passage of Of GrammatologY he writes: 
Writing is not only an auxiliary means in the service of science-and possibly its 
object- but first, as Husserl in particular pointed out in the Origin of Geometrv, the 
condition of the possibility of ideal objects and therefore of scientific objectivity. 
Before being its object, writing is the condition of the epistýnzý.... Historicity itself is 
tied to the possibility of writing ; to the possibility of writing in general, beyond those 
particular forms of writing in the name of which we have long spoken of peoples 
without writing and without history. Before being the object of history-of an 
historical science-writing opens the field of history-of historical becoming. And the 
fonTier (Historic in Gen-nan) presupposes the latter (Geschichte). 223 
To the extent that writing is necessary for the constitution of sense, Husserl's 
phenomenology does not leave the realm of factuality, but it is not an empiricism; it is a 
science of origins insofar as it insists that the historical habitat authenticate truth. History 
is where instituting fact is singular, irreducible and invariable. In seeking the primordial 
constitution of truth, phenomenology proceeds from the sedimentation of tradition, from 
histoi-v, to the institutive act, an origin, "the unique fact of the first tinze, " 224 We may 
venture that this sedimentation constitutes an archive. Writing inscribes the past in a way 
. ). 13 
. OG.. p. 27. 224 
IOG., p. 48. 
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that produces a new relation to the present and future, which may now be conceived 
within the horizon of a historical temporality, and as the element of (the transmission of) 
ideality. As Derrida is keen to emphasize, writing constitutes ideal objects by enabling 
them to transcend the facticity of a particular time and place. Yet the condition of idealitv I 
is the repetition of a written mark through time and space, an inscription that is itself a 
sedimentary deposit, necessarily restricting the purity of the transcendence from the 
sediment that is aimed at. Conversely, the sedimentary mark that makes up the support of 
ideality does not have the status of a substantial thing, for such repetition is not possible 
unless the difference of each inscription re-marks the inscription. This movement reveals 
that, if writing constitutes transcendence, arche-writing comprehends the very process of 
constitution. Arche-writing "originates" in the very genetivity of-a written origin or 
inscription, "an origin which has no meaning before the of, an origin inseperable from 
genetivity and from the space that it engenders and orients: an inscribed origin. The 
inscription is the written origin: traced and henceforth inscribed in a system, in a figure 
which it no longer governs. " 225 In contrast to Husserl's concept of writing as what 
emancipates sense from the factual or worldly realm, Derrida's notion of inscription 
points to a dehiscence, an opening, that confounds the opposition of the finite and the 
infinite, sarne and other, being-sense and graphic sign. Whereas the phenomenolgical 
reduction is aimed at essences, an inscribed origin exceeds any notion of a singular or 
pure source; writing is what frees sense from the temporal and spatial limits of the 
speaking subject to create "an intentionality without intenturn"; that is, writing displaces 
phenomenological intentionality with an "autonomous [quasi] transcendental field". 
226 
225 Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essaý on the Thought of Eninianuel Levinas, " in 
Writing and Difficrence, trans. Alan Bass, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 115. 
226 10G., P. 88. ' 
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The method of deconstruction: an argument for historical necessity 
This excusion into Derrida's engagement with Husserlian phenomenology allows us L- ý 
to approach the question aporetic status of the deconstructive gesture. Derrida's thinking, 
it now seems reasonably clear, follows a rhythm which shuttles between what would 
traditionally be distinguished as the transcendental and the empirical (as philosophy and 
its others), asserting the priority of neither and the subordination of both to a wider 
movement of generalized inscription neither is in a position to understand. Richard 
Beardsworth has called this orientation the method of deconstruction. 227 Now, as anyone 
who is familiar with Derrida's work will recall, the use of the term method as a means of 
characterizing what goes on with deconstruction is controversial. As Derrida has repeated 
insisted, deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one, especially if 
the technical and procedural significations of the word is stressed. Recognizing the 
necessity of Derrida's resistance to this term Beardsworth emphasizes that his use of it is 
contextually determined and strategic, motivated by a wish to press home the precise 
disciplinary and institutional stakes of Derrida's text. In citing Beardsworth I want to 
take up this task but with the additional aim of tying this to the historical dimension of 
Derrida's argument. In this connection, if, like Beardsworth, my use of the term method 
underscores the necessity of thinking through the institutional and disciplinary 
iniplications that follow from Derrida's reinscription of the metaphysical opposition 
between the transcendental and empirical, it also emphasizes the peculiarity that will 
inake of deconstruction a radical empiricism that proceeds according to what Derrida 
takes to be the necessity of a certain "historical analysis". 
In order to open onto what it at issue here let me pose an open set of questions that are 
fact first asked by Gayatri Spivak in her preface to the English translation of Of 
Granunatology. 228 Spivak has been discussing a number of small but decisive changes 
I)I -- See Richard Beardsworth, Derrida & the Political, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 5. 
22S OG. pp. ix-Mwii. 
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and interpolations that have made their way into the first part of Derrida's text (Part I of 
Of Grammatology is an expanded version of a number of review articles of books 
published in the early 1960s), changes which turn on Derrida's arguments for the fact that 
the change in emphasis from language to writing are historically necessary events. Let me 
briefly sketch what Spivak is referring to. In Of Grammatology Derrida characterizes the 
present age as one in "suspense between two ages of writing, " one in which "linear 
writing" and "the book" are "[b]y a slow movement whose necessity is hardly 
perceptible, " marked by a closure we thereby merely glimpse. Opening the first chapter of 
part I of the text ("The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing") Derrida reads the 
signs of this closure, which has "already been announced ... as such and after thefact, " in 
a generalized crisis, an exhaustion, which is also a symptom which indicates that "a 
historico-metaphysical epoch must finally determine as language the totality of its 
,, 229 problematic horizon . Insofar as the definition of language that Derrida is working 
with here takes its point of departure in certain working hypotheses of classical 
structuralism (mainly in the officially sanctioned reading of Saussure's differential notion 
of the sign as outlined in his Cours de linguistique generale and in the writings of Levi- 
Strauss which Derrida takes to privilege a theoretically comprehensive and enclosed 
systern which attaches it in general to "hearing (understanding)-oneself-sPeak") such a 
crisis marks a decentering of the structuralist "taxonomy" which "strictly speaking, 
amounts to destroying the concept of the "sign" and its entire logic. " Again, this is a 
matter of necessity since, as Derrida states, "[u]ndoubtedly, it is not by chance that this 
overit, helining supervenes at the moment when the extension of the concept of language 
effaces all its limits. " -)30 In the same movement whereby language effaces all its limits, at 
that moment when it ceases to be -guaranteed by the infinite signified that seemed to 
exceed it, " there is announced a new situation for the Western concept of language where 
it is revealed as tile guise or disguise of a writing, "more fundamental than that which, 
119 
- Ibid., p. 6. 230 
Ibid., p. 7. 
142 
before this conversion, passed for the simple supplement to the spoken word". 231 Yet 
again, "[t]hese disguises are not historical contingencies that one might admire or regret. 
Their movement is absolutely necessary, with a necessity that cannot be judged by any 
other tribunal. " Thus, Of Grammatology marks a response to a situation which indicates 
nothing but the necessity of the "death of speech (of so called full speech) and a new 
,, 232 
mutation in the history of writing, of history as writing. Consequently, all those 
domains, both natural and cultural, which for a certain period had been conceived on the 
restricted economy of "language" are now being reconceived on the more general 
economy of writing. As we have seen, writing is the constituting possibility or "originary 
synthesis" of the differential interplay which intimately affects everything that enters in to 
a relation of difference or opposition-presence and absence, self and other, living and 
non living, indeed of all alterity between terms and entities. All the manifestations of the 
resurgence of the graphic, so visibly different, share an irreducible and invisible 
element-the gramme or grapheme, the trace: hence inscription in general. 
Having offered this sketch let me return to Spivak; she asks: "In a text where he 
elaborately launches a theory against teleological patternings of history and thought, 
where he delivers the notion of the play of necessity and contingency, why does Derrida 
tI abricate so strong an argument for historical necessity? Why is the opening chapter- 
"The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing"-full of a slightly embarrassing 
messianic promise? If we really do not believe in "epistemological cut off points, " or in 
the possibility of stepping out of the metaphysical enclosure by simply deciding to, or in 
the linearity of time, then with what seriousness can we declare a different "world to 
coine, " a world where the "values of sign, speech, and writing will be made to tremble. " 
How reconcile ourselves with this break between the world of the past and the world of 
the future? It seems, " Spivak asserts, "an empiricist betrayal of the structure of difference 
131 
Ibid., p. 7. '32 
Ibid., p. 8. 
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and postponement, and any cleconstructive reading of Derrida. will have to take this into 
account. " 
233 
Now, in the light of Derrida's latest concerns, Spivak's assertion that a "slightly 
embarrassing messianic promise" pervades Of Grammatology appears somewhat ironic 
since both the messianic and the promise have become central concerns of Derrida's more 
recent texts. To stick with our present discussion however, let me suggest that judging by 
her remarks Spivak has not taken the measure of Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's 
thinking of the history of Being. As we have seen, Derrida's text carries the full weight of 
this thinking even as it transforms it, even as, for example, he rethinks Heidegger's 
thinking of the end of philosophy as its closure. It would seem Spivak has not taken the 
implications of this distinction on board since it undermines any "break between the 
world of the past and the world of the future". As Derrida tells Henri Ronse (remarks that 
could be taken as a reply to Spivak), "one would be mistaken in coming to the conclusion 
of a death of the book and a birth of writing from that which is entitled "The End of the 
Book and the Beginning of Writing. " One page before the chapter which bears this title a 
distinction is proposed between closure and end. What is held within the demarcated 
closure may continue indefinitely. If one does not simply read the title, it announces 
precisely that there is no end of the book and no beginning of writing. The chapter shows 
just that: writing does not begin. It is even on the basis of writing, if one can put it this 
way, that one can put in question the search for an archie, an absolute beginning, an 
,, 234 orioin. Writing can no more begin, therefore, than the book can end. 
Just as she has missed the distinction Derrida wants to think between end and closure, 
iii speaking of an "empiricist betrayal of the structure of difference and postponement" 
Spi\, ak seems to have underestimated what is at stake in the method of deconstruction. 
Indeed, it is precisely here that one can provide the test for the questions she raises. If this 
niethod articulates the necessity of reinscribing the metaphysical opposition between the 
'33 Ibid., p. lxxxi. 4 P.. pp. 13-14. 
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transcendental and the empirical, thinking this necessity means thinking the inescapabilitý 
of inscription in general-which would include the instances of history, world, 
experience, thought, genetics, technics, etc. Inversely, thinking inscription in general is to 
trace the closure of the logocentric-metaphysical era. Said otherwise, it is in the 
irreducibility of the double move or method of deconstruction (neither in philosophy nor 
outside it) that Derrida locates the historical necessity-the "new mutation in the history 
of writing, in history as writing"-to which this method corresponds. This aporetic 
middle ground opens up a movement that consists not only in inscribing itself in a 
context, but thereby also in producing a context, transforming a given context, opening it 
up and bringing about a new contextual giving. From this point of view, deconstruction 
inflects a context and, in so doing, appeals for a new one from where the future of 
thinking and practice (writing) is thought. 
"We must begin wherever we are": Derrida's radical empiricism 
Let me take a closer look at what is involved here as it emerges in the argumentation 
of Of Grain ma to logy. In this text the method of deconstruction merges with the question 
of the exhobitant: "But what is the exorbitant ? ý9235 Derrida writes, A wished to reach the 
point of a certain exteriority in relation to the totality of the age of logocentrism. Starting 
from this point of exteriority, a certain deconstruction of that totality which is also a 
traced path, of that orb (orbis) which is also orbitary (orbita), might be broached. The 
first gesture of this departure can not be given methodological or logical intra-orbitrary 
assurances. ' 
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Rather, 
The [dcconstructive] departure is radically empincist. It proceeds like a wandefing 
thought oil the possibility of itinerary and of method. It is affected by nonknowledge 
as by its future and it ventures out deliberately. I have myself defined the form and 
OG., p. 16 1. 2311 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 
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vulnerability of this empificism. But here the very concept of empiricism destroys 
itself. 
237 
To exceed the metaphysical orb, to trace its outline or margin, is to think the entirety of 
the classical metaphysical oppositions, particularly the one within which the value of 
empiricism is held-the opposition of philosophy and non philosophy (another name for 
empiricism). The consequences of Derrida's "radical empiricism" are quickly brought 
out: "We must begin wherever we are and the thought of the trace which cannot not take 
the scent into account, has already taught us it is impossible to justify our point of 
departure absolutely. Wherever we are, " Derrida continues, "in a text where we already 
believe ourselves to be". 238 This syntactically enigmatic supposition of the "already" is 
crucial; it illustrates Derrida's notoriously misunderstood "axial proposition" that "there 
is nothing outside the text [there is no outside-text; il Wy a pas de hors-texte]" 239 This 
might more helpfully be phrased as "there is nothing outside context" (but only on 
condition of trying to situate an experience of context as necessarily in excess of, 
supplementary to and breaking with any experience, presence or intention. ) Indeed, what 
is interesting here is that the continuum of writing , as Derrida presents it, is not only a 
structural one, but also, inevitably, a historical one-or rather, more precisely, a natural 
historical one (these terms of course being presented under erasure by Derrida). The 
processes of differentiation and deferment-diffirance-that the tracing of the graphic 
inakcs possible is part of a "pluri -dimensional" process of "evolution" which precedes, 
conditions, and cuts across (or, rather, cuts together and grafts) all orders of beings 
exmiding t'ar bcyond the narrowly conceived instance of the "human": 
'3 7 Ibid., p. 162. 
239 Ibid. 
23Y 
Ibid., p. 163. 
146 
This movement goes far beyond the possibilities of the "Intentional consciousness. " It 
is an emergence which makes the granuný appear as such (that is to say according to a 
new structure of non presence) and undoubtedly makes possible the emergence of 
systems of writing in the narrow sense. Since "genetic inscription" and the "short 
programmatic chains" regulating the behaviour of the amoeba or the annelid up to the 
passage beyond alphabetic writing to the orders of the logos and of a certain horno 
sapiens, the possibility of the grammý structures the movement of its history according 
to rigorously original levels, types and rhythms. 240 
All this points to the fact that Derrida's radically empiricist deconstructive method 
depends on a strategy that justifies its departure as an "historical analysis, " a move which 
requires that an incision be made in the general movement of the field in the process of 
deconstruction. Derrida summarizes these arguments in Positions when he writes: 
The incision of deconstruction, which is not a voluntary decision or an absolute 
beginning, does not take place just anywhere, or in an absolute elsewhere. An incision, 
precisely, it can be made only according to lines of force and forces of rupture that are 
localizable in the discourse to be deconstructed. The topical and technical 
detennination of the most necessary sites and operators-beginnings, holds, levers, 
etc. -In a given situation depends upon an historical analysis. The analysis is made in 
the general movement of the field, and is never exhausted by the conscious calculation 
ol'a subject. 
24 1 
As an historical analysis Derrida's exorbitant method traces a certain force of dislocation 
or heterogeneity, a disjunction of the present in which something happens. Here, let me 
recall Derrida's insistence that "Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not 
14' ) Ibid., p. 84. 241 
82. 
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await the deliberation, consciousness or organization of a subject, or even of modernity. It 
deconstructs it-self. It can be deconstructed. [(7a se d&onstruit. ] The -it" [p] is not here 
an impersonal thing that is opposed to some egological subjectivity. It is ill 
deconstruction (the Littre says, "to cleconstruct it-self [se diconstruire] ... to lose its 
construction , ). 
242 Indeed, it is this question which opens the program of Of 
Grammatology. Part I of this text ("Writing before the Letter"), in which Derrida relates 
the problematic of writing as idea and as phenomenon to both the mainstream of Western 
philosophy and its other(s), constitutes a manifesto for what deconstructs itself. As such it 
is something of a declaration that, 
corresponds to a condition of forces and translates a historical calculation. Thus, over 
and above those that I have already defined, a certain number of givens belonging to the 
discourse of our time have progressively imposed this choice upon me. The word 
[writing] must refer itself to a certain number of contemporary discourses whose force I 
intend to take into account. Not that I accept them totally. But the word [writing] 
establishes the clearest connections with them and thus permits me to dispense with 
certain developments which have already demonstrated their effectiveness in those 
fields. 243 
In pointing up this attachment to a certain number of contemporary discourses, contextual 
givens ("lines of force") of the general movement of the field in deconstruction, Derrida 
attests to those exigencies that prompted him to advance the historical analysis of the 
closure of the logocentic-metaphysical era. In this connection, as I noted at the outset of 
this chapter, OJ'Gi-annnatology proceeds from a gesture that has become characteristic of 
many of Derrida's initiatives-an enumeration of the historical signs or symptoms tbt 
242 Jacques Derrida. "Letter to a Japanese Friend, " trans. David Wood and Atldrcýý Benjamin in Derrida 
and Difference, ed. D. Wood and R. Bernasconi, (EvanstonNorthwestern Univcrsity Press, 1988), pp. I 
V. 4. 
ý43 OG., p. 70. 
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call for the initiative in question. In this case the signs pointing to the necessity of the 
transition from language to the more general notion of writing. In Derrida's words, 
And if this symptom is revealed today, it is not at all due to some more or less ingenious 
discovery initiated by someone here or there. It is due rather to a certain total 
transforination (that can no longer even be called "historical" or -worldwide, " because 
the transfon-nation infringes on the security of such significations) that can also be 
ascertained in other deten-nined fields (mathematical and logical formalization, 
linguistics, ethology, psychoanalysis, political economy, biology, the technology of 
information, programming, etc. ). 244 
This inventory of signs for the global liberation of the graphic can (and should) be 
extended. Indeed, insofar as writing is the "medium of the great metaphysical, scientific, 
technical and economic adventure of the West" as well as of the "cultural areas" on which 
it iniposes its ''laws, " such signs are, at least potentially, limitless. That said, it is not a 
inatter of an overwhelming range of phenomena, an unmanageable empirical abundance; it 
is a matter, rather, of a series of transformations which, exceeding the orbit of logocentic- 
inetaphysics, bring about a thinking of the general economy within which the restricted 
cconomies of the specific disciplines must be approached so as to rethink their implication 
in the event. This is precisely the method of deconstruction and points up Its disciplinary 
and institutional stakes. What I want to do now is press home these stakes. This will lead 
rne to my main interest of the chapter which is to demonstrate the irreducible implication 
of deconstruction and technics. 
144 pp. 6-7. 
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Transversal relations: Derrida and techno-science 
Being concerned with all manner of inscription and with the question of how any 
experience, practice or mode of knowledge relates to writing, the Derridean delimitation of 
metaphysics articulates an open set of transversal relations-envois without destination to 
use Derrida's postal discourse-with emergent forms of knowledge and their technical 
elaborations. In this regard Of Grammatology anticipates many of Derrida's later works 
where we find an explicit call for trans-lating and trans-fering coordinations-multiple 
passages (of thought) that traverse institutional boundaries ("an immense and 
differentiated terrain") and open up entirely new problernatics and institutional (or extra- 
institutional) spaces. 245 The collapse of philosophy's traditional "over-arching" position, 
articulated across Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's thinking of the history of 
philosophy along with his reworking of traditional opposition between the transcendental 
and empirical, exposes it to the necessity of rethinking its relation to multiple orders of 
knowledge and practice and, in particular, to the techno-scientific mutations that affect 
them. It must think its implication in these multiple orders even as it thinks their role in 
it. 246 In calling for this new philosophical undertaking Derrida participates in and 
radicalizes the structuralist program, thereby marking the closure of an epoch of 
specialization (marked in all its breadth by so called "fundamental" and so called 
66 applied" or "end-oriented" research), 247 toward the discursive formation of disciplinary 
245 1 refer in particular to Derrida's extensive writings on the institution of philosophy collected in Du Droit 
6 la philosophie, (Paris: Galil6e, 1990), writings that range from the earliest proposals and essays written 
for GREPH (the "Groupe de recherches sur 1'enseignement de la philosophie") to the more recent work on 
behalf of the College International de Philosophie. 
2" This is a point Fynsk makes. Cf. op. cit., n 176 at p. 154-156. 
247 1 am marking here a quiding thread that weaves together Derrida's interrogation of the thought of 
"destination" as an integral element of his articulation of the closure of metaphysics. Such a thought 
condenses and formalizes possibilities for thinking philosophy's engagement in the transversal relations to 
which it is called. On the one hand, Derrida says, the turn (and return) to philosophy on the part of the 
human or social, life or natural sciences, takes the form of a meditation on ends or finality (which along 
with the question of "destination" in all its breadth, forms the basic lines of Derrida's schema). This turn 
meets in philosophy itself a fundamental transformation of the problematic of ends and transmission in the 
form of a new thought of "dispensation, " "sending ..... the postal, 
"-a thought which no longer belongs to 
philosophy proper and, as we have seen in our discussion of Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's epochal 
schema of the history of metaphysics, has the force to recast the history of philosophy as a thinking of Being 
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syntheses, including, such composites as serniology, molecular biology, cybernetics and 
systems theory. 
It should be clear by now that the intertext of the vocabulary of these disciplines is 
symptomatic and not simply a passing gesture to the intellectual fashion of the moment. 
On the contrary, the philosophical project that Derrida undertakes in Of Grammatology 
and related texts cannot be abstracted from the wider disciplinary context with which 
philosophy has to reckon. It is essential to his affirmation of the urgently contemporary 
relevance of his philosophy of inscription and thereby to the historical strategy 
(contextualization) of the deconstructive method. Indeed, as Johnson says, Deffida's work 
would be "unintelligible if it were abstracted from the context of the post-war advances in 
the related fields of biology and cybernetic theory". 248 Of course, as Johnson rightly points 
out, the sciences Derrida refers to here are not any of the sciences. Modern molecular 
biology and cybernetics occupy what might be termed the "soft" end of the "hard" 
and thereby all the fundamental questions of philosophy and techno-science. In this regard see "Sendoffs" in 
Yale French Studies, n" 77,1990 Yale University. pp. 11-43. 
2" See Johnson, ( 1993) Cf. op. cit., n 208 p. 143. As Johnson points out some of the insights provided by 
these disciplines were being given more general expression in the fields of systems theory whch addresses 
the following problems: 1) the self-organization of complex systems and 2) their self-regulation through 
operations such as feed-back; 3) the passage between the differing levels of a system; 4) the modalities of 
openness and closure of a given system; 5) the question of teleology and finality; 6) the concept of code. 
Along with Johnson a number of commentators have variously pointed to the parellels between his notion of 
differance and the concepts of difference and feedback in cybernetics. As early as 1972 Anthony Wilden 
gave a reading of Derrida of Freud and Derrida that compares Derrida's presentation of differance with 
Gregory Bateson's idea of information as difference. For her part Irene Harvey (1986), asks: "Is not not this 
reflexivity or "circular causality", characteristic of cybernetics, which Derrida himself is aiming towards 
with his notion of diffirance as economy? " Derrida's relation to biology, cybernetics and information 
theory is also treated by Richard Doyle in his On the Living Bej, ond (1994), Chapter 5, "Allergies of 
reading: DNA, language, and the problem of origins". Within the wider scientific field Arklady Plotnitsky's 
Complementari4P (1994) details the "analogies ... .. affinities, " and "metaphoric parellels" of the Derridean 
text with that of Niels Bohr, thereby showing a generalized "anti -epistemo logical" effect of an ineluctable 
loss of meaning accompanying the necessary replacement of the restricted economy of classical physics and 
metaphysics by a general economy. In connection with this see also Plotnitsky's "But It Is Above All Not 
True: Derrida, Relativity, and the "Science Wars" (1997) which offers a response to the attacks on Derrida 
by Gross and Levitt in Higher Superstition (1994) and by Alan Sokal in his Social Text (1996). Christopher 
Norris, on the other hand, enlists Derrida's aid in reining in Plotnitsky in support of a defence of some 
minimal commitment to ontological realism in sci. -nce. (See especially Chapter 4, "Quantum mechanics: a 
case for deconstruction" in Norris, Against Relativism, 1997. ) A number of other studies have, with varying 
dcgree's of success, attempted to offer analogies between Derrida's work to that of chaos theory. In this 
regard see N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound (1990), especially Chapter 7, "Chaos and postructuralism"; 
Laurie McRobert, "On fractal thought" (1995), Robert Smith, "Short Cuts to Derrida" (1996); and 
Alexander Argyros, A Blesssed Ragefor Order. - Deconstruction, Evolution, and Chaos (199 1). 
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sciences, and are of interest to philosophy and the human sciences precisely because they 
touch more immediately upon questions concerning the cultural fabric of "life". The 
preoccupation of cybernetics with information transfer (feedback) and auto-mobile 
processes (communication and control) in animals, machines and humans has placed a 
large question mark over what we mean by the "life" sciences offering as it does new ways 
of thinking the relationship between the animal and the human, the human and the 
technological. The latter question, the question concerning technology, also reminds us 
that Derrida's own thinking of writing is not simply inspired by scientific theor-y (given 
Derrida's deconstruction of the empi ri co-tran scen dental difference it is precisely the 
traditional oppositions of "theory" and "practice, " of "pure" and "applied" science which 
are in question here) but also, inseparably, by the practice of the new information and 
249 
communication technologies developed in the post-war period . In this case, Oj' 
Grammatology, announcing the "death of the book, " participates in a "practical 
deconstruction" which covers electronic messages and which are part of the domain of 
inscription in general. Thus: 
The development of the practical methods of information retrieval extends the 
possibilities of the "message" vastly, to the point where it is no longer the "written" 
translation of a language, the transporting of a signified which could remain spoken in its 
integrity. It goes hand in hand with the extension of phonography and of all the means of 
conserving the spoken language, of making it function without the presence of the 
speaking subject. This development, coupled with that of anthropology and that of the 
history of writing, teaches us that phonetic writing, the medium of the great 
rnetaphysical, scientific, technical, and economic adventure of the West, is limited in 
space and time and limits itself even as it is the process of imposing its laws upon the 
244 Johnson, 1998,0, op. cit., n 208 at p. 478. 
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cultural areas that had escaped it. But this nonfortuitous conjunction of cybernetics and 
the "human sciences" of writing leads to a more profound reversal. " 
Along with those already quoted this statement highlights the considerable importance 
that the recent onset of that set of technologies-designed to optimize the transmission of 
data and relay of inform ati on-termed telecommunicational (in the broadest sense) have 
251 For Derrida's program in general . Indeed, it must 
be emphasized that from his earliest 
texts on Derrida is aware of, and makes clear, the fact that the logocentric repression of 
writing is only now visible and understandable in the light of recent developments in the 
wider interdisciplinary context, that is, the context of what were at the time still recent 
developments in the techno-sciences and most strikingly where this concerns the new 
information and communications technologies. This is point made by Gregory Ulmer who 
argues that Derrida's negotiation of the historical transition toward writing "reflects an 
internalization of the electronic media, thus marking what is really at stake in the debate 
surrounding the closure of Western metaphysics". He then states "a fuller appreciation of 
the import of Derrida's style for philosophy is possible in the context of this technological 
transformation, indicating the position that enables him to compose scripts "beyond the 
book. ,,, 252 Notwithstanding Derrida's resistance to any notion of internalization, Ulmer's 
point is taken; the relevance and scope of Derrida's grammatological articulation of the 
closure of metaphysics is made more intelligible if we consider it in conjunction with 
contemporary technological formations in which it is manifest. Johnson who, as I have 
already indicated, makes much of the resonance between Derrida's formulation of 
writing, trace and other afferent concepts to some of the central concepts of information, 
cybernetic, and systerns theory gocs further taking Derrida's program to be directly 
15() OG 
,, P. 10. 151 In "Sendoffs" Derrida calls for a .... Fundamental" reflection on the concepts of' "communication" and 
"long-distance communication, " on the no doubt structural and thus irreducible links bemcen techne in 
oeneral 
Grcgory Ulmer,, 41)1)led Graniniatology: Post(e)-Pedagogyfroni Jacques Derri(la to Joseph Betivs, 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univcrsity Press. 1985), p. 303. 
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implicated in the more general technological evolution of modem society. He writes, 
"[Derrida's] diagnosis of a certain "end" of (logocentric) metaphysics, of which the 
grammatological turn is a symptom, depends on the total social fact of this qualitative as 
well as quantitative evolution of technological culture" 253 For Jean-Joseph Goux, whom 
Johnson also cites, among other historical factors it is the fact of the new ambient 
technologies which have made possible Derrida's deconstruction of the traditional 
downgrading of writing as mere techne. Goux writes: 
The scriptural and graphical operation, which moreover, raises the very question of 
technology, of the general relation between the living and the machine, is no longer an 
object of disparagement. There is no longer a philosophical downgrading of the material 
reality of the signifier, what cybernetic theory readily refers to as the "support" of a 
"semantics"... As we know, for the new technicist thought, meaning or information have 
no intrinsic essentiality. According to the cyberrieticians, meaning is nothing more than 
the ensemble of actions it both activates and regulates from machine to machine. It is 
clearly this new phase of infon-nation technology, still in its early stages, which Derrida 
alludes to, this revolutionary event in the history of the gram that, among other historical 
determinants, has made possible the new grammatological enquiry. 254 
Following Goux's remarks let me now insist on this point: contemporary technological 
society as a whole far from being merely a theme of the Derridean text does in fact 
constitute the field from which the closure of the logocentric epoch can understood and is 
the key to its deconstruction. 
Such insistence must, of course, be tempered. For it remains the case that even as he 
asscrts that the transformations effected by the contemporary techno-sciences constitute a 
practical deconstruction of the world, Dcrrida makes no systematic use in his work of the 
253 Jolinson (1993) Cf. op. (-it., n 208 at p. 6. 254 klin Joseph-Goux cited by Johnson (1993). Cf. op. cit., n 208 at pp. 5-6. 
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developing conceptual and methodological matrix that the new technologies bring. Even 
in what has to be seen as the most declarative of his texts in this respect, Of 
Grammatology, the substance of Derrida's references to cybernetics and biology is more 
of the order of allusion and evocation than of direct and active engagement. The passatc--, e 
devoted to "The Program" in the first chapter of Of Grammatology is brief and summary, 
while the third chapter, "Of Grammatology as a Positive Science, " reveals itself to be 
history or genealogy of the philosophy of writing rather than (as the title might suggest) 
an interdisciplinary exploration of the scope of grammatology. That said, the lack of a 
more explicit and detailed account is inevitable given the irreducibly aporetic 
circumstance which attaches to Derrida's reworking of the transcendental-empirical 
difference; we must remember that being neither in philosophy nor outside it (or, 
conversely, being both philosophy and non-philosophy) the "radically empiricist" incision 
of the deconstructive act, cannot be justified on either transcendental or empirical 
grounds; as contextualized as well as contextualizing it makes its inscription in the 
general movenient of the field under scrutiny. In short, the Derridean text must take 
account of the emergence of writing whilst simultaneously attempting to account for it. 
This, however, is not without consequence. Derrida's interest in the new technologies and 
their relation to writing contains ambiguities that need to be clarified. 
"Monstrous monstrosities" 
What is at issue here turns on the decisive question of Derrida's characterization of the 
context in which his elaboration of grammatology developed-the "new mutation in the 
Iiistory of writing, of history as writing". As Derrida asks "Why is [this situation] today in t-I 
the process of making itself know as such and after thefact? " This question is posed but 
. 
just as quickly dismissed since it "would call forth an interminable analysis. " 155 Now, 
I- tracing the "middle siiice the delimitation of the logocentric epoch finds its opening b\ 
255 OG., p. 9. 
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ground" between the transcendental and the empirical, a context that is never absolutelv 
determinable (or rather its determination is never certain or saturated) but Is aporetic or 
undecidable, the Derridean text is it seems unable to fully come to terms with its own 
situation or offer a positive account of its relation to the new forms of media. This is the 
point made by Mark Poster who notes that deconstruction both recognizes its attachment L- 
to its context and yet is unable to define that attachment, rigorously to problematise It, 
and to fully acknowledge its implications. As Poster says I am struck by the difference 
between the meticulous care with which Derrida treats logocentric texts as opposed to the 
elliptical, vague statements he often uses to define the current situation. His 
characterizations of the present are general, contradictory, hesitant and unclear about the 
relation of deconstruction to new forms of writing. It is as if he cannot decide if 
deconstruction is the philosopher's "grey on grey, " depicting the contours of a past age of 
print writing, or if it is the seer's dancing star announcing the birth of electronic writing. 
The present situation is an abyss, and looking into it one sees only monsters. " 256 
Poster's reference here to "monsters" in the context of a discussion of writing and 
technology is important. It recalls Derrida's characterization of deconstruction as a 
cýitachresis, that is, a "violent production of meaning" which is a showing, a monstration 
of the other (montre means "to show" and is etymologically linked to nionstre). 257 As 
Derrida says, "I am trying to produce new forms of catachresis, another kind of writing, a 
\-Iolent writing which stakes out the faults (failles) and deviations of language; so that the 
text produces a language of its own, in itself, which while continuing to work through 
tradition emerges at a given moment as a nionster, a monstrous mutation without tradition 
258 
or normative precedent. " - For Derrida, a monster is not an absolute break with 
normality but is a graft that cuts heterogeneous bodies together: "This in fact happens in 
256 Mark Poster, Thc Mode q Info"nation: Posts tri ictu ra 1 ism and Social Context, (London: Polity Press, 
1990). p. 104. 
257 For more on the link bet\ýccn montrer and monsti-e, see GII, pp. 166-69. IýNý . hitervic\ý with Richard Kearney. "Jacques Dcrrida: Deconstruction and the Other, " in Dialogues with 
Contonporan, Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester, Lng.: Manchester 
LlimersityPress, 1984), P. 123. 
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certain kinds of writing. At that moment, monstrosity may reveal or make one aware of 
what normality is". "One must produce, " Derrida says, "what in fact looks like a 
discursive monster so that the analysis will be a practical effect, so that people will be 
259 
forced to become aware of the history of normality" . In speaking of the monster 
Derrida is referring here to works such as Glas or The Post Card, works whose 
performativity radically puts in question "the book" and all its implications. But the 
notion of the monster also refers to his earlier texts and to the situation in which these 
texts emerge. Translated into the language of these texts the notion of the monster refers 
us to, 
a kind of question, let us still call it historical, whose conception, formation, gestation 
and labor we are only catching a glimpse of today. I employ these words, I admit, with a 
glance toward the operations of childbearing-but also with a glance toward those who, 
in a society frorn which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the 
as yet unnamable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary 
whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the 
forrnless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity. 
260 
Here, at the end of "Structure Sign and Play, " deconstruction is characterized, albeit 
indirectly, as a kind of monstrous giving birth. Notwithstanding the curious appeal to "the 
operations of childbearing' 261 the logic of what is said here is familiar enough when one 
takes into account the context in which it was written: Derrida. has just invoked two kinds 
of interpretation, one logocentric, the other affirming "play". He urges not a choice 
between the two but an effort to "conceive of the common ground, and the diffirance of 
251) Jacques Derrida, "Pass ags-from Traurnatism to Pron-ýse" , trans. Peggy Kamuf, in Points ... 
Interviews. 
19.74-1994, trans. Peggy Kamuf et al, ed. Elizabeth Weber, (Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1995), pp. -172-395. p. 
386. 
N1 SSP.. P. 293. 2m For an interesting discussion of this see Geoffrey Bennington, "RIP" in Futurcs: Of Jacques Derrida, ed. 
Richard Rand, (Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 1-17. 
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this irreducible difference. " Such an effort-the Derridean gesture-will make of 
deconstruction "a way of thinking that is faithful and attentive to the ineluctable world of 
the future which proclaims itself at present, beyond the closure of knowledge. The future 
can only be anticipated in the form of an absolute danger. It is that which breaks 
absolutely with constituted normality and can only be proclaimed, presented as a sort of 
monstrosi ty.,, 
262 
Now, in both these passages (the second being the famous comments that close the 
"Exergue" to Of Grammatology) the "monster" may be read as the sober image of a time 
in which unprecedented techno-scientific invention threatens all manner of dangers 
including nuclear catastrophe, ecological disaster, the productive possibilities afforded by 
genetic engineering, etc. Equally, the "monstrous" refers us to the -new mutation in the 
history of writing" that Derrida will take as marking the closure of logocentric- 
metaphysics and, as the field of its exorbitant method, the justification and point of 
263 departure of deconstruction . Indeed, deconstruction shares with writing this status as 
a monstrosity since both appear as monstrosities from the point of view of logocentrism 
when thought in terms of radical otherness. In an interview collected in Points Derrida 
says of his use of the figure of the monster when speaking of the future that it indicates 
something about "that which appears for the first time and, consequently, is not yet 
recognized. A monster is a species for which we do not have a name, which does not 
,Q 
-- OG., 1). 4-5. 
263 In two essays orl. ginally delivered at a colloquium at Cornell University in 1984, "No Apocalypse, Not 
Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives), " and "Psyche: Inventions of the Other, " Derrida 
galliers around the topic of writing and the future the apparently opposing notions of absolute destruction 
and absolute invention, two events, we might say, that lie in the future. They are figures of the future that 
have no referent and so are unanticipatable, surprising and monstrous. In the former essay, Derrida tells us 
that the borrib continues to be 'fabulously textual, through and through". Derrida does not deny the realitN 
of nuclear weapons that are stockpiled everywhere, but he does argue that a nuclear war has not yet taken 
place-the bombings of 1945, in Derrida's opinion, ending a "classical" war rather than setting off a 
nuclear one. And if it has not taken place one can onIt talk or write about it: "the terrifying reality of the 
nuclear conflict can onIN be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or 
"text". (p. 23. ) See "No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives), " trans. 
Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, in Diaci-itics, 14, (1984), pp. 20-31; and -Psýche: Inventions of the 
Other, " trans. Catherine Porter, in Reading de Man Reading, eds. Lindsey Waters and Wlad Godzich, 
ýMinneapolis: Umvcrsity of' NlInnesota Press, 1989, pp. 25-65.1 \%, III rcturn to the latter essay in Chapter 5- 
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rnean the species is abnormal, namely, the composition and hybridization of already 
known species. Simply, it shows itself [elle se montre]in something that is not yet shown 
[montre] and that therefore looks like an hallucination, it strikes the eye, it frightens 
because no anticipation had prepared one to identify this figure. -264 Or, as he puts it 
elsewhere, "monstrous monstrosities" like cleconstruction, "never present themselves as 
such" and are always "unrecognized and misunderstood". One immediately recognizes 
here a re-figuration of the self-dissimulating logic of arche-writing (in its reference to the 
other). Accordingly, both "Structure, Sign and Play" and Of Grammatology announce a 
birth in the world, the arrival of the monstrous, an event "for which there Is no self- 
presentation as such nor assured destination. " The monstrous is a name for what has no 
narne, for what is to come. It is to come precisely because it does not have the status of a 
present being, nor (insofar as it violates a norm or the order of things) is it an object of 
knowledge. In short, the monster is the very figure of the formlessness and 
nonpresentability of the future. If the future (Vavenir) is what is to-come (a-venir), it is 
not a repetition of the same but is something surprising, an event for which we are not 
prepared. As Derrida says in the interview just cited, "A future that would not be 
monstrous would not be a future-, it would already be a predictable, calculable, and 
,, 265 programmable tomorrow . In 
Chapter 51 will return to this monstrous opening to the 
future when I consider some of Derrida's more recent texts where deconstruction can be 
seen to emerge as an "affirmative technology" and as the machinic opening of the future. 
Let me here however return to what is presently at issue. I was discussing those 
ambiguities that can be seen to attend Derrida's characterization of the current situation. 
Some questions: Derrida's materialism and originary technicity? 
Derrida's mobilization of the monster articulates his fascination with invaginated 
topolocties. As David Wood has pointed out, formally speaking what is important about 11 
't4 Cl'. op. cit., n 256 at p. 385-386. 
Ibid., p. 387. 
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such topologies is that their outside, or part of their outside, is also inside, or 
alternatively, that at certain points the distinction between the outside and the inside 
becomes problematic, undecidable. 266 In terms of the exorbitant method of deconstruction 
the possibility of the other than metaphysics lies within, the outside inside, the future in 
the mutation of the present. Here, it should be clear, the use Derrida makes of an 
invaginated topology, makes any reference to the "beyond" undecidable and renders 
utterly obscure any sense of the possibility of representing the future. 
Given that this topology of invagination puts in question the distinction of the inside 
and outside, what belongs and what does not, one can understand Poster's confusion over 
the the relation between writing and the historical context of Derrida's works. For Poster 
the question is "does deconstruction serve as a critique of "phonetic writing" from the 
tiew standpoint of electronic writing or, does it aspire only to a critique of phonetic 
writing while witnessing from the outside the "more profound reversal" of electronic 
writing,?,, 267 Now, in the light what we have just said it will immediately be apparent that 
this question is not only badly formulated but is predicated upon a fatal misunderstanding 
of Derrida's text. That said, the force of Poster's question stands since the relation 
between the new media technologies and those that are said to be characteristic of "the 
book" and phonetic writing necessarily remains ambiguous In Derrida's work. 
Lx, t me make what is at stake here more precise by turning back for a moment to The 
Post Cartl. As we saw in the previous chapter, the interest of this text derives from its 
elaborating a set of paradoxes which base themselves on the diffirantial structure of the 
post card-it gocs astray, gets lost, is re-routed, and fails to reach Its destination. Here I- 
Derrida is scnsitive to the way the postcard structures messages and to place of the 
postcard in the history of communications technology. However, like the work I have 
been discussing above, this text provokes ambivalent conclusions from Derrida. In places 
lie suggests that the postcard is a basic principle of the logocentic era, -an epoch (whosc Zý I- 
, t, (, Sec David Wood, The Deconstruction o Time, (Atlantic Highlands: Hurnanme.,, Press, 1998), p. 87. 1 kS 7 Cf. Op. cit., n 256 at p. 108. 
f 
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technology is marked by paper, pen, the envelope, the individual subject, addressee, etc. ) 
and which goes shall we say from Socrates to Freud and Heidegger. " Elsewhere, he 
suggests that the new electronic forms of transmission are either a continuation of the 
postal epoch or different from it268 On the one hand, however important technological 
differences might be, it will be found that technology does not "arrive" or occur with the 
invention of the pen and paper, photographic reproduction or even computers and 
"faxing. " It is simply a condition of possibility of the postal, which is a possibility of the 
event, which is a possibility of technology, and so on, where non of those terms can 
ascribe to themselves absolute priority. In this case, however obliquely, and in spite of 
post-war technological innovation, Derrida's thinking undermines the nalve opposition 
between those communications that rely on print technology and the contemporary era of 
telecommunications. For Derrida, all communication relies upon the logocentric principle 
of address and destination. 269 On the other hand, the electrification of the gramme opens 
up new modalities for the transmission of information that dispense with what is perhaps 
the most important trait of the postcard, the particular materiality or support of the 
document-what Derrida will later think in terms of the "subjectile"-upon which the 
postcard and its attendant industry depend. As Derrida says, 
"[flhe procedures of "routing" and of distribution, the paths of transmission, concern the 
very support of the messages sufficiently not to be without effect on the content, and I 
269 PC., p. 104. 
269 This is a point made by David Wills. Cf. op. cit., n 161 at pp. 180-181. As Wills notes, for Derrida the 
postal most obviously refers to systems of communication and more particularly to those delivery systems 
relying upon the transfer or transport of a material message-a note, letter and so on-systems that are 
different, at first glance, from oral communication on the one hand and computer and satallite message 
transfer on the other. But on closer analysis all of these systems depend upon a notion of destination, a 
concept of sending that assumes the logocentric principle of a closed circuit between sender and receiver. 
Thus, though there appear to be important and obvious material differences between systems of 
conimunication such as the voice, the letter and electronic transfer, those differences cannot be read as 
oppositional given their common relience on the idea of destination. Indeed, for Wills, following Derrida, 
the idea of modern telecommunication, far from articulating a radical histofical shift in fact reproduces the 
same model insituted by oral address and phonetic writing and allows for a tightening of the circuit of 
Inessage transfer. 
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am not only speaking of the signified content ... 
In everyday language the post, in the 
strict sense, is distinguished from every other telecommunication (telegraph or 
telephone, for example, telematics in general) by this characteristic: the transport of the 
"document, " of its material support. A rather confused idea, but rather useful for 
constructing a consensus around the banal notion of post-and we do need one. But it 
suffices to analyze the notion of "document" or of material support a bit for the 
difficulties to accumulate. 
270 
The difficulties do indeed accumulate. In The Post Card Derrida shifts back and forth, 
hesitant to make an issue of the "material support" in its relation to the processes of 
electronic transmission. This only underlines the divisive status of the post and, hence, 
the divisibility of the message. If the message involves transport or movement, if it can be 
diverted an any point or at any number of identifiable, material points throughout that 
inovement, and if the fact of some material support, post or card, is the mark of that 
potential diversion as much as it might be the mark of some monumentality, then there 
can be no arguing for its indivisibility. The post or card becomes, therefore, the material 
niark of diffýrance in the transmission of the message, of the necessity of differing and 
deferral which exists at every point along the route. Thus, although Derrida Is indeed 
sensitive to differences in the media, differences that concern the crucial issue of the 
materiality of the trace, the deconstructive logic of inscription forbids their thernatization. 
For Derrida "matter" is above all a philosopheme to be read in metaphysical texts, a 
marker or trace of a "radical alterity, " which is to say writing, that cannot be 
conceptualized. 27 1 This inability to grapple with material production outside of 
170 PC, pp. 104-105. 
271 In an interview collected in Positions Derrida considers whether or not his text can be considered 
materialist". He writes: "If I have not very often used the word "matter, ' it is not, as vou know, because of 
sonic idealist or spiritualist kind of reservation. It is that in the logic of the phase of overturning this concept 
has too often been reinvested with "logoccntric" values, values associated with those of thing, reality, 
Pre-sclicc in general, sensible presence, for example, substantial plenitude, content, referent, etc. Realism or Z, 
sew, "al ism-"ernpiric ism--are modifications of logocentrism. (I have often insisted on the fact that 
.. writing" or the "text" are not reducible either to the sensible or visible presence of the graphic or the 
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metaphysical conceptuality is part and parcel of Derrida's ambiguous relation to the new 
technologies. For some, this circumstance limits his engagement in these technologies 
and thereby limits contemporary interest in his work. Indeed, as John Protevi has 
remarked, while deconstruction can dismantle the logocentric values in which the concept 
of matter is inscribed-values associated with those of thing, reality, presence in general, 
sensible presence, substantial plenitude, content, referent, etc. -and move us into the 
general text, Derrida's work is unable to articulate the material processes of production 
upon whose effects it lives: "It can't offer us an empirical research program for exploring 
that text and the material bodies formed therein. 99272 Instead of raising the question of the 
material configuration of each technology, thereby articulating a system of technical 
differentiation, we are referred instead to an indefinite series of graphic possibilities that 
still remain to be analyzed, however interminable that operation might be. 273 In this case, 
"literal". ) In short, the signifier "matter" appears to me problematical only at the moment when its 
reinscription cannot avoid making of it a new fundamental principle which, by means of theoretical 
regression, would be reconstituted in to a "transcendental signified". It is not only idealism in the narrow 
sense that falls back upon the transcendental signified. It can always come to assure a metaphysical 
materialism. It then becomes an ultimate referent, according to the classical logic implied by the value of 
referent, or it becomes an "objective reality" absolutely anterior to any work of the mark, the semantic 
content of a form of presence which guarantees the movement of the text in general from the outside. " 
Earlier in the same interview in reply to questions about the relation of deconstruction to "dialectical 
material logic" Derrida had stated "Above all they [the consequences of his writings] refer to the general 
economy whose traits I attempted to outline based on a reading of Bataille. It follows that if, and in the 
extent to which, matter in this general economy designates, as you said, radical alterity (I will specify: in 
relation to philosophical oppositions), then what I write can be considered "materialist". " See, P., p. 64-65. 
272 John Protevi, Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the Body Politic, (London: The Athlone Press, 
2001), p. 4. In contrast to Derrida, Protevi points to the radical materialism proposed by Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari in their two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand 
Plateaus. The basic difference between Derrida and Deleuze-Guattari relevant in this case is that between a 
post- phenomenological and a historical I ibid inal -materialism: the study of the im-possibility of presence as 
an effect of the general text and the study and positive articulation of material self-ordering of "abstract 
machines" linked together to form a "machinic phylum". See Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Anti- 
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. 
Minneaopolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983; and A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massurni. Minneaopolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. 273 For Derrida, the material support is never simple but already from the beginning operates as a muti- 
medium. In the case of the postcard he points out that it is already formally divided (picture, copyright, 
message, signature, address, stamp, and postmark) and hence problematic in its relations. This is a point that 
is developed in an interview given to Cahiers de Midiologie in 1998 where the question is one of the multi- 
media potential of paper. Derrida states that its economy has always been more than that of a medium which 
would "reduce paper to the function or topos of an inert surface laid under marks, a substratum designed to 
unhold them, to assure their survival or subsistence. " (p. 2. ) For Derrida the economy of paper "has always 
been 
... that of a multi-medium. It has always potentially been that, though not in the currently accepted 
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Derrida prefers to minimize, at times even to disregard, technolocTical/material difference Z- 
in favor of a discourse on the emerging and more general economy theY attest to. Here the 
new technologies along with the theoretical frameworks that subtend them may indeed 
mark or trace the closure of the logocentric-metaphysical epoch. For that very reason, 
however, their particularity is the already dissimulated effect of the field of generalized 
inscription. As Derrida puts it in Of Grammatology, 
If the theory of cybernetics is by itself to oust all metaphysical concepts-including the 
concepts of soul, of life, of value, of choice, of memory-which until recently served to 
separate the machine from man, it must conserve the notion of writing, trace, gramm6 
[written mark], or grapheme, until its own metaphysical character is exposed. 274 
This sentence is exemplary of the complex relation between technics and writing, 
bringing the logic of the generalized inscription together with its historical exposure. At 
f. irst glance it suggests Derrida's positing of a quasi -similarity between the two. But this is 
not the case, indeed it cannot be the case since Derrida forewarns us that a purely 
technical understanding of writing would be instrumentalist and would reduce writing to 
a nierely empirical supplement, a tool in the service of speech. This would amount, 
precisely, to the way logocentrism reduces writing, expelling it outside "full" speech and 
thereby confining it to a secondary function: translator of a full speech that was fully 
present. Said otherwise arche-writing is not reducible to the technical arrival of the 
gramme-, it "does not depend on any sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or 
scilsc of a term which strictly speaking presupposes an electronic support... It is not merely the support of 
niarks, of traccsý it is the support of a complex spatial and temporal operation, visible, tangible and often 
audible, active but also passive ... paper can work- in the manner of a inultimedium, at 
least when it is there 
to be read or written upon, for there is also wrapping paper, wallpaper, cigarette paper, toilet paper and so 
forth. " (p. 2-3. ) This extends all the way to where the paper body is no longer there "in person" so to speak-. 
"[elven when you ýýrite with a computer, it is still with a view to finally printing on paper. ýýhether this 
actuallýý happens or not. The vocabulary of paper (rather than of parchment) is there on the screen-lincs, 
pa-cs. paragraphs, margins and so on. . (p. 5. ) See Jacques Derrida, "Paper or Myself, Nou knoýý.. Jncvv 
,, I)cculation-s on a luxui-v of the poor)" in Paragraph, vol 2 1, rl' I March 1998, pp. 1-27. A 
0G., P. 9. 
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graphic. It is on the contrary, the condition of such a plenitude. , 
275 This statement appears' 
to be a somewhat surprising declaration of independence which is problematic because it 
effaces the radical empiricism that is upheld in the differential movement of inscription in 
general. It indicates, nevertheless, that if writing is to be distinguished from particular 
empirical supplements it is primarily because the diffirance between the transcendental 
and the empirical constitutes the impossibility of approaching the trace in terms of a 
present mark, the impossibility of folding back arche-writing upon its irreducible 
empiricity. As the diff, ýrantial and thereby undecidable opening of the transcendental and 
the empirical, arche-writing is always already materialized, while never simply being 
material. It is impossible to suspend this aporia since the "constituted" always already 
affects, but after the event, the "constituting" Thus, one must both distinguish and not 
oppose technics and writing. It is a question then of thinking technics otherwise, on the 
basis of inscription in general. And/or, inversely, 
a certain sort of question about the meaning and origin of writing precedes, or at least 
merges with, a certain type of question about the meaning and origin of technics. That is 
why the notion of technique can never simply clarify the notion of writing. 
276 
As Bernhard Stiegler has noted in commenting on this sentence, "simply" would seem to 
be the operative term here. 277 For as Stiegler says the notion of technics can clarify the 
notion of writing if our understanding of the former is heavily revised. For this to be 
dmic, the two notions of technics and writing need to be clarified in relation to each other 
and zinalyzed in the context of the the closure of metaphysics that they bring about. This 
closure should be seen. accordingly, as a deconstruction that comes about through a 
27 ,S lbid., p. 62. 276 OG., P. 8. 277 See Bemard Sticgler, "Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at the Limits of Deconstruction and the 
Prosthesis of Faith" in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities. -A Critical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2001), pp. 238-270. p. 252. 
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certain technicity. In this connection, we must acknowledge that at the same moment 
when Derrida deconstructs the historico-metaphysical reduction of writing, opening up in L- 
the same movement the thought of arche-writing, such a program is equally organized 
around the concept and figure of technology itself. Indeed, Derrida's analysis have clearl, N 
demonstrated that technology has always shared a common structure with writing L- 
provoking similar treatment. As Alan Bass one of Derrida's translators puts it, "Writing is 
always treated by philosophy as a technique, as part of the technology of communication, t-- 
which always means the communication of truth and meaning. According to the 
traditional view, technology has no life of its own and is to be kept below and apart from 
living truth. Like writing. It is no accident, then, that the machine-the dead mechanism 
that endlessly produces the same thing-should be as unthinkable for philosophy as 
writing. , 278 Once writing, condemned throughout the history of philosophy as techne-an 
auxiliary technique, becomes irreducible, so does technology. Hence, the received 
concept of the technical must transgress itself generating a very different view of 
technology-as originary with respect to the constitution of the philosophical episteme 
and, more generally, to any attempt to constitute what is proper, authentic or appropriate 
to the human. That is, insofar as Derrida's radicalization of writing reworks the 
distinction between the natural and artificial, physis and techne, between man and 
machine, between speech and writing, of the thing itself and signs as well as working 
upon the distinction of the transcendental and empirical constitutive of such oppositions, 
then we can begin to understand the bold thesis put forward in Derrida's work as 
articulating an a general grammar of technics and technicity. In this case the Derridean 
text concerns not any given form of technology, but rather the promotion of an originary 
differential machine that articulates the general inscription of any entity whatsoever. On 
this view, as Timothy Clark points out, we should not think of technology as an object of 
2'78 
ý\lan Bass, "The Doublc Game: An Introduction" in Taking Chances: Derrida Psychoanalysis and 
Litcrature, ed. Joscph H. Smith and William Kerrigan, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UnIN-ci-sity Press. 
1984) pp- 66-85. p. 77. 
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deconstruction as some method of analysis or critique. Rather, technology is "in 
deconstruction" as the condition of its being: for writing as an originary technicity both 
opens, and renders untenable, the metaphysico-logocentric/techno-scientific concepts of 
technol ogy. 
279 
Where does the economy of arche or originary technicity which is reserved in the 
exorbitant method of cleconstruction lead us? Given that the subordination of writing in 
and through the logocentric era was (as Derrida. insists) a "strategic move in the economy 
of mastery, , 280 the machinic possibilities that issue with the liberation of the graphic, e. g., 
cybernetics, genetic engineering, the invention of artificial intelligence, etc., are indeed 
far reaching. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, such possibilities expose the 
Derridean text to the shock that it has already been comprehended by Heidegger's 
thinking of the technological outcome of metaphysics . 
Cf. op. cIt.. n 10 at p. 252. 
OG., p. 285-86. 
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4 
Uncanny Intimacy: Writing and das Ge-stell 
Introduction 
The last chapter has shown that since the late 1960's Derrida's response to what he 
takes to be a "certain total transformation" of our historical situation brings metaphysics 
and deconstruction into a singular constellation which points to the interaction of his text 
with an unprecedented development of post-war techno-scientific culture, most strikingly 
in the domain of that set of tele-technologies termed informational and communicational 
in the broadest sense. In 1967 the "nonfortuitous conjunction of cybernetics and the 
human sciences" announces "nothing but a death of speech and a new mutation in the 
history of writing, in history as writing. " A context in which "the future can only be 
anticipated in the form of an absolute danger ... and can only be proclaimed, presented as 
a sort of monstrosity". And a technology that constitutes a "practical deconstruction" of 
the logocentric-metaphysical era. Understood in this way technology is not simply a 
"theme" of deconstruction; rather, the techno-scientific development of the contemporary 
episteme is both the determining and determined context to which Derrida refers, it 
coincides with deconstruction understood as event, as that which happens to a world in 
the process of changing. 
As we have seen, Derrida's quasi -cybernetic inscriptions in his early texts arose 
\vithin the context of his negotiations between philosophy and the human sciences under 
the aegis of the structuralist programme. A context which not only articulates the 
obligation of the former to entertain an open set of transversal relations with emergent 
t. orms of knowledge and their technical elaborations, but also pressures the latter into 4-- 
interrogatino their "transcendental contraband". From a certain perspective this context 
constitutes the most immediate point of reference for any evaluation of deconstruction as 
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it is elaborated by Derrida in the period. That said, Derrida's text can also be seen as 
emerging against the background of Heidegger's questioning of cybernetics and 
information theory as an aspect of his assessment of the techno-scientific completion of 
rnetaphysics. Indeed, the massive impact of Heidegger's work on Derrida at this time, a 
Heidegger re-read and retrieved from the narrowly existentialist and humanist gloss that 
had dominated the first phase of the French Heidegger reception, 2" forms an essential 
element of Derrida's diagnosis of the new philosophical and non-philosophical 
exigencies. 
The challenge posed to philosophy is noted in the mid-sixties by Heidegger in "The 
End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" where he further develops his question 
concerning the essence of modern technology through a confrontation with the then rising 
power of the human sciences. In particular, Heidegger's thinking appears to be informed 
by Norbert Wiener's CYbernetics since his assertion that "[n]o prophecy is necessary to 
recognize that the sciences now establishing themselves will soon be determined and 
regulated by the new fundamental science that is called cyberneti CS, 282 directly recalls the 
the latter's thesis. Whether or not he had read Wiener's book, when Heidegger speaks of 
cybernetics he is once again elaborating the self-regulating feed-back control system of 
the Ge-stell as that into which traditional philosophy is resolved. To be more specific, for 
Heidegger cybernetics is the fundamental characteristic of the techno-scientific attitude of 
hunianity in the modern age and corresponds to the human sciences of communication, 
which transform languacTe" into a positivistic "exchange of news" and information. As 4-- 
sLich, cybernetics is the emancipation of these sciences from philosophy: "It suffices to 
refer to the independence of psychology, sociology, anthropology as cultural 
anthropology, or to the role of logic as symbolic logic and sernantics, " all of which 
Husserl had sought to keep under the umbrella of philosophy in the first stage of the L- 
Is] For a detailed assessment of the French rcccptIcn of Heidegger's ýwrk see Tom Rockmore's Heidegger 
(in(I f'rench Philosophy. Cf. op. cit.. n 39. 
2Q FP., P. 434. 
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-crisis" of philosophy's interdisciplinari ty. 283 Heidegger continues on the subject of the 
end of philosophy: "Philosophy turns into the empirical science of man, of all that can 
become for man the experiential object of his technology. " "The [techno-sciences] are 
now taking over as their task what philosophy in the course of its history tried to present 
in certain places, and even the only inadequately, that is, the ontolocries of the various 
regions of beings (nature, history, law, art) ... As the technology by which man 
"establishes himself in the world by working on it in the manifold modes of working and 
shaping, " these sciences look like the mere dissolution of philosophy but are in truth its 
completion: "[t]he development of philosophy into the independent sciences that, 
however, interdependently communicate among themselves ever more markedly, is the 
legitimate completion of philosophy. [It is a sign that] philosophy is ending in the present 
99284 age . 
Derrida's shock: the incalculability of Heidegger's text 
Heidegger's essay was first published in France in 1966 at a point when Derrida was 
deconstructing the human sciences (theoretically renewed by structuralism), and 
elaborating grammatology. The expected confrontation on the basis of the immediate and 
seemingly obvious implications that Heidegger's thinking has for Derrida's program, 
does not however materialize. Indeed, although Heidegger's thinking, and particularly 
his conception of the history of metaphysics, was central to Derrida's work at this time 
there is a conspicuous and peculiar lack of any direct engagement with the claims that 
Heidegger makes regarding the relations between philosophy and techno-science. To be 
sure, insofar as Derrida submits Heidegger's thinking to the question of writing and 
'S3 I refer to Husserl's unfinished The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: An hitroduction to Phenomenological Philosoph 
,v 
(1934-37). Includes the Vienna lecture, 
trans. David Carr, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). In the related Vienna lecture (Crisis, 
pl). 296-99), Husscrl traces the blarne for this crisis, obviously intensified by Europe's standing on the 
threashold ofwar, back to the abandonment of philosophys disciplinary rigor by the post-Kantian idealists, 
Mio allowed philosophy to leak into and be modificd by other area's (such as religion, law, historv. 
, icmhetics and so on). 294 EP., p. 434-435. 
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thereby to the closure of metaphysics as logocentrism, the question of technics is brought 
into play. However, any explicit engagement with or response to Heidegger's provocative 
and rather uncompromising assertions regarding the techno-scientific "realization" of 
philosophy remains secreted in Derrida's more overt reinscriptions of the thinking of 
Being. When the response does come it takes the form of both an anticipation and 
overturning. As we saw in Chapter 2, by the early 1980's, and specifically in The Post 
Card and its supplements, Derrida poses the objection to himself that his rewriting of 
Heidegger's text has already been displaced by Heidegger since his deconstructive 
elaboration of the post invokes the role of a form of technology, a communications 
technology, which Heidegger has delimited in advance. Yet it is not Derrida but 
Heidegger who deploys the postal discourse, who speaks in terms of Geschichte, 
Geschick, and Schicken. By indicating from afar and in a direction not opened by 
Heidegger's thought a hidden passageway that makes the problem of -scnding" 
communicate with the problem of the written trace, Derrida is able to make an incision in 
Heidegger's text that opens the latter's thinking of Being to the disserninative effects of a 
machinic parasite. Thus contaminated and exposed to deconstructive reinscription, 
Heidegger's thinking of the sending or destining of Being comes to occupy a place which 
in Derrida's "own" work is occupied by writing or the general text which is the matrix 
within which all transfers, sendings, correspondences, and telecommunications take 
place. And Derrida's main point, among other things, against Heidegger's thinking of the 
history of Being, is that technology does not arrive; it does not as Heidegger claims come 
to dissimulate or stand as a derivative schema, a final epoch of Being which gathers all 
others thereby bringing philosophy to an end-an end, that is, as the place of "another 
beginning". Rather, for Derrida, technology has always already begun-from the most L__ 
pi-Inial traces that launch the process of hominization ("the emergence of a certain homo 
vapiens"), and extending as far as all forms of contemporary tele-technology, technical 
archiving and computer programming-just as writing has already begun. Both in fact tý - 
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occur "originarily, " in the same movement, introducing the irreducibility of inscription in 
general, thus offering Derrida the chance of parallel or joined deconstructive strategies 
beyond the play of presence, the proper, and appropriation. 
That said, the Derridean text is manifestly unable to oversee the entire economy of 
Heidegger's "uncircumventable meditation". In this connection, what strikes one 
immediately in the type of stakes specific to the method of deconstruction is the necessitY 
in which it finds itself from the start, a necessity which, as we have seen, articulates an 
aporetic and uncontrollable position neither in philosophy nor outside it and which means 
thinking the inescapability of inscription in general. But what strikes one next, and in 
connection with this, is a strange hesitation-and a hesitation that is one of its most 
powerful resources-between the recognition of debt in due form with respect to 
Heidegger on the one hand, and on the other the erasure of this debt through the liberation 
of writing. Nothing shows the meaning of the "hesitation" more clearly than the 
anibiguity of the Heideggerian situation with respect to logocentrism and the metaphysics 
of presence: "It is at once contained in it and transgresses it" Derrida insists, "but it is 
impossible to separate the two. The very movement of transgression sometimes holds it 
back short of the lim it,, 285 Here, what I noted in the previous chapter with regard to 
Derrida's fascination with invaginated topologies-that their outside, or part of their 
outside, is also inside with the consequence that at certain points the distinction between 
the outside and inside becomes problematic, undecidable-is equally pertinent. It is this 
undecidability with which the Derridean text must contend; it is what makes 
deconstruction above all an im-possibility. Notice I write im-possible here with a hyphen. 
The impossibility of deconstruction is not the simple contrary of its possibility. It 
supposes and also (TIves itself over to possibility, traverses it, and leaves in it the trace of 
its removal. There is nothing fortuitous about the fact that this discourse on the conditions 
of possibility, at the very place where its claims are compounded with impossibility. can 
OG., p. 22. 
172 
spread to all the places of the Derridean text: it is what puts deconstruction in motion. As 
Derrida says, "from the very heart of the impossible, one would thus hear the pulsing 
drive of what is called deconstruction. The condition of possibility would thus gi give one 
chance as possible but by depriving it of its purity. And the law of this spectral 
contamination, the impure law of this impurity, is what one must never cease 
reelaboratin g,, 
286 
The recurrent expression of the conditions of possibility and impossibility, of the 
aporetic law of quasi -tran scen dental i ty and contamination, does not fail to signal some L- 
major stakes for deconstruction, namely, the shock delivered to hardly foreseeable 
consequences. Naturally it is a question here of the calculable and the incalculable-, 
deconstruction must calculate with the incalculable. In this connection, Derrida will insist 
on the question of strategy and wager, that is, the question of decision. In Derrida's 
words: 
I shall insist on the question of wager and strategy. If a strategy were guaranteed in and 
of itself, if its calculation were sure, there would be no strategy at all. Strategy always 
implies a wager-that is, a certain way of giving ourselves over to not-knowing, to the 
incalculable. We calculate because there is something incalculable. We calculate where 
we do not know, where we can make no determination. Thus, a strategic wager always 
consists in making a decision, or rather in giving ourselves over to the decision- 
paradoxically, in making decisions we cannot justify from start to finish-287 
Now, when Derrida comes to calculate with the Heideggerian text; when he takes a 
decision over the thinking of Being', the incalculability of this thinking, its excess and 
reserve with respect to metaphysics, is always at work; it leaves its mark on the Derridean 
2" I-or a concise account of the impossibility of deconstruction see Derrida's "Deconstructions: The Im- 
possible" in Fi-ench Theon, in America, trans, Micheal Taormina, eds: Sylvere Lol-ringer and Sandra 
Cohen, (London: Routledge. 2001). pp. 13-31. p. 25. 287 TS 13. 
C, 
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text in turn. To begin with this allows Derrida to claim to have found the "trace" of some 
powerful questioning of "metaphysics, " that is, and all at once, freely to take inspiration 
from the very movement and from the Heideggerian pace of "destruction" as much of the 
"privilege of presence" as of the "end" of philosophy and in order to find therein the 
forerunners of writing in general, certainly, but from which this writing must, for its part, 
always delimit itself in order to exceed the closure of metaphysics. There is no question 
that this writing is strongly at work in the ontological difference, dif-ference (Unter- 
Scheid) or Ereignis that articulates Heidegger's transgression and containment with 
respect to metaphysics. Equally however, and for the same reason, Derrida's text finds 
itself having to face up to its implication in the technological outcome of metaphysics and 
in a way it is unable to fully calculate. To say this is neither a contradiction, recantation, 
nor turnabout from what I have said with regard to Derrida's assertions over the non- 
arrival of technics, of its "originality' with respect to the history and thinking of Being. 
On the contrary, in exposing the Derridean text to the Heideggerian thought of technology 
I am taking up a thread that is at the center of these assertions; I am following Derrida's 
lead and taking up his anticipation, imagination, and calculation (I don't say position) of 
Heidegger's incalculable response to his re-routing of the technological end of 
inetaphysics-that Heidegger would consider his text symptomatic of this outcome. By 
taking Derrida at his word I am upholding the complex interplay of proximities and 
distances that I have said characterize Derrida's relation to Heidegger. I do so, howevcr, 
with the difference that I let Heidegger's thought-paths take advantage of their 
incalculability and of their machinic repetition. In this connection, in this chapter I want 
to pursue the possibility that Derrida's own text has gone astray, and that it has got lost 
within the circuit of the Heideggerian thinking of technology. 
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Writing and das Ge-stell: some textual pointers 
Quite apart from Derrida's own anticipation, such a possibility is not ývithout 
precedent. A number of commentators have noted the conjunction of Derrida's text and 
the Heideggerian thinking of technology. For example, in his Applied Grativizatology, 
Gregory Ulmer takes up the question of Derrida's interest in contemporary media. 
Affirming that it is central to his articulation of the historical move from language to 
writing he writes, "[t1he facilitator of Derrida's exploration of this shift, then, will not be 
Marshall McLuhan, who projected the return of an oral civilization, but Martin 
Heidegger. Working philologically, Heidegger located the essence of modem technology 
in the family of terms related to Ge-stell (enframing), including thus all the stellen words, 
translated as "to order, to represent, to secure, to entrap, to disguise, to produce, to 
present, to supply. " Derrida took up the question of enframing, as indicated in his 
exploration of all marginal and paragonal. phenomena, in order to prepare the way for the 
shift away from, or deemphasis of, speech in favour of writing. , 288 Ulmer's reading here 
is guided by the conviction that Derrida's elaboration of writing is directly implicated in 
the Heideggerian mobilization of Ge-stell and its cognates, a conviction that causes him 
to conflate their respective texts. Thus, in close proximity to the above quote he writes 
"Enframing, iii short, concerns not just any given form of technology, but the production 
and relaying of information by whatever means, which is to say that the techne itself 
cannot "end" or "arrive" at its "completion, " since it is what allows anything at all to 
,, 289 becorne present. Techne thus overlaps as a question of difference . 
In a similar vein to Ulmer, Michael Roth has also broached the complex implication 
ol'the Derridean-Heidcggerian text with regard to the problematic of technology and in a 
inanner that conflates the two. Like Ulmer, Roth has been discussing the relation of 
ývnting and technology as this is elaborated by Derrida in his early work. In this case he Cp 
2X8 Cf. op. cit., n 252 at p. I 299 Ibid., p. 15. 
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turns to Derrida's "Freud and the Scene of Writing, " and to his statement that -[t]he 
machine-and, consequently, representation, -is death and finitude within the psYche" 
He then states, "[i]t seems that Derrida has embraced the manner of Being of technology 
as a component in the closure of metaphysics. But Derrida's interest in technology is on a 
par with Heidegger's. He too thinks that something saving is unconcealed in technologý 
along with its overwhelming threat to all that is. The technological poses the greatest 
threat [and saving ofl the world because in many ways the technological, although still L- 
operative within the realm of presence, reveals the structure of the textual. " 290 
Now, in the light of what I have said in this study, both these interpretations should be 
seen to be problematic and for similar reasons. In Ulmer's case, his collapsing of 
Heidegger's text onto Derrida's, his assertion that enframing is equal to "the relaying of 
information by whatever means" and that techne "does not arrive, " only takes up 
Derrida's side of the story so to speak and fails to uphold the complex interplay between 
the his thinking and Heidegger's. The same can be said of Roth. His assertion that for 
Derrida "something saving is unconcealed in technology" totally misses what is at stake 
in the latter's reinscription of Heidegger's text. And yet, that said, even while they fail to 
mark the difference between Heidegger and Derrida, and perhaps because they fail, both 
Uli-ner and Roth indicate the peculiar proximity of Heidegger's thinking of technology to 
the Derridean program. 
What I want to do is bring this proximity into focus and draw out its implications. In 
order to do so I will turn to two other places where the implication of Derrida's text in 
fleidegger's thinking of technology is also recognized but with much greater penetration. 
Recently both Steven Galt Crowell 291 and Bernhard Radl off292 have opened up certain 
lines of inquiry into this implication and have drawn out important connections. In both 
290 Micheal Roth, The Poetics of Res I'stance: Heidegger's Line, (Illinois: Northwestem Umvers, ty Press, 
1996. ), p. 196. 
291 Steven Gait Crowell, "Text and Technology- in Man and World 023: pp. 419-440,1990. Kluver 
Academic Publishers. 
"JI Bernhard Radloff, "Das Gestcll and L'6criture: The Discourse of Expropriation in Heidegger and 
Derrida" in Heitlegger Stuelies, vol 5.1989. pp. 23-47. 
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cases this turns on a series of indications that point up the "uncanny intimacy" (Radloff s 
term) that obtains between Derrida's treatment of writing and the Heideggerian thought of 
the Ge-stell. In this connection, the line of argument I want to pursue here takes up the 
attempt to locate in the calculus of the Derridean text certain articulations and 
assumptions that expose it to Heideggerian charge of its belonging to technological end of 
metaphysics. To this end, and using as a guide Gait Crowell's and Radloff s texts, I want 
to elaborate three points which are interrelated. Firstly, I will mark the Heideggerian 
implications for the Derridean text insofar as the latter undermines the repetition 
(Weiderholung) and recollection of that which has withdrawn and been forgotten by 
metaphysics, namely, Being qua Being. By actively displacing the thinking of Being via 
the general economy of writing deconstruction can be seen as a forgetting of the 
forgetting of withdrawal and of the concomitant thought of the proper. Second, I shall 
raise the question of what happens to the "subject" in the Derridean text. To ask this 
question is to encounter the critique of the "onto-theo-logical" subject which is also at 
issue for Heidegger and which in Derrida is carried to the point where it prepares the 
space of the technical constitution of human being as originary supplementarity. Thirdly, 
I shall point up the way in which generalized inscription remarks the very terms by which 
Heidegger defines the way in which all that is given under the sway of technology. By 
elaborating these three points I aim to show, in particular, how "deconstruction, " and 
I gi-ýirnrnatological strategies" gravitate around the turning of Heidegger's thought that, to 
put it another way, they simultaneously arise from and come back to: the technological 
outcome of metaphysics-and not the other way round. 
The Derridean retrait: the withdrawal of withdrawal 
With regard to the first point, the Derridean displacement of Heidecruer's retrieval of 
the "forgotten" of metaphysics, we have already seen how this is plaý'ed out via Derrida's 
deconstruction of Heidegger's thinking of the Geschick and of the epochality of Being. In 
177 
exposing Heidegger's text to all the procedures of routing, relaying, and paths of 
transmission, that is, to all the telecommunicative effects of postality, Derrida insists on 
the necessary contamination of (the thinking of) essence and marks the Heideggerian 
hypothesis of the withdrawal of Being for reinscription. What I want to do is look at what 
is involved here in a little more detail. At issue is Heidegger's still provocative matrix 
statement regarding the dynamic of the concealing of the concealing of Being-its 
oblivion. For Heidegger the peculiarity of the concealing (lethe; Verborgenheit) at the 
heart of the essence or truth (aletheia; Unverborgenheit), understood as the realm of the 
un-concealment or disclosure of Being, is that concealing is the preserve of Being and 
what is proper to it. As Heidegger puts it in "On the Essence of Truth, " 
Concealment deprives aletheia of disclosure yet does not render it steresis (privation); 
rather, concealment preserves what is most proper to aletheia as its own. Considered 
with respect to truth as disclosedness, concealment is then undislosedness and 
accordingly the untruth that is most proper to the essence of truth. " 293 
The lethe, concealment, is the movement of withdrawal from unconcealment, from 
disclosedness. Such withdrawal therefore marks the difference (Unterscheid) of Being 
and beings insofar as Being comes to presence in beings-grants them their presence-by 
holding itself back, by preserving itself in beings as its shelter. This difference is 
precisely what has been forgotten by metaphysics. Metaphysics therefore unfolds as the 
epochality of Being, as the withdrawal and shelter of what is proper to Being. The 
thinking of Being would attempt to stay with withdrawal and think it as withdrawal. To 
think withdrawal as withdrawal, to think it as such, is not to think something other than 
the modes of dissimulation-the various epochs of metaphysics-through which the 
oblivion of Being traces itself; it is to let withdrawal be withdrawal. This letting-be is the 
`93 Martin Heidegger, "on the Essence of Truth" in Basic Writings, ed and trans. David Farrell Krell, 
(London: Routledge, 1978), pp. 115-138. p. 130. 
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turn (Kehre) of thought into the movement of withdrawal and thereby into the dif- 
ferential movement out of representation into this dif-ference itself. As I have asserted in 
this study, only at the technological completion of metaphysics and only there does this 
turn as difference become the "matter" (Sache) for thinking. With the gathering of 
rnetaphysics into its uttermost possibility Heidegger proposes that the Ge-stell opens up 
the first "flashing" of the event of appropriation (Ereignis). For Heidegger technology is 
the "photographic negative" of the possibility of Ereignis-, the janus face of Ge-stell and 
Ereignis belong in the same of the withdrawal from representation. In this case, thinking 
turns to withdrawal in response to the provocation of the modern techno-scientific 
challenge. By tracing the regulative circulation and exchange, the ever shifting event-like 
network of relations of the Ge-stell for signs of the liminal appearance of the event 
thinking would thereby be drawn into the withdrawal and would, precisely, enter into 
technology, into its essence, as die Sache, the dif-ference between Being and beings, 
between Being and man and what is proper to them. 
Now, the method of deconstruction as the liberation of the graphic broaches 
withdrawal by allowing this dynamic to be reiterated in the econorny of generalized 
inscription which marks the overwhelming of the metaphysics of representation wherein 
the text is defined by its reference to the object. But does the withdrawal of the text from 
representation mean that the text itself is the meaning of withdrawal? The answer, as we 
mioht expect, has to be both yes and no. Deconstruction cannot allow the thinking of 
Being to arise except by way of the calculus which reiterates and repeats the withdrawal 
from representation. Writing is unthinkable except as the withdrawal of representation 
ýmd of the proper. But precisely the withdrawal as withdrawal escapes writing. In fact, as 
Radloff remarks, the supposition that the trace occults itself is the motive and nonetheless 
unappropriated force motivating Derrida's thinking of the closure of metaphysics, the 
294 emergence of writing, etc . 
294 
Cf. op. cit., n 292 at p. 26. 
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For Derrida the withdrawal is thought as le retrait. What, is a trait or retrait? In his, 
article "The Retrait of Metaphor, " Derrida. argues that within a certain context this word 
is "the most proper to capture the greatest quantity of energy and information in the 
Heideggerian text. , 295 Retrait, having a variety of meanings in French, such as retrace, 
recess, retraction, and retreat, remarks Heidegger's thinking of the withdrawal of Being tý I 
The trait is retrait, the trait is withdrawn. It signifies an "essential and in itself double, 
equivocal movement. , 296 writes Derrida. Let me quickly mark this the equivocality of 
Derrida's reinscription: first, the word trait (Zug) refers to the tracing of a way or a rift 
(Riss) that, as an in-between (Zwischen) first opens a first relation. (Bezug). Yet the trait 
is nothing before the tracing it achieves or before what it subsequently brings into 
relation. Second, the trait withdraws, retreats, in the very act of tracing an in-between for 
a i-elation. However, being nothing except what it gives rise to, the trait is not to be 
mistaken for what it brings forth. Indeed, "the trait is, a-priori, withdrawal, unappearance, 
and effacement of its mark in its incision. " The trait only comes forth in being erased. 
Third, the trait cannot be simply identified with this seeming alternating dynamic of 
tI orthcoming and subsequent erasure, because the retreat of the trait is also what allows 
the trait to come forward from under its obliteration as retrait. Without a retreat of the 
retrait, without a retrait of the retrait, the trait would not be capable of tracing its self 
eclipsing way or of opening in the first place. Derrida writes, "The trait is ... veiled, 
\\! ithdrawn, but it is the trait which brings together and separates [ecarte] at once veiling 
and the unveiling, the withdrawal and the withdrawal of the withdrawal. " 297 
Now, having said this much it will be apparent that the retrait is one of the ever 
substitutable quasi -transcendental machines that make up the infrastructural chain of the 
Igencral text. 
Along with diffiýmnce, trace, iteration, etc., retrait can be seen as the o 
niediurn or "open matrix" of differentiation in general. The re-of reo-ait allows us to think 
. 195 Jacques Derrida, "The Retrait of Nletaphor, " trans. Frieda Gasdner et al. Ench'tic, 2, no 2 1978. pp. 5-33. 
ý46 19. 
Ibid., p. 22. 
Ibid., p. 3 1. 
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the withdrawal of the withdrawal of Being; the withdrawal doubles back on itself. Thus 
the retrait sufficiently remarks the withdrawal of Being to take it into account, to re-count 
it and to integrate it into the general economy of writing. To think the withdrawal Of 
Being (pour penser Vetre en son retrait) by way of the deconstruction of metaphysics rs 
therefore to follow the turn away from metaphysics-but also from Beincy-into the 
retrait, the return, the duplication of a discourse charged by the productivity of an extra 
turn. 
What of this extra turn? Integrated into the discourse of generalized writing the 
withdrawal of Being, its retrait, is determined by the withdrawal of diffýrance, which 
organizes it. Diffýrance "Itself' which neither a classically conceived name, or "word, " 
nor yet signifier, makes the presentation of being-present possible but never presents 
itself as such. Indeed, as I pointed out in Chapter 2 the appearance of diffirance as such 
means the appearance of diffýrance, the other, as "self-occultation". When the other 
announces itself as such, it presents itself in the dissimulation of itself, that is to say in the 
dissimulation of its "as such", which has already begun. The economy of diffirance 
means that we know it only by its effects, it is characterized by "reserving itself, not 
exposing itself, " by, precisely, differing and deferring. If this is so it would therefore 
pertain to attend to the movement of withdrawal from deferred presentation. But the 
inovement of withdrawal as withdrawal (as opposed to its "effects, " the nominal system, 
tile economy it organizes) never arises. Inasmuch as Derrida thinks the movement of 
ývlthdrawal as systemic, as an "infinite reserve of traces, " the trace of writing exceeds its 
mvii occultation by put-suing occultation absolutely. In short, the withdrawal from 
i-epresentation, from meaning, from truth metaphysically conceived, withdrawal as 
withdrawal is nothing. 
As these remarks suggest, the movement of diffýrance can be qualified as the 
productive re-cuperation of the withdrawal; it implicates an extra turn which re-traces the 
withdrawal of Being and reiterates it in the differinc-cleferring economy of the general Zý 
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text. Inasmuch as Derrida thinks the movement of this text in terms of the production of 
the signifier and beyond this as generalized inscription, the truth of the withdrawal from 
representation as the possibility of the thinking of withdrawal as such does not arise. To 
be sure, as Derrida says "diffýrance is certainly but the historical and epochal unfolding of 
Being or of the ontological difference. The a of diffirance marks the inovement of this 
unfolding. " But "[slince Being has never had a "meaning, " has never been thought or said 
as such, except by dissimulating itself in beings, then diffýrance, in a certain and very 
strange way, (is) "older" than the ontological difference or the truth of Being. When it has 
,, 298 this play it can be called the play of the trace . In this case, what comes into play by 
way of the trace is the field of inscription as the calculated re-Iteration of beings. ThLIS, 
whereas the issue for Heidegger is the movement of withdrawal intimated by the trace 
(Spur) of Being, the issue for Derrida is the movement of the trace as it traces itself and 
erases itself in bcings. This way leads to the trace of the trace as the movement which 
issues in the inscription of beings in general; it is the condition and calculus of their 
deferred presence, of their simultaneously being used up and reserved for use. Here, 
where the entity is lacking, the lack of the entity is simply the deferral of its availability-, 
the entity as such in its "own" objectivity and presence (or absence) cannot arise; the 
being present of the entity, in Derrida's terms, "becomes a function in a structure of 
generalized reference. " This is the point Radloff makes when he writes, 
Perhaps diffýrance is the calculus of language conceived as the economy of economies- 
or, rather, language conceived as the meta-technical system of the optimum organization 
of' entities. Hence "to defer" signifies "the action of putting off till later, of taking into 
, iccount, of taking account of time and of the forces of an operation that implies an 
econornic calculation, a detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation". Derrida 
surns up these characteristics as "temporal i zing. " The temporal is thought in terms of 
298 D., 22. 
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holding in reserve, of defemng; deferral, in turn, expresses the inherent thrust of the 
. ýystem to optimize 
its forces. The fundamental move of this system is the reservation of 
the entity (the signifier) to assure the avadabdio, of the entity. It belongs to the calculus 
of the system that it would "account for" both the establishment of pure presence and its 
absolute loss. 
299 
Where does this movement lead us? What is reserved in the Derridean discourse of 
writing as that which assures the availability of the entity? As Radloff wonders, doesn't 
the Derridean program intimate the systematic occultation of the site of disclosure 
(Dasein), the site (Unverborgenheit) of questioning-thinking, by actively forgetting the 
process of the emergence from occultation? Doesn't the abandonment of the question of 
Being signify the abandonment of the being that questions-and therefore all beings-to 
the excess of metaphysics in the technological ? 300 
The "subject" in bits 
By way of a deferral of an answer to these questions and thereby to prepare such an 
answer let me turn to the second of the points I marked above, the question of the place of 
the subject in deconstruction. This question has two aspects: how, in general, is the 
domain of subjectivity treated in deconstruction, and how, specifically, does this 
treatincrit impact on Heidegger's thinking of Being? With regard to the first aspect, the 
subject" is a dispersed figure in Derrida's text. Neither a signifier nor a signified, neither 
a sign nor a thing, neither a presence nor an absence, neither a position nor a negation 
I. subject" is the name of a "generative multiplicity". In other words, the subject of 
deconstruction has been "exploded" or "disseminated". Indeed, subjectivity is but "an 
effect of the general economy of the text and of diffýrance, an effect inscribed in the 
system of di 11 f the subject) is the humanist subject, ffirance". Among the bits (supposedly q 
Cf. op. cit., n 21)2 at p. 27. 
Ibid., p. 29. 
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the subject as gram, the subject as Dasein, the subject as who, as signature, as person, and 
so on. Here, the one who speaks is herself "written" before being able to speak, is herself 
calculated-not behind a text as a governing intention, but by means of the text through 
"topical and technical determinations". The subject, of course, does not "disappear 11 in 
deconstruction. Nevertheless, as regards the subject of writing "it is solely necessary to 
reconsider the problem of the effect of subjectivity such as it is produced by the structure 
of the text. , 301 In this case, writing, in the order of its effects, 64 enlarges diffirance and the 
possibility of putting in reserve: it at once and in the same movement constitutes and 
effaces so-called conscious subjectivity, its logos, and its theological attributes. " 102 
"Can there be a clearer indication of the affinity of Derridean thought with the topics 
of the Heideggerian understanding of technol ogy?,, 303 This is in fact Galt Crowell's 
question. As he says, the idea that for deconstruction the gram or trace constitutes and 
effaces subjectivity by enlarging the possibility for "putting in reserve" brings to light the 
very term by which Heidegger defines the way in which all that is experienced under the 
sway of technology. Once again the critique of the (Cartesian) subject, the "onto-theo- 
logical" subject which is also at issue in Heidegger's text, is here carried to the point 
where it is seen as "in reserve, " as an effect of that which it does not govern. However, 
there is no complimentary movement, as there is in Heidegger's text, back towards the 
recovery of a subject who would not simply be such an effect but would, precisely, be the 
dif-ferential site of disclosure (Da-sein) of Being in its withdrawal. Indeed, it is precisely 
such a move that in Derrida's eyes holds Heidegger back short of the margin of 
nietaphysics. Deconstruction then will move in the opposite direction, or, to be more 
301 P., P. 88. 
302 
,, one might cxpect Dcrrida's inscription of the subject and subjectitity forms a highly complex thread 
that runs throughout his corpus and in the space I have here my treatment can only appear an 
mci-siniplification. If one were to locate an essay in which Derrida explores the subject-in-bits-and-pieces, 
it \%, ould be in the cssay published in 1986 entitled "To Unsense the Subjectile" in The Secret Art O'Antofuo 
Arlaud. trails. Mary Ann Caws. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). For a nuanced and extended essaý on this 
inatter see Chapter 4 of Herman Rapaport's Liter Derrida: Reading the Recent Work, (London: Routl edge. 
2003). 
. 10.1 Cf. op. cit., n 292 at p. 434. 
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precise, in "the direction of an entirely other text". This brings me the second aspect of 
my question: How does the Derridean treatment of the subject impact on Heidegger's 
thinking? 
Heidegger and "The Ends of Man" 
Derrida's deconstruction of Heidegger's thinking extends as far as and beyond 
Heidegger's retrieval of human existence in the form of Dasein and later of "man". In this 
respect, "The Ends of Man" is one of the most important works in Derrida's corpus. This 
text can be read as a repetition of Heidegger's "Letter on Humanism, " raising the 
question of thinking the ends of man otherwise than as determined by dialectics or 
negation. The essay performs a reinscription of Heidegger for the sake of allowing the 
question posed at the outset to resonate. In doing so Derrida's text entreats the question of 
the human and its limits, at once petitioning, as its precursor, a certain Heideggerian 
authority and the metaphysical closure of the question it announces, while at the same 
time offering a decision of sorts over the equivocality of the way in ývhich the "Letter" at 
once lifts itself out of the ontology of the human, setting it in relief, while nevertheless 
remaining bound to it in its very overcoming. While problematizing the "we men" of 
humanism Heidegger nevertheless insists on what Derrida calls the "magnetic attraction" 
ofman and Being upon one another. Derrida interrogates this relation by way of a return 
to Section 2 of Being and Time where Heidegger explicates the formal structure of the 
question of Being as the unity of the questioner (Dasein) and what is questioned. He 
ugLies that although Dasein is not man, it is nevertheless nothing other than a certain 1-1) lzý 
itself within repetition of rnan, such that Heidegger's destruction of humanism reinscribes i 
ail older metaphysics that in fact determines the shape of every humanism. To be specific, 
according to Derrida, the Dasein analytic repeats a certain figure of man and hunianism 
, 304 and thereby sccks "the revalorization and dignity of man . 
EAV p. 128. 
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Now, although Heidegger never speaks explicitly of such revalorization the attempt to 
A the "essence of man" clearly occupies a central place in the thinking of Be nL-. \nd thl II CY - 
this is where Derrida develops his deconstruction of the latent value of proximm, 
oahering, and the proper that I took up in Chapter 2 with regard to Heidegger's epochal 
scherna of the history of Being. Derrida elaborates this position through a deconstruction 
of the "proper" of man, of his Eigenheit and "authenticity" with respect to Being. For 
Derrida, "[p]ropriety, the co-propriety of Being and man, is proximity as 
inseperabi I ity". 305 It is proximity that governs the ek-static "belonging-together" of man 
and Being, the open site (Da-) which sustains and carries each to the other and which is 
opened up by the question of Being. Derrida emphasizes that Dasein serves as the 
privileged being that makes accessible the question of the meaning of Being precisely 
because of its proximity to both the question and to itself, and that this proximity is 
determined by the value of self-presence. This value of proximity, which according to 
Derrida "will not cease to direct all the itineraries of [Heidegger's] thought" thus 
articulates a certain revalorization of presence, and it functions only insofar as it fails to 
t'ully interrogate the values it conceals. Consequently, 
It rernains that the thinking of Being, the thinking of the truth of Being, in the name of tn' 
which Heidegger de-firnits humanism and metaphysics, remains a thinking of man. Man 
and the name of man are not displaced in the question of Being such as it is put to 
inetaphysics. Even less do they disappear. On the contrary, at issue is a kind of 
reN, aluation or revalorization of the essence and dignity of man. What is threatened in the 
extension of metaphysics and technology-and we know the essential necessity that 
leads Heidegger to associate one with the other-is the essence of man, which here 
would have to be thought before and beyond its metaphysical deternii nations. 306 
ý() 's Ibid., p. 133. 306 1bid., p. 128. 
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The implication of this priority of the proximity (of Being and man) ýý ithin the 
metaphysics of presence is traced by Derrida not in order to expose deficiencies that 
might be corrected-"who could testify against it? and from where ?,, 
307 
-but rather by 
way of reopening the question of difference and of inscription in general. Here, the 
function of the notion of proximity within the Derridean text pre-empts the possibility of 
the question of Being by showing it to suppose inscription in general. It thereby 
deconstructs the site or opening for the appropriation of Being which discloses itself first 
and foremost in its withdrawal. By placing "in reserve" "man" and all its modes, whether 
this be thought as subject or Dasein, deconstruction at last shows the way beyond all 
anthropocentrisms and humanisms (as that which would hold Heidegger back within 
metaphysics) and opens a new scene: it prepares the space of the technical constitution of 
human being as originary supplernentarity. As Derrida says in Of Graminatology: 
Man allows himself to be announced to himself after the fact of supplementarity, which 
is thus not an attribute-acci dental or essential-of man ... supplementarity, which is 
nothing, neither a substance nor an essence of man. It is precisely the play of presence 
and absence, the opening of this play that no metaphysical nor ontological concept can 
comprehend. Therefore the property [proprel of man is not a property of man: it is the 
very dislocation of the proper in general: it is the dislocation of the characteristic, the 
proper in general, the impossibility-and therefore the desire-of self-proxlmlty.,, 
308 
The supplement, says Derrida in Speech and Phenomena, is another name for diffýrance- 
"Supplementarity is in reality diffirance, the operation of differing which at one and the 
sarne time both fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial 
diN, ision and delay, " because the supplementing difference "vicariously stands in for 
. 107 Jacques Derrida, Aporias: dying - awaiting (one another) at the ""'? "ts of truth ", trans. 
Thomas Dutoit, 
(Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1993), p. 56. 
30ý OG., p. 244. 
187 
309 
Mt), presence due to its primordial self-deficiency. " But unlike diffirance, supplement, i 
stresses more explicitly the function of substitutive supplementation in general, which is 
rooted in the "primordial nonself-presence"of "full" terms. 310 It places greater emphasis 
on the structural necessity of the addition of a difference to a "full" entity by showing it to 
be a consequence of the fact that "full" terms compensate for their lack of another origin. 
Understood in this way, supplementarity could also be said to be a variation of the trace, 
but again, instead of referring to other, supplementarity attributes the structural need of 
adding an other to the vicarious nature of presence itself. 
Now, with regard to what is at issue here, such supplementarity, in its play of 
presence and absence, "precedes what one calls man and extends outside of him". 311 It 
precedes the distinction between man and machine, between the human and the non- 
human, between human being and other living organisms. Consequently, "Instead of 
having recourse to all the concepts that habitually serve to distinguish man from other 
living beings (instinct and intelligence, absence or presence of speech, of society, of 
economy, etc., etc. ) the notion of the program is evoked. It must of course be understood 
in the cybernetic sense, but cybernetics is itself intelligible only in terms of a history of 
,, 312 the possibility of the trace . 
The technical supplement: Derrida, Leroi-Gourhan, and Freud. 
Supplementarity defines deconstructed life as a structure of deferred availability, 
deferred being-present; it thereby presupposes human life to be the kind of entitv which 
can be supplemented. In this context the Derrida's elaboration of writing can be taken as 
an innovative engagement with the originary technicity of the human. We can understand 
IN Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essa " ), s on 
Husserl's Them?, of Signs, trans. David 
B. Allison, (Evanston: Northweste m University Press, 1973), p. 88; hereafter cited as SP. 310 id., p. 87. 311 OG., p. 244. 312 Ibid., p. 84. 
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this in terms of the work of the French paleoanthropologist Andr6 Leroi-Gourhan who 
exercises a not often remarked upon influence on Derrida. A central theme of Leroi- 
Gourhan's work is the importance, from the evolutionary point of view, of manual 
technology in the development of human intelligence and symbolic representation. Such 
development is only possible thinks Leroi-Gourhan, through the close interaction of the 
hand (its use of tools) and brain over the millennia, their mutual conditioning in a circuit 
of positive feedback whereby the "program" is evoked. In this regard he shows (1) that it 
is impossible to dissociate anthropogenesis from technogenesis, (2) that technogenesis 
pursues the conquest of mobility, that is, of life, by means other than life, (3) that 
accordingly the relation between the human and the non human has to be rethought, (4) 
that the technical exteriorization of the living marks the origin of humanity, (5) that the 
technical object constitutes as such a memory support (as well as the condition of what 
Plato calls "hypomnesis"), (5) that for these reasons, language and instrumentality are two 
aspects of the same phenomenon. 
313 
This idea of a positive feedback between tool and agent, their reciprocal 
determination, clearly inform Derrida's thinking since in Of Graminatology Derrida refers 
directly to these theses. The "logic of the supplement"-as a logic of prosthesis that 
shows the "truth" of the "inside" to be (in) the outside in which it exteriorizes itself- 
makes the opposition inside/outside redundant. Leroi-Gourhan can only speak of 
"exteriorization" to the extent that what exteriorizes itself (the "interior, " "life becoming 
conscious of itself") is constituted by its very exteriorization. This is something that 
Derrida's reading of Plato's PhaedruS314 also elaborates in terms of the logic of 
hypomnesis and is already made explicit in "Freud and the Scene of Writing". 
315 nte 
latter essay we recall that Derrida. discusses Freud's use of a child's toy-the "Mystic 
Writing Pad". The Mystic Pad is a machine that represents the workings of the psyche. 
313 Andre Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, trans. Ann Bostock Berger (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1993). 314 Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy. " in DIS pp. 63-171. 
3li Jacques Deffida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing. in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass, 
(London: Routledge, 1978) pp. 196-23 1. 
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The problem for Freud is how the psyche has new experiences, understood as ne-,, v, while 
having memories with an ongoing role in the psyche. What must the mind be like if it can 
perform both of these operations? His answer is that is like a mystic writing pad where 
there is a slab of wax covered by a thin sheet which is attached to the slab at one end and 
loose at the other. Actually there are two sheets, a transparent one on top of a translucent 
piece of waxed paper. Any inscription makes a mark that can be erased by lifting the two 
sheets. The mark disappears at the surface but the wax slab beneath the sheets retains the 
inscription. It is easy to understand Derrida's interest in Freud's model. The system of 
retention and erasure articulates Freud's use of scriptural metaphors; perception is always 
by way of writing. Writing opens up the possibility of perception as a repetition of what 
was erased in the perceptual system and traced in the memory system. Therefore, it 
supplements perception even in the "present" of the "initial" impression. The metaphor of 
writing becomes a working model when it is combined with the machine in the model of 
the Mystic Pad. 
Typically, however, Derrida is not content to indicate the heuristic advantages of 
Fi-eud's model and this is where he exceeds Freud. Freud's use of the analogy of the 
Mystic Pad is in the end a purely instrumental one; he concedes that this model falls to 
iniitate the actual workings of the human memory to the extent that it does not posses the 
autonomy or spontaneity of the human psychical apparatus. It is at this point that Derrida 
qLiestions the limits of Freud's model. Despite the sophistication of Freud's model, his 
final distinction between the living human psyche and the dead technology of the Mystic 
Pad remarks the traditional philosophical conception of technology as external support, 
aii auxiliary but not essential part of the human. In exceeding Freud, Derrida proposes 
that the "resemblance, " the very possibility of passage between psyche and model, \vould 
indicate a more fundamental relationship between the two. The very possibility of the 
supplementation of consciousness is grounded in a necessary cxternalization. This 
11CCCssity structures the psyche as such (in its "interior"). The psvche as such 1.1.1 
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extemalization, is machine writing. The resemblance of memory to its "mechanical 
representation" defines memory. The "machine"-"and, consequently, representation-") 
death and finitude within the psyche. , 316 Therefore, death (the '-machine": re- 
presentation) is already interior to "life". Writing inscribes the "technics" of the "relation Cý 
between life and death, between present and representation". 317 As in a cybernetic circuit, 
the externalization of the human would also be the internalization of the non-human, a 
reciprocal process of affection and modification. 
Stiegler's prosthesis 
The implications of what is at issue here are brought out by Bernard Stiegler who in 
the first volume of his Technics and Time argues that the history of the human is nothing 
other than the process of "exteriorization" ground upon an absolute default of origin, a 
thought "which thus opens the ultimate possibility of a pursuit of technological 
differentiation-pursuit of life by means other than those of life-by the renunciation of 
humanity itself. -318 As Stiegler sees it the problem arising here 
is that the evolution of this essentially technical being that the human is exceeds the 
biological, although this dimension is an essential part of the technical phenomenon 
itself, something like its enigma. The evolution of the "prosthesis, " not itself living, by 
which the hurnan is nonetheless defined as a living being, constitutes the reality of the 
hurnan's evolution, as if, with it, the history of life were to continue by means other than 
life: this is the paradox of the living being characterized in its forms of life by the non tl 
living-or by the traces that its life leaves in the non living. 
319 
316 Ibid., p. 114. 
317 Ibid., p. 116. 
ý; 19 Bernard Stiegler. Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epinietheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and 
George Collins, (Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998). p. 144. 
Ily Ibid., p. 50. Stiegicr's own work is deeply indebted to Derrida cvcn if he will want to mark his distance. 
Like Derrida, Stic, -flcr is concemed to show that the concept of technics, thoug-11 a metaphys, ca 
1 concept 
through and through, rcscrvcs resources for thinking that allow a displacement ot' metaphysics in general. 
and the possibility of an opening of it to the thought of an originary technicity. And, like Derrida, Stiegler's 
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For Stiegler the paradox of human being leads to recognition that, "[iln the process and in 
its evolution, the human undoubtedly remains the agent of differentiation, even though it 
is guided by the very thing it differentiates, even though it discovers itself and becomes 
differentiated in that process, in short, is invented or finds its image there, its iniago, 
being here neither a phantasm nor a simulacrum-as it always is when describing 
technics. Yet can one then measure what is therefore said of the human, of (the absence 
oo its unity and essence 
?, 9320 "From the absence of unity in the human, it would be better 
to conclude that the human can only be defined negatively, by the trait of this technical 
inhumanity that allows it to be differentiated without, however, permitting its 
,, 321 identification. 
Stiegler's narrative of the technical differentiation of the human, of the impossibility 
of anything but a phantasmatic identification of the human in its inhumanity, shows us 
through antithesis how everything of the order of what is usually considered specifically 
hui-nan is immediately and irremediably linked to an absence of property (improprijtj), to 
rnethod shows the necessity today of a negotiation between philosophy and the sciences for technics to be 
thought in its undetermined "specificity". In this connection, Stiegler has an apparently straightforward 
answer to what metaphysics has failed to think in failing to think technics: organiZed inorganic entities. 
These are, he says, situated between the inorganic beings described by the physical sciences, and the 
organised (organic) beings studied by biology, and they have a dynamic proper to them (so that technical 
objects are in a sense self-organising inorganic matter). p. 85. The major moves in Stlegler's argumentation 
are as follows: 1. establish an ontic specificity of technical objects; 2. establish that such objects form a 
sYsteni with a quasi-intentional dynamic proper to it; 3. Show that this dynamic is inseperable from the 
process of "horninization" as such. Technicity, metaphysically thought of as mere supplement or prosthesis 
ofwhat is properly human turns out to be the "origin" of the humanity, which is thus marked by an originary 
"det'cct" or "lack" that technics makes good. Man is in this sense "essentially" technical. 
It is tempting to find in Stiegler's genealogy of "matter" a solution to the problems that I considered in 
Chapter 3 with regard to Derrida's inability to offer a non metaphysical materialism. It is also in Stlegler 
that one can find another turn on Derrida's attempt to deconstruct Heidegger. That said, as Geoffrcý- 
Bennington points out, Stiegler's at times brilliant account of originary technicity is presented in tandem 
with a set of claims about technics and even techno-science as though all these claims happened on the same 
IeN, el. For Bennington, "(t]his mechanism makes of Stiegler's book perhaps the most refined example to date 
of the confusion of the quasi-transcendental (originary technicity) and transcendental contraband 
Occhnics), whereby Stiegler constantly reinstates all the oppositions (summerized here in the physisItechne 
opposition) his analysis is also acute enough to criticize and deconstruct. " See Geoffrey Bennint"ton, 
"Ernergencies, " in Oxford Literary ReOew, vol. 18., 1998. For a strong defensc of Stiegler see Richard 
Beardsworth, "From a Genealogy of Matter to a Politics of Memory: Stiecder's Thinking of Technics" in C7 1 Tcchnenia at http: H\% ww. gold. ac. uk/tekhnema/2/beards\ý-orth/beardsworth. html "I'lbid., 
p. 158, 1, Ibid., p. 157. 
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a process of "supplementation, " of prosthetization or exteriorization, in which nothing is 
no longer immediately at hand, where everything is found mediated and technicIzed, 
unbalanced. Human being is characterized by an exteriorization which is not preceded bý- 
an interiority, but which determines it. This is indeed Derrida's position. As he says in an 
interview collected in Points, "There is no natural, originary body: technology has not 
simply added itself, from the outside or after the fact, as a foreign body. Or at least this 
foreign or dangerous supplement is "originarily" at work and in place in the supposedly 
ideal interiority of the "body and soul. " It is indeed at the heart of the heart. -322 What is 
said here is repeated in an interview with Richard Beardsworth where Derrida notes that 
the living being undoes the traditional relation between physis and techne (whereby the 
latter has always been subordinated to the former) and should rather be thought in the 
context of an originary technicity: 
As a self-relation , as activity and reactivity, as differential 
force and repetition, life is 
always already inhabited by technicization. The relation between physis and technics is 
not an opposition; from the very first there is mstrumentalization [djs Vorl'gine il ya de 
Vinstruinentalisation]. The ten-n instrument is inappropropriate in the context of 
originary technicity. Whatever, a prosthetic strategy of repetition inhabits the very 
inornent of life: life is a process of self-replacement, the handing down of life is a 
mechanike, a fonri of technics. Not only, then, is technics not in opposition to life, it also 
haunts it from the very beginning. 323 
The idea that inscription in general both constitutes and effaces human being and bein(Is Z7 
in general according to supplementarity and the possibility of -puttim-' in reserve, " defines Cý - 
322 Jacques Dcrrida, "The Rhetoric of Drugs, " trans. Micheal Isreal, in Points ... 
Intmiews, 1974-1994. ed. 
Hizabeth Weber, trans. Peggy Karnuf et al. (Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992) pp. 228-254- 
ý-3244-245. 
Jacques Derrida, "Nietzsche and the Machine. " trans. Richard Beardsworth, In Negotiations: 
11110"'t'ntions and Inten, icws 19, -1-2001, trans and ed. Elizabeth Rotteriber. g. (Stanford Call f.. Stanford 
Ulliversity Press, 2002), pp. 215-256. p. 244. 
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deconstructed life as a structure of deferred availability, deferred being-present: it thereby 
presupposes human life to be the kind of entitY which can be suppleniented. (Heidecyger L- -- 
calls this the "technicized animal") The graphics of supplementarity integrate technic..,, 
into the human being conceived differentially. 
Generalized inscription and the "standing reserve" 
It is telling that within the exorbitant method of deconstruction, in its approach to the 
subject and to beings in general-that they suppose the necessity of inscription in general 
-that supplementarity should come to replace human being conceived as Dasein. It is 
equally telling that within the deconstructive gesture there remains room for a "structural 
science" but not for phenomenology though both were the original sources for Derrida's 
project. For it is precisely in the trace of specifically phenomenonological motifs, in the 
disclosive event of the unconcealment of beings, that the movement of Heidegger's 
thinking opens onto the non-representative and incalculable actuality of metaphysics 
where this is equal to the surpassing or thinking beyond of contemporary techno-scientific 
accomplishment and reign. The authority which Derrida grants to writing on the other 
liaiid implicates an extra turn which re-traces the completion of metaphysics to re-iterate 
it. Given that the disavowal of writing in and through the logocentric era was, as Derrida 
insists, equally the disavowal of techne conceived as mere instrument and tool, the 
"productive possibilities" that issue with the liberation of the graphic, e. g., the creation of 
technology in the guise of programmes of "research and development, " in the guise of 
cybernetics, artificial intelligence, the manipulation of genetic codes including our own 
(tlie production of "bio-machines": clones, chimera's, hybrids, shape shifters, mosaics), 
are the repressed empirical re-iterations of what was always the case: writing was always 
already the originary condition of the world-wide technicization of all relations among 
bemos. 
I- 
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As the above suggests, it seems that the program of the dissimulation of the 
withdrawal (the forgetting of forgetting) of (the thinking of) Being and of the 
deconstruction of Dasein indeed forgets itself as the condition of the systernatic 
manipulation of entities. It should not therefore be surprising to find in the Derridean text 
those features which Heidegger takes to be characteristic of the Ge-stell. Indeed, if as 
opening onto a space that extends beyond the purview of representation the significance 
of the latter lies primarily and decisively in the elision of that definiteness, of those 
ý4proper" boundaries, which were the hallmark of the "subject-object" relation, and In the 
infinite ordering, storing up, switching-around, re-channeling, and calculating of 
4&energy"-i. e., of that impalpable non-object which is known only by its -effects"-then 
the very emergence of the notion of the field of generalized inscription as determined by 
the appeal to diffirance, trace, supplement, retrait, etc., can be thought in terms of the 
Heideggerian standing reserve. This is Galt Crowell's view. He points out that insofar as 
it authorizes the erasure of boundaries the Derridean text can be seen to be symptomatic 
of thinking in the age of technology. As he says, this has been implicit in the agenda of 
the structuralist inquiry into differential or diacritical characteristics of signs and sign 
systerns as a counter thrust to phenomenology, and it becomes explicit in the shift from 
laiiguage to the more general notion of writing: "For in the concept of a writing which 
wotild be cut loose from the logocentric priority of "full" presence there lies an originary 
"fi-arning" by way of certain structuralist views of the sign and the system Of signs as a 
setting up of the field of endless "deferrals . 91324 "Writing, as the 
doubling of the sign is the 
condition for all tcchnology, for all "programming" as Derrida claims. But then since all 
sions reveal this doubling structure according to the deconstruction of structuralism the 
concept of arche-writing which emerges can be seen as the essence of technology, or 
better, as that which replaces "essence" in the technological age, viz., the "frame" or 
324 Cf. op. cit., n 291 at p. 435. 
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weave of diffirance. "" With the liberation of the graphic Being and beings are seen to be 
an "effect of diffýrance, " an effect of the general text. The very determinateness contained 
in the concept of an "entity" is said to be the "occulted movement of the trace" achieved 
in metaphysics. "In the end it is the concept of the trace, which "neither meaning nor t7 
presence can pin down" in the field of writing that bears the closest resemblance to the 
Heideggerian notion of the "standing reserve". ""' 
This assessment that Derrida's notion of generalized inscription can be thought in 
terms of the Heideggerian thinking of the standing reserve is one that is shared by Radloft' 
who asserts that "Vecriture is the metatechnology of the discourse of cxpropriation: it 
belongs in the same as what Heidegger calls das Ge-stell. 9327 Taking into account its 
usual translation as "Enframing" or Framework" Radloff states that that which Heidegger 
attempts to think under the term Ge-stell is "more properly thought as Exposition: the 
discourse of expropriation. " Translated as Exposition, Ge-stell names "the system of 
discourse which expropriates the identity of the entity in favor of its availability for show 
(play) within the functional system of writing. " 328 Noting that the scope of Derridean 
generýilized writing is such that it cuts across and cuts together (grafts) all manner of 
entities thereby erasing the distinction between man and machine and between human 
being and other living organisms, Radloff states that inscription in general functions as ID 
the "Interface" which constitutes, nature and mankind as mutual expropriation. Thus 
[w]nting, or let us say, "programmatics, " would be-to use the shorthand of 
nietaphysics-the condition of the possibility of the manipulation and production of 
eiltities. Writing, then, is entirely at the service, as it were-is the empowering thought- 
,, 329 ofa more efficient technicity . 
id., p. 435. 
i d., p. 436. 
. 127 f. op. ot., n 292 at p. 27. 
. 128 Ibid., p. 27. 329 Ibid., p. 27-28. 
196 
Now, having cited the arguments of both Galt Crowell and Radloff I should say that 
although they open up for inspection the link Derrida draws between writing and 
technology nowhere do they take up Derrida on his own terms; that is, they do not make 
anything of Derrida's assertions regarding the co-implication of writing and technics 
where this issues in the thinking of generalized inscription as ofiginary technicity. Nor do 
they make anything of Derrida's attestation that before it is anything deconstruction is a 
response to, is itself, a certain historical event, a happening that is linked to a mutation 
within Western techno-scientific culture. Nor again do they make their way to any of 
those texts where Derrida's deconstruction of the Heideggerian thinking of technology is 
played out in explicit fashion. On the contrary, everything turns on locating Derrida in 
Heidegger's text and there is no attempt to spoil the demonstration by rehearsing 
Derrida's powerful challenge to such a move. Consequently, nothing is made of the at 
once infinitesimal but decisive diffirance that Derrida wants to mark between his own 
text and Heidegger's. 
That said, although they do not say as much both Galt Crowell and Radloff do 
highlight the links between writing and technology as it is found in Derrida They do 
therefore mark, without saying so and without recognizing its deconstructive 
implications, the diffirance that articulates Derrida's closure of Heidegger's text where 
this turns on the affirmation of originary technicity. Now, if we subscribe to the view that 
Derridean writing can be seen as belonging to the "standing reserve" of das Ge-stell, then 
this originality must be seen as already at work in Heidegger's assertion of the 
technological completion of philosophy. That is, the Heideggerian text already contains 
within its weave the thought of technics as it is found in and subsequently elaborated by 
Derrida as that which will decisively open the proximity and distance between the 
thinking of Being and deconstruction. The Derridean text therefore finds itself inscribed 
within the thinking of Being at that very moment, and precisely, when it subjects this 
thinking to deconstructive re-inscription. To say this is not only to affirm the 
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incalculability of Heidegger's thinking with respect to the Derridean calculation, it is 
equally to mark decon structi on's own subjection to its articulation of the loc:,, Ic of closure. 
A strategic mis-reading 
The incalculable shock that is delivered to the Derridean text becomes intelligible 
when we consider the strategic wager or calculation that Derrida has taken with respect to 
Heidegger's aporetic status vis-a-vis metaphysics. As David Wood has remarked, the real 
contribution of Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's thinking is to have drawn our 
attention to the double movement at work in his text ("It is at once contained in 
[metaphysics] and transgresses it. But it is impossible to separate the two"), to have 
drawn together the strands of each movement, and then to have presented these two 
movements as intimately conjoined. What Derrida then does is to inscribe in a most 
delicate way his own thought of diffirance ("not within but on the horizon of the 
Heideggerian paths, and yet in them") as a way (a) of coming to see Being always as a 
(historically) determined trace, (b) of grasping that "all is not to be thought of at one go, " 
and (c) of giving a radical integration to Heidegger's various moves. 330 
The lesson we are to learn from this exemplary reading is that not only can everything 
not be thought of "at one go" but that it is essential to deconstructive reinscription that it 
take certain routes. This itinerary is an assumed paradox: on the one hand, by showing 
that Heidegger's various reinscriptions of metaphysics were always for him and still are 
I'or us open to deconstructive redraftings pursuing the matter for thinking in different 
contexts, Derrida remarks the thinking of Being and opens up another Heidegger, one 
ývho is continually on the way beyond metaphysics (and its privilege of presence); on the 
other hand, such an opening of Heidegger's text which addresses itself via the detour of a t-- 
1ý I that requires a switch point, a 
halt, stasis strategic telecommunicat ion, sets in play a relay III 
or nioment of determination (a decision or calculation over the incalcalculabllltý- of 
33o See David Wood, ThinkingAfiter Heitlegger, (London: Pohtý Prcs,,, 2002). p. 97. 
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Heidegger's thought) that short circuits any possible move out of (the technological 
completion of) the history of Western philosophy by locating Heidegger's thinking in its 
belonging to metaphysics. 
Now, as Wood asks, is there not a danger or risk that by following this itinerarv, in 
articulating the closure of Heidegger's thinking, the Derridean strategy reduces its 
dynamic to a structure in tension, and that the real movement of Heidegger's text-its 
immanent transform ati on-mere] y supplies evidence of both sides of this tension? 331 
Surely it is not only we and Derrida who pass through cleconstructive writing (in relation 
to Heidegger)-it is Heidegger's own practice. In this case, Heideauer's text does not Cý-- 
wait upon Derrida to send it elsewhere, it is itself already on the way. Indeed, as I 
emphasized in Chapter I even as they return to the same matter (Sache) again and again, 
Heiclegger's own writings are themselves pluralized and differentiated into various 
"Heidegger's, " topoi, and thought-paths. Here, Heidegger's thought is articulated across a 
re-elaborative gathering that is equally an irreducible dispersion of the "unique central 
question". To point up such plurality is not to deny Heidegger's text its unity and 
continuity; on the contrary, it is to recognize this unity across and from out of its 
performative enactment, the enactment that is of that which is to be thought ever anew, 
i. c., the self-dif-ferentiating of die Sache. The issue then would be: how distinctively 
productive is Derrida's rewriting of Heidegger's text given that this text, clearly, is 
already differentiated and is continually reiterated and reinscribed in different and 
clashing ways? Is Derridean deconstruction able to bear the thought of the trans 
(enactment, movement, opening, ) that belongs to Heidegger's thinking" If, as Wood It:, I 
, sýiys, Derrida stresses the "structure in tension" of Heidegger's thought rather than its own 
nio\! enient of differentiation might not this suggest perhaps that Derridean reinscription 
functions by way of a motivated calculus that reduces the immanent dynamic of 
Heidegger's thinking to a thesis the better to release its o\A., n brand of textual difference" 
331 
Ibid., p. 97. 
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This is a scenario suggested by Thomas Sheehan as a way of making sense of what, in 
his opinion, is the gross misreading of Heidegger found in Derrida's early work. As 
Sheehan says, "[i]f we study Derrida's early interpretations of Heidegger in Marges de la 
Philosophie and De la Grammatologie we find him attributing to Heidegger positions 
,, 332 that simply cannot be found on Heidegger's page. More strongly, Sheehan contends 
that Derrida proposes readings which are so obviously wrong that "quite frankly, we 
would not accept them from our own graduate students. , 333 
What Sheehan finds extraordinary are Derrida's most obvious arguments for 
Heidegger's continued commitment to the philosophical tradition and for his privileging 
of unity over dispersal; his claim that Heidegger's mobilization of the family of words 
relating to the adjective eigen marking the movement from authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) 
through to appropriation (Ereignis), articulates "perhaps the most continuous thread in 
Heidegger's thought, " and demonstrates more than any other his revaluation of the 
thought of presence and desire for the proper. Briefly stated, Sheehan thinks that by 
linking Eigentlichkeit and Ereignis Derrida has indeed zeroed in on the center of 
Heidegger's thought. However, he contends that Derrida has completely missed the 
movement he seeks to affirm. Whereas Derrida claims to have shown by deconstruction 
that Heidegger's is a text marked by the metaphysical desire for unity and "the same" 
whereby Being means immediate presence to Dasein which is in turn defined as presence 
or nearness to itself, what Heidegger's thinking does in fact perform is the undermining 
of any such immediacy and self-presence. Just to take the example of Eigentlichkiet, 
authenticity, as Sheehan points out, taken at their word Heidegger's texts clearly say that 
to be authentic means to live in one's throwness and self-absence and that what is proper 
to Dasein lies precisely in its condition of being "Fort-Sein, " self-transcendent in the 
direction of the finite delimitation of any self-presence. 334 There is of course no doubt 
332 Thomas Sheehan, "Derrida and Heidegger" in Hermenuetics and Deconstruction, ed. Hugh Milverman 
and Don lhde, (Albany: State University of New York, 1985), pp. 201-217. P. 203. 333 Ibid., p. 212. 334 Ibid., p. 207. 
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that there are moments in Heidegger's thinking where a certain dfive to presence 
manifests itself. However, for Sheehan, in his attempt to retrieve the problem of Being 
from its metaphysical instance what Heidegger's text provides above all is an abyssal 
thinking of dis-ownment, withdrawal, exposure, openness, and even dissolution. Indeed, 
Heidegger is so much aware of this abyssal dimension that were it not an essential 
dimension of the proper, the proper would have to be abandoned. 
Derrida's arguments over Heidegger's use of the etymological chain Eigentlichkeit, 
Eigen, Ereignis are also questioned by Wood who remarks that it would be hard to 
overestimate the power and persuasiveness of the moves by which Heidegger persistently 
distancies himself from affirming the value of presence and all its cognates. To begin 
with, for Wood it does not seem sufficient to treat the movement from Eigentlichkeit to 
Ereignis, say, as one of displacement, in which a univocal sense can be attributed to these 
terms such that "the same" concern is being handed on from word to word. That does not 
seem to account for the radical dropping of the term Eigentlichkeit after Being and Time, 
nor for Heidegger's own account of the provisionality of his formulation in Being and 
Time. 335 Moreover, like Sheehan, Wood notes that Heidegger's thinking of the notion of 
authenticity has such an abyssal dimension in Being and Time as to disturb rather than 
confirm or sustain any sort of secure self-identity. Similarly, if we turn to the thinking of 
Ereignis even the most cursory examination of Heidegger's text will recognize the 
verbality and transitivity at stake, and will note above all that the thinking of Ereignis can 
only arise necessarily and on condition that thinking has opened up and built a way of 
questioning into the essence of technology. As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, questioning 
into the essence of technology means to enter into the transitivity of Being where this is 
equal to the the oscillating-vibrating edifice of the Ge-stell as the opening of Ereignis. 
Taking into account the constellation of Ge-stell-Ereignis as one that involves above all 
movement and transition we see that what is at issue in Heidegger's text is articulated 
... Cf. op. cit., n 330 at p. 98. 
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primarily in terms of withholding, withdrawal, denial, temporal extension, and 
expropriation. Insofar as it implicates the peculiar quality of a space withdrawn from 
representation Ereignis cannot be "placed in front of us, " or -opposite us, " or "as 
something all encompassing". One only comes into one's own bv enduring 
transcendence, by being radically outside oneself, as the opening of -time, " as much as of 
-space". Thus when Heidegger speaks of Ereignis as "the extending and sending which 
opens and preserves, " we must resist the supposition that something like a simplc 
reinscription of the value of the proper or property is being reasserted. 
I let citations stand in place of arguments here because any straightforward "critique- 
of the "Who's-more-metaphysical? " type is, as I have said, very problematic, perhaps 
impossible, and almost certainly beside the point since it remains (rather overtly) within 
the bounds of representation and exhausts itself in merely comparing texts, securing 
landmarks, and in making decisions between themes or positions. This is a circumstance 
to which both Wood and Sheehan are sensitive. Instead of fashioning a thesis it is more 
productive to see Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's text as structured by a pattern of 
return, of recognition of misrecognition, and of constant reworking, which is the way 
Wood sees it, or, as a calculated misreading, which is Sheehan's view. To be more 
precise, Sheehan contends that Derrida has strategically misunderstood the difference 
that rules in the inseparable structure of Dasein and Ereignis and that he has 
misrepresented the irreducible movement of Heidegger's thinking the better to release it 
as his own diffiýi-ance. Thus he can find in the Heideggerian thernatics of authenticity 
(h'igentlichkeit) and Ei-eignis-that is, at the very place where Derrida traces Heidegger's 
commitment to the metaphysics of presence-a movement that is "the undecidable itself, 
neither presence nor absence, neither inside nor outside, " a movement which turns out to 
be "the dislocation that never arrives at a new locus, the effacement of entities by 
reducing them to traces which in turn are not reducible to any telos. -I , 16 
336 C f. op. c it., n332atp. 2 16. 
202 
Derrida's thesis 
Following these remarks let me consider the possibility that once the deconstructive 
incision is made in Heidegger's text everything happens as if the problematic of closure 
compels Derrida to strategically avoid, obfuscate, overlook, ignore, or restrict what, in 
Heideggerian thought, would disrupt his textual understanding of (the history of) 
philosophy, of writing and diffirance etc. Here, Heidegger's text yields to a violent yet 
almost internal necessity and, although not actually undone, is nonetheless opened up by a 
certain machinic intervention. It is thus forced to open onto still another reading that 
refuses to let itself be contained there. Furthermore, let me suggest that at the same time 
as he marks the unclecidability of Heidegger's text, its simultaneous belonging to and 
transgression with respect to metaphysics, Derrida's deconstructive method articulates a 
calculus that checks the differential constitution of Heidegger's text and puts in play a 
program that paves the way for a restricted econornization of the sheer plurality of the 
inany "ways, " "paths, " or way-traces that make up the incalculable and nonmasterable 
Sache of his thought. In this case, in presuming to penetrate to the most intimate reaches 
of Heidegger's thinking Derrida reduces it to a schema that effectively re-marks its 
irreducible movement to take it into account, to re-count it, and to integrate it into the 
general economy of writing as a way of opening up its textuality (as his own). I- 
Now, if Derrida's insistence on "subtle, hidden, stubborn privilege" of the general 
concept of proximity, the desire for that which is gathered and unified, presents us with 
perhaps the most obvious instance of the Derridean strategic misreading of Heidegger, 
then this ought to be readable in his deconstruction of Heidegger's thinking of the end of 
inetaphysics and its technological outcome. This is indeed what we find. In this regard 
Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's text can be seen to exhibit a revcaling swerve from 
the decisive formulations of those texts composed in the 1950s and 1960s which think the 
essence of technology as Ge-stell and as cybernetics towards the more restricted i,,,, ues of 
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those of the 1930s and 1940s. As was shown in Chapter 1, in the economy of Heideg2er's 
thought the latter set of texts open onto the emergence of technology via the rethinking of 
the history of nihilism as found in Nietzsche and by way of its reflection on 
representation as the condition for the transformation of science into research via the 
projection of object-domains and the demand for exactness. Here, the most important 
development in Heidegger's thinking lies in the way it effectively elaborates the way in 
which the technological apprehension of the modem world is experienced as 
"representation" (Vorstellung) as "view" and as "object for a subject". As I said, although 
Heidegger's later thinking of the essence of technology as Ge-stell retains a serniological 
connection with the thinking of representation such thinking is transformed and is not 
applicable, without further ado, to the later texts. To be more precise, in the pervasive 
dominance and increasing prevalence of Ge-stell considerably more is at stake than what 
is said to be the case in those essays in which representation is at issue since, as 
Heidegger explicitly states, what is revealed within modern technology is no longer 
uniquely articulated within the horizon of representation and so is foreign to traditional 
thinking (with its emphasis on a static conception of Being). The chain of cognates built 
around Stelle, "place, " emphasizes the centrality of a conception of placing: setting things 
in place, holding them in place, ordering them into place, securing their place within a 
systeni of placement where everything is posited and has its place. But with the advent of 
tI ull blown technology in the manner of Ge-stell this placing, positing, and structuring of 
everything within the system entails precisely a displacement from the immediate field of 
what is brought to stand. The transitivity, inconstancy, violent vibrating and oscillating 
that such a systern entails is precisely what enables Heidegger to think beyond a static 
conception of Being which is determinative of metaphysics. In short, technology is the 
field and decisive condition which opens thinking to a possibility in excess of traditional 
metaphysics as actualized in the representationalist project. To say it again: it is 
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technology and only technology that opens thinking to the event (Ereignis) and to the dif- 
ference (Unter-Schied) that is the matter (Sache) for thinking. 
That it is the earlier work that primarily informs the Derridean reinscription of 
Heidegger can be seen if we turn back to those texts-The Post Card and its 
supplements-that were the primary focus of Chapter 2, texts which contain ýýhat 
remains Derrida's most explicit and sustained engagement with the Heidegger's thinking 
of technology. As we have seen, in The Post Card Derrida poses the objection to himself 
that Heidegger would have considered his entire insistence on the posts and everything 
that it governs as a technology belonging within metaphysics: "he would accuse me, you 
can see it from here, of constructing a metaphysics of the posts or postality-, and above all 
an imposition of position precisely, of determining the envoi of Being as position, 
posture, thesis or theme (Set71111g, thesis, etc. ), a gesture that he alleges to situate, as well 11 
as technology, within the history of metaphysics". 
"Position ... .. posture ... .. theme, " or "thesis"; these are the key words that guide 
Derrida's strategic circumvention of the expected Heideggerian charge. What such words 
show above all is that Derrida's reading of the Heideggerian thinking of technology takes 
the problematic of representation, the positional initiative and the subjective setting-up 
and rendering-present of "objects, " to be decisive. Indeed, in "Sendings" an essay which 
tackles the question of representation via an extended reading of "The Age of the World 
Picture, " Derrida writes, I must content myself with situating here the precise place of 
the necessity of the whole Heideggerian meditation on the Ge-stell and the modern 
,, 337 essence of techniqUe . 
The consequences of Derrida's strategic misreading are immediately apparent. Bý 
contenting himself' with situating the necessity of Heidegger's thinking of the essence of 
tcchnology in the place where the problematic of representation is elaborated, that is, bý 
making of Heidegger's tcxt a thesis, Derrida strips it of the verbality and transiti-vity that 
337 
S-. 11-309, 
205 
ýuch thinking emphasizes. Such a move, which coincides with the closure of Heidegger's 
thought, has the effect of restricting the movement-immanent transformation-of 
Heidegger's text as it traverses the epochal shift out beyond the metaphysics of 
representation into the thinking of difference. In this case, the Derridean strategy 
calculates with the incalculability and ambiguity of Heidegger's text by organizing 
according to a structure in tension that would favor the explicit elaboration of a writing 
and thereby a techne that would take their leave from Heidegger's thinking of the end of 
philosophy. In this case, deconstruction hopes that the entire "topology of Being" will be 
at the mercy of the "literality of the trace" and not the reverse. 338 It hopes that 
Heidegger's text will submit to a writing and a techne which are in fact already at work 
there, already at work at the limit or border where representation, and thereby technology, 
opens onto its other, onto Ereignis, and so grants to the incalculable its proper 
determination. Hence Derrida's point of departure is inadequate to his own appreciation 
of technicity as originary. Perhaps there is nothing accidental or fortuitous about this. 
Perhaps this inadequacy is necessitated by the failure of deconstruction to think technics 
radically enough, which is to say, to think it in its essence as the epochal event of the 
disclosure of beings. Notice I said perhaps; this matter is of course undecidable. If it 
remains the case that even as it articulates the necessity of originary technicity Derrida's 
text finds itself having to contend with the fact that such an elaboration is symptomatic 
of the ongoing actualization of completed metaphysics, that it marks another turn of "the 
i-clease of Being into machination, " (such that Derrida finds himself alongside all those 
other technicians who, beginning with the Greeks, were subject to a "destiny" that 
determined their thought with respect to what remains unthought) it is equally the case 
that Derrida finds in this circumstance a source of affirmation and the promise of a future. 
It is to this affirmation that I now want to turn. 
339 For an interesting discussion of this reversal see G6rard Guest "The Turning of Ereignis, Situating 
"Deconstruction" in the Topology ofBeing" in Heidegger Studies, vol 15. pp. 19-35- It'. 11: 1 
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Later Derrida: Deconstruction as Affirmative Technology 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I considered the possibility that Derrida's reinscription of 
Heidegger's text finds itself having to face up to the incalculable shock that it is 
symptomatic of technological thinking as Heidegger sees it, that it belongs to the same as 
what Heidegger calls das Ge-stell. Such a possibility attests to the fact that between 
Derrida's text and Heidegger's thinking there is, together with a radical displacement, a 
much closer proximity. Indeed, given his restriction of Heidegger's thinking to the 
concern with representation, a proximity much closer than Derrida is able to show. And 
yet, that said, the "uncanny intimacy" of the Derridean text and Heidegger's thinking of 
technology is marked by a limitation which makes all the difference, if not the 
"infinitesimal and decisive diffýrance" of which Derrida speaks. This limitation turns on 
the circumstance that although Heidegger is one of the first philosophers to be very 
attentive to the question of technology, to the question of the relation of technology and 
pliflosophy, technology and metaphysics, technology and the West, he nonetheless 
remains, at a certain moment, tempted by a characteristic relegation of technology (where 
this would include science) to a secondary position in relation to the pretechnical 
onginariness of what is taken up as the matter of thinking. As Derrida asks: 
Doesn't he suggest that there is a thinking pure of all technics? And in his eyes, that zn 
technicity is not technical, that the thinking of technics is not technical, this is the 
condition of thinking. He would not say that the thinking of essence is neither thinking 
nor essence. This gesture by which he incessantly reminds us that the scientificity of 
science is not scientific, this gesture in which one hopes to think [pense penserl the 
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ontological difference, that is to say, the fact that the essence of this is not this. and 
that this is the condition of thinking, ensures that between thinking and technics, aý; 
between thinking and science, there is the abyss of which Heidegger wants to remind 
339 
US. 
What Derrida says here remarks his disquiet and hesitation over the Heideggerian desire 
for rigorous non-contami nation that I noted in Chapter 2. As I said, it seems to Derrida 
that the attempt to make of thinking or of the thinkable somethin-c-, that 's pure of all 
philosophical, scientific, or technical contamination is not self evident. In Derrida's 
words, "[t]his is, for me in any case and if I understand it correctly, the title of an 
immense question-and of an immense reserve with respect to the ensemble not only of 
,, 340 what Heidegger thinks, but of what he thinks of thinking. One may want to claim, of 
course, that this difference between technics and thinking cannot be ascribed to 
Heidegger without a certain violence, a certain (strategic) misreading. As I have argued in 
this study, it is technology and only technology that opens Heidegger to what is the task 
and matter of thinking, to the dif-ference which by remaining Linthought has always 
dominated metaphysics. In opening up a space withdrawn from representation, in 
exceeding the calculable and becoming, precisely, incalculable, technology is the liminal 
appearance of the event of appropriation and as such the anticipatory incidence of a 
contemporary potential that marks the opening of the future. Indeed, if the immanent 
dynamic of his thinking is taken seriously, it is clear that for Heidegger there is no 
questioning retrieval of Being, no "turn" out of metaphysics, no thinking entry into 
Ereignis as the possibility of the "other beginning, " without the "first beginning" entering 
into its technological end. Moreover, insofar as his response to the provocation of modern 
technolocyv opens up a retrieval of the original Greek sense of techile as poietic, as that 1ý. 
. 139 Jacques Dcrrida and Beniard StIc., der, Echographies of Television, trans. Jennit-cr Bajorek, (London: C, Politv Press, 2002. pp. 133-134 hereafter cited as EOT. 
.; 
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which belongs to a "bringing-forth" understood as a mode of disclosure where disclosure 
is precisely what is to be thought, then for Heidegger technics does I belong to 
thinking just as thinking belongs to technics. The question, however, still remains: Is 
Heidegger thereby a thinker of originary technicity? Derrida's answer to this question, 
which reinforces his recognition that the thought of technology for Heidegger is at least 
double, that it cannot be reduced to this or that proposition or thesis, would have to be 
both yes and no: yes insofar as technology is thought by Heidegger in a way that moves 
beyond its instrumental-anthropological determination; no insofar as Heidegger's 
thinking of the nontechnical essence of technology constitutes a certain subtraction or 
exclusion of technics from the field of what is to be thought, that is, appropriated at the 
end of metaphysics. This foreclosure of technology answers the question of technology 
itself. In the final analysis it is the subtle maintenance of the border between an actual or 
ontic technics and its essence forged out of the desire for non-contarn i nation and which 
manifests itself in the thinking of epochality, in authentic or proper thinking, that will 
hold Heidegger back within metaphysics and will stop him from making his way to the 
"older" thought of generalized inscription and originary technicity. 
Derrida's deconstruction of Heidegger's assertion of the ontological difference 
between technics and its essence remarks in a sure way his arguments regarding the 
traditional treatment of writing as techne, as a mere technical artifice and auxiliary 
instruinent that has no constitutive meaning or proper dynamic of its own. It forms part of 
a program that calls into question a history that has associated technics and logocentric 
rimaphysics for nearly three millennia. A history in which technics and all technical 
knoývledge is foreclosed as a matter of thought on the basis of a determined devaluation. 
For Derrida this constitutes something like the major decision of philosophical thou"'ht- 
Froin this perspective, and despite everything that works against it, Heidegger's thinking 
can be seen to perpetuate the traditional philosophical anxiety over technic', and 
-eby it is seen as a perversion. a corruption, an extern iý lechnicization whei afitv and a 
209 
constant threat of contamination. Thus, despite having raised technology to the status of a 
the question that is put to philosophy as the question to which it must respond, as the 
question about its history and its end, for Derrida, Heidegger's thinking " despite so many 
ý, 341 denials on the subject, remains anti technological, originaristic, even ecologistic . 
Deconstruction on the other hand emerges as that which opens up an affirmative 
technology. Indeed, as the thought of the inescapability of inscription in general and 
thereby of originary technicity, deconstruction is an affirmative technology. This is not 
simply because deconstruction articulates the release or liberation of technics from its 
philosophical repression. Nor is it merely because there is, as Derrida's work shows, no 
thinking or questioning, no philosophy, outside of some process of technicization. 
Rather, and also, it is because this same technology becomes the site of that which 
happens, of a world in the process of changing and thus of deconstructing, becomes that 
is, the site of the event. In this regard deconstruction takes place where both the event and 
technology no longer appear as antinomic or thought from out of an ontological 
difference. On the contrary, they appear as two compatible or even indissociable 
concepts. In this case, the event would be what, this time, no longer happens without 
technology. Rather, it would happen by technology. 
Perhaps. This event-machine is to-come; it is of the future as its machinic opening. 342 
Indeed, as Derrida told David Wills in a seminar held in Sydney in 1999: 
We have to affirm the to-come in the form of technology. If there is a future, if there is 
a to-come, it will happen indissociably with a transformation of the world by, through 
341 Ibid., p. 133. 
342 As we shall see below, the logic of the "perhaps" goes to the very heart of deconstruction. As Derrida 
says, "There is no future and no relation to the coming of the event without experience of the "perhaps. 
" 
What takes place does not have to announce itself as possible or necessary; if it did, its irruption as event 
would in advance be neutralized. The event belongs to a perhaps that is in keeping not with the possible 
but 
with the impossible. " See Jacques Derrida, "The Future of the Profession or the Universit , 
N, without 
condition (thanks to the "Humanities, " what could take place tomorrow)" in Jacques Derrida and the 
Hunianities: A Critical Reader, ed. Tom Cohen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 
24-57. 
P. 54, cited hereafter as FP. 
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or within technology, and we know this more than ever today. It has always been true. 
but today we know that the to-come will come to us in the form of a new technology. 
So the technology is not simply a set of instruments external to our life, our 
temporality, our decision, and so on and so forth. So from that point of view I cannot 
dissociate the problematic of technology from affirmation. 343 
Now, while this study has laid the groundwork for what is involved here it remains a 
complexity to be developed. To this end, in this final chapter I want to re-explicate what I 
have in fact been attempting all along which is to render explicit, if I can put it like that, 
what is often called an "affirmative deconstruction" or deconstruction in its affirmative 
phase. In its affirmative phase it is more widely understood that deconstruction is not, and 
never was, a purely negative enterprise intent on destroying foundations, conventions, 
structures, institutions, philosophies, etc. Rather, as I have been keen to emphasize, 
deconstruction is thought in terms of the event itself, it is one of the many possible 
metonymic names for what is happening today, not only within philosophical texts but to 
the world in general in its techno-scientfic transformation. In this connection, I want to 
turn to some of Derrida's more recent texts where deconstruction emerges as a question 
of the indissociability of technics and the event and, thereby, as an affirmative 
technology. The matters that I want to discuss derive from a context that is established, in 
particular, in a number of Derrida's texts from the 1990s. If I can summarise that context 
by quoting Derrida in a lecture given in 1998 and published as "Typewriter Ribbon: 
Limited Ink (2) ("within such limits")". Derrida opens this lecture-which sets in play a 
textual machine that weaves together a complex network around certain unfinished 
business with Paul de Man and whose elements consist of, among others, the themes of 
Pardon, forgiveness, excuse, betrayal, perjury-by looking to the machinic future. He 
343 See Jacques Derrida, "Affirmative Deconstruction, Inheritance, Technology" in Deconstruction 
Engage&The Sydneýy Seminars, eds. Paul Patton and Terry Smith, (Sydney: Power Publications, 2001). pp. 
71-79. p. 78; cited hereafter as DE. 
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begins by raising the question of whether it will one day be possible (and he tell.,,, us there 
ý611 be no future except on this condition) to think both the event and the machine as ox, o 
compatible and even indissociable concepts even though at present they appear to us to be 
antinomic. Antinomic because it is commonly thought that the event ought to keep some 
incalculable and nonprogrammable singularity, that it must not give in or be reduced to 
the programs or calculations of a machine. Having raised this question Derrida then says, 
one day, and with one and the same concept, these two incompatible concepts, the 
event and the machine, were to be thought together, you can bet that not only (and I insist 
on not only) will one have produced a new logic, an unheard-of conceptual form, against 
the background and at the horizon of our present possibilities this new figure would 
resemble a monster. , 
344 Moreover, 
it is already necessary to correct this formulation: the new figure of an event-machine 
would no longer be even be a figure and it would not resemble, it would resemble 
nothing, not even what we call, In a still-familiar way, a monster. But it would therefore 
be, by virtue of this very novelty, an event, the only and the first possible event, because 
ii-n-possible. That is why I ventured to say that this thinking could belong only to the 
future-and even that it makes the future possible. An event does not come about unless 
its irruption interrupts the course of the possible, and, as the im-possible itself, surprises 
any foreseeability. But such a supermonster of eventriess would be, this time, for the first 
time, also be produced by the machine. 
345 
No%v, if what is said here means to mark an opening for the future it equally remarks the 
past. Indeed, in close proximity to the above Derrida writes, "To givc up neither the event 
nor the machine, to subordinate neither one to the other, never to reduce one to the other: 
. 44 Jacques Derrida, -Typewriter Rlbbon: I-jimited Ink (2) ("w1thin such Um, ts"), - In Material Events: Paul 
de Afail cind the A. J? crlýjc of Aeon,, ed. Andrze'l Warminsky et al. (Minncapolis: 
Unjvcrsjtý of Nlinneýota 
Press. 2001), pp. 278-359. p. 2178. 
* 
345 Ibid., p. 278. 
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this is perhaps a concern that has kept a certain number of "us" working for the past f6ý 
decades. But who is this "us"? Who would this "us" whom I dare speak of so carelessly" 
"Perhaps, " Derrida adds, "it designates at bottom, and first of all, those who find 
thernselves in the improbable place or in the unihabitable habitat of this monster. ' 346 A -s 
this testimony indicates, while developing over four decades through an astonishing arra\ 
of performative experiments Derrida's work has been entirely consistent with this 
movement of thought which pays the greatest attention to the event, to what is happening. 
as, precisely, that which is to-come and which is also produced by technology. From the 
thinking of writing and diffirance, through the postal, and the gift to the more recent 
ethico-political themes of spectrality, the promise, the messianic, justice, faith, 
hospitality, friendship, etc., what Derrida has managed to write in this time has been 
guided by a certain "logic" that gets reinscribed again and again and which articulates 
what happens or comes (advient) as the event, an event that is always singular, impossible 
to anticipate (a future necessarilY monstrous since unprogrammed), and which is affirmed 
through the structural opening of technics. 
Now you can see that a very wide context is drawn in this summary I have made here. 
WIlat I want to concentrate on in this chapter is the possibility of bringing together, let us 
say, three elements of this complex network: the idea of spectrality, the idea of how this 
i-elates to technology, and then relate that to questions concerning deconstruction as event, 
as the opening of up of an unprecedented future. What isn't mentioned here is the 
question of invention and of the invention of the other which are central to Derrida's 
elaboration of deconstruction as an affirmative technology. But we will get to that. 
346 
Ibid., p. 279. 
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Deconstructing Marx: specters of the media 
Let me proceed by calling up the monstrous of Derrida's text. Let me invoke the 
specter or, more precisely, the Specters of Marx. As is well known this remains one of 
Derrida's most complex texts. Like many of his other writings, it is perhaps impossible to 
reduce it to a central, essential argument. It is hard to unravel the whole network of traces 
that lead not only to Marx but also Valery, Stirner, Heidegger, Fukuyama, and many 
others. Rather than summarising at least some of these digressions, I will limit myself 
here to indicating what I take to be at Issue in Derrida's response to the Marxist legacy as 
this concerns the affirmation of the event-machine to-come. 
Derrida takes deconstruction as a way to continue the revolutionary scare of Marxism, 
not least in its recognition of the irreducibility of technics and the media in their relation 
to the globalization of national economies-but always by another means. Marx remains 
"one of the first thinkers of technics .,, 
347 "Marx understood, lets call it, so as to move 
quickly, the essence of technics or, in any case, the irreducibility of the technical in 
science, language, politics, even the irreducibility of the media. , 348He sees technics and 
i-neans of production as changing according to laws other than those determined by 
human use. He is also "one of those rare thinkers of the past to have taken seriously, at 
least in principle, the originary indissociability of technics and language, and thus of tele- 
technics (for every language is tele-technics). " 349 And yet, that said, for Derrida, the 
Marxist text-"this thought which divides itself into a philosophy and something other 
than phi losophy"350-seems tormented by contradictory movements which cut short its 
own radicality. On the one hand, insofar as he espouses the view that it is real social and 
iiiaterial conditions that structure human consciousness and beliefs, not vice versa, and i-, ý 
alert to the social, political and conceptual consequences of technological innovation and 
. 
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rnarket directed forces, Marx would seem to endorse, in its first principles, a rejection of' 
the traditional view of technology as a mere instrument. On the other hand, the narrative 
of revolution to which Marx remained committed envisages the realization or 
actualization of a certain end, a messianic promise of liberation of some collective human 
subject from the disappropriating effects of servitude by what ought to be its instruments. 
a view of the untrammeled human essence and a hoped for materialization of an idea 
(communism) which still falls within the traditional conception. 
If cleconstruction moves beyond Marx and Marxism, it does so only by moving 
through it. In what is by now a familiar move it proceeds by shaking the assured 
distinctions of the ontology upon which Marxist critique rests: between the real and the 
ideal; between the effective actualitY of economico-material forces and the unreal or 
fantastic; between being and appearance; between between full presence and absence; and 
between the fullness of the living present and the void of death. This movement is 
developed in the context of what Derrida calls the schema of the ghost or i-evenant. With 
typical flare, Derrida describes his reading as a movement from Marxist "ontology" to a 
postcritical "hauntology, " to a logic of spectrality. In continuity with Derrida's most 
faT-nous work this logic is irreducible, it belongs amongst the most recurrent of Derridean 
sclierna's and ought to be understood as part of a long line of marks and graphemes-like 
wi-iting, trace, differance, iteration-meant to disturb our dreams of presence and signal 
the closure of metaphysical thinking. As Derrida says "We will take this category to be 
irreducible, and first of all to everything it makes possible: ontology, theology, Positive or 
ne(lat've onto-theol ogy,, 
351 
ý, I 
As Derrida shows, the specter is that "figure" which massively and under the most 
disliarate narnes haunts Marx's texts-whether as phantasmagoria or enigi-na, as fetish or 
ideology, as theological whim or objective veil-and which is the phenomenon, or I- 
phenomenon of phenomenality that is at work on Marx, in Marx, and behind his back. 
351 SM 
., p. 5 1. 
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, %jarx is 
both for and against ghosts. He both exorcises them and befieves in them, but 
without quite being able to monitor these operations. Indeed, as John Caputo points out, 
Marx is in a double bind. On the one hand, he exorcises the ghost of the commodity. For 
example, in "The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret" in Capital, Marx descries 
the famous magical, mystical wooden table that stands up on its feet, and then on its head 
and discourses with other commodities. He reduces the specter back to the artifactual, 
technical body that is constituted by labor. But, on the other hand, he founds this 
exorcism of the ghost on a pre-deconstructive "critique, " on an "Ontology" of the 
presence of what is really real that aims at dissipating the phantom into thin air, conjuring 
it away inasmuch as the real forces of production and work have no more to do with these 
fantastic beings than does an engine with Heidegger's thinking. Derrida's deconstruction 
of this critique does not jettison it but opens it up to questions that the critique tends to 
close off, questions that are actually more "radical' than critique or ontology: I- 51 For 
Derrida, Marx's hostility towards ghosts will be what he will have always had in common 
with his adversaries: "He to will have tried to conjour (away) the -, hosts and everything 
Owt was neither life nor death, namely, the re-apparition of an apparition that will never 
be either the appearing or the disappeared, the phenomenon or its contrary. He will have 
thed to conjour (away) the ghosts like the conspirators [conjourýsl of old Europe on 
whom the Manifesto declares war. , 353 In Echographies Derrida tells us: 
All of this proceeds from a point where Marx reminds us that the ultimate foundation 
reinains living experience, living production, which must efface every trace of spectrality. 
In the final analysis, one must refer to a zone where spectrallty is nothing. This Is why 
Marx seemed to me to contradict or to limit the movement that ought to have prompted 11 
352 See John D. Caputo, The Pravers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Rell'gioll wl'tholit Religion. 
BloomingtomIndiana University Press, 1997), p. 12 1. 
p. 47. 
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him to take technicity, iterability, everything that makes spectrality irreducible, more 
seriously. " 
354 
Derrida's remarks here suggest that if cleconstruction is in line with Marxism insofar as 
the latter consists in a recognition of the irreducibility of technics (at least in principle), 
then it turns against Marxism insofar as the latter, rooted as it is in a metaphysics of the 
effectivity of the living present, wants to disavow all spectrality. In short, the 
deconstruction of Marx opens up the possibility of thinking origmary technicization as 
spectral i zati on. Now as we might expect, and as Derrida argues throughout Specters of' 
Marx, this process is unthinkable outside of the technicization of the contemporary world 
and the human. Indeed, "spectrality" is nothing other than a way of describing effects of 
technicization. Given that this process is originary, it is to be understood both 
philosophically and historically. Marx is obviously crucial in this reflection, but a 
deconstructed Marx, one subject to those "seismic events" affecting the contemporary 
episteme. Indeed, although "the century of Marxism will have been that of the techno- 
scientific and effective decentering of the earth, of geo-politics, of the anthropos in its 
onto-theological identity or its genetic properties, , 355 Marx himself could never ha%, c 
iniagined the contemporary scope of what Derrida calls "spectrality" a circumstance 
wherein the logic of the effectivity or actuality of the living present seems to be of limited 
pei-tinence. For Derrida, "this limit is nothing new, it has always been leaving its mark on 
anti-Marxist idealism as well as on "dialectical materialism". However, "it seems to be 
demonstrated today better than ever in the ghostly, "synthetic, " "prosthetic" virtual 
happenings of the scientific domain and therefore the domain of techno-media and 
therefore the public or political domain. " 356 -A set of transformations of all sorts (in 
Particular, techno-scientifico-economico-media) exceeds both the traditional givens of the 
3S4 OT., P. 1-17. 355 S'll., P. 98. 
ll. ic' Ibid., p. 63. 
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Marxist discourse and those of the liberal discourse opposed to it. Even if we have 
inherited some essential resources for projecting their analysis, we must first recognize t_ 
that these mutations perturb the onto-theological schemas or the philosophies of technics 
as such. " 357 In Specters Derrida sums up the consequences of all this: 
The diffýrantial deployment of techne, of techno-science or teletechnoloav.. obliges us 
rnore than ever to think the virtualization of space and time, the possibility of virtual 
events whose movement and speed prohibit us more than ever (more and otherwise than 
ever, for this is not absolutely and thoroughly new) from opposirig pre"ence to its 
representation, "real time" to "deferred time, " effectivity to Its siniulacrum, the fiving to 
the non-living, in short, the living to the living dead of its ghosts . 
358 
The scene of deconstruction, the present scene, is a scene that is utterly transfixed by 
the spectral phenomenon of technicity, by a world in which the processes of 
spectralization articulate the political "givens" of today and tomorrow. As Derrida says, 
"I believe that this technical transformation-of the telephone, of the fax machine, of 
television, e-mail and the internet-will have done more for what is called 
"democratization, " even in countries in the East, than all the discourses on behalf of 
hunian rights, more than all the presentations of models in whose name this 
deniocratization was able to get started. " 359 That said, if democracy is indissociable from 
the development of technicization this same technology is radically transforming the 
political co-ordinates of today. Older notions of the public sphere are being profoundlý 
disrupted "by techno-tele-media apparatuses and by new rhythms of information and 
C011111ILinication, by the devices and the speed of forces represented by the latter. -360 
Media power renders traditional politicians redundant-con temporary politic, is 
id., p. 70. 
Ibid., p. 169. 
EOT., p. 7 1. 
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calculated and constrained, "formatted" and "initialized" by the organizations of the 
media-and effectively supplants the competencies granted politicians by institutions 
such as parliaments. 
361 Today, more than ever before, it is apparent that what is 
commonly thought to be "actual" is in fact an artifact, it is not given but act'%Cl\, 
produced, sifted, invested, performatively interpreted by many hierarchizinggy and sclective 
procedures-artificial or prosthetic supplements for which Derrida coins the terms 
arlifactuality and actuvirtuality. 
362 Here the widespread dissemination of tele-machines 
takes the form of a generalized virtuality a concept which can no longer be opposed with 
philosophical equanimity to actual reality in the way one used to distinguish between 
power and act, dynamis and energeia, the potentiality of matter and the defining form of a 
telos, and hence of progress, etc. Contemporary tele-technologies put to work 
new modes of appropriation ... 
by the structure of the event and of its spectrality that they 
produce (both invent and bring up to date, inaugurate and reveal, cause to come about 
and bring to light at the same time, there where they were already there without being 
there: it is the relation of the concept of production to the ghost that is in question here). 
This transformation does not affect only facts but the concept of such "facts". 
363 
This general virtuality, which is another way of thinking spectral 1 zation, is not just the 
monopoly of the richer industrialized countries. Spectralization is coincident with what in 
French Derrida calls the motidialisation A motide, the worldwide-ization of the world 
and what in English is called globalization. Any country, any locality determines Its 
understanding of time, place and community in relation to this process. This situation i.,, 
not absolutely novel in its structure, "for as soon as there is a trace, there k some 
. It, ] Ibid., p. 80. 
. 162 See Jacques Del-l-ida, "The Deconstructlon of Actuality- in Negotiations, ed and trans. I-. 11/aheth 
Rottenburg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 85-116. p. 86. 
, %3 SM., p. 79. 
219 
virtualization; this is the "abc" of deconstruction. , 
364 What is new, quantitatively, is the 
acceleration of the rhythm, the extent and powers of capitalization of such virtualltv 
which is taking place today at a historically unprecedented speed. Even if they can at 
times produce the opposite effect (an illusion of proximity, of immediacy, of presence 
and the proper), the global and dominant effect of television, the telephone, the fax 
machine, satellites, the accelerated circulation of images, discourse, etc., is that the here- 
and-now becomes uncertain, without guarantee. Not only do they produce a dissociation 
of the political and the local, of the national, of the nation-state and the local, more than 
previously tele-technologies are creating a general form of expropriation, dislocation or 
deterritorialization of all the cultures of the world by severing the relation between 
identity of self and a certain integrity of place, a circumstance which will become all the 
more acute, at the level of human reception and negotiation of the "inhuman, " with the 
exponentially accelerating developments in machine intelligence and in the biotechnical 
recombination and supplementation of "human" and "non-human" DNA. Here it is clear 
that future genetic "ingredients" of the human will accelerate processes of evolution at 
such a speed that present conceptions of history, inheritance, memory and the body will 
need to be dramatically reorganized. Hence the hypothesis Derrida ventures with regard 
to the reaction and "regression" which accompanies the acceleration of the technological 
process, which is always also a process of delocalization, and which is happening in the 
world today in the form of what is currently called a "return of nationalisms, " a 
364 FP-, p. 31. Derrida's assertion here finds strong resonance with the work of Gille Deleuze who, 
following his reinvention of Henri Bergson, has also developed new tools for thinking the virtual as a 
productive power of difference. Indeed, in the commemorative essay written on the occasion of Deleuze's 
death, Derrida spoke of a "nearly total affinity" between his own work and that of Deleuze. See Jacques 
Derrida, "I'm Going to Have to Walk all Alone, " trans. Leonard Lawler, in Philosoph ,y 
Toda 
, v, 
Spring, 
1998, pp. 3-5. At the time of writing what Derrida speaks of here remains to be demonstrated in all its 
complexity. For an initial attempt see Lenonard Lawler, "A Nearly Total Affinity: The Deleuzian Virtual 
Image versus the Derridean Trace, " in Angelaki, vol. 8 no. 2.2000. pp. 59-70. For discussions of the 
virtual in Deleuze see Keith Ansell Pearson's Gerininal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deletize. 
(London: Routledge, 1999) and Philosopki, and the Adventure of the Virtual. - Berýgson and the Tinie of 
Life. 
(London: Routledge, 2002). 
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66 reappearance of fundamentalisms, " twitchings around the phantasms of blood and soil, 
racisms, xenophobia's, holy wars, ethnic wars or ethnic cleansings. 
Now, in this context of increasing spectralization what purchase does "affir-niative 
deconstruction" have? Put more succinctly, in the context of deconstruction*s approadi 
to the contemporary world, can we envisage deconstructioii as an affirmative 
technology-is it possible and if so how? This is a question David Wills raises in the 
Sydney seminar I cited above. 365 Like Wills, the reason I pose this question, the reason I 
ask how, or whether, the technology can function as something affirmative, as an opening 
for the future to-come, is that most of the discussion Derrida has concerning technology z: l - 
in his latest writings, most of his references to the spectralizing of the world, seem to 
mitigate against the possibility of any such affirmation. Indeed, whereas he is careful to 
distance himself from the anti -techn ol ogical side of Heidegger, so to speak, when he talks 
about spectrality, the references Derrida makes to such things as the effect of tele-techno- 
iiiedia apparatuses on public space, on the transformation of governments including 
legislation and law, on decision making, on the topological structure of the university 
(including the "work" done there), the reactive rise of nationalisms and fundamentalisms 
(the attempt to re-assert identity in the circumstance of increased dis-location), the 
valorizations of the body (even if those function by means of a violation of the body), 
wilich is therefore supposed to be immune from technological effect, all that, as well a..,, 
the problems of the time, or lack of time, given to intellectual debate, the media's (and its 
consuniers) na*fve presumption of immediateness, and then Derrida's own uneasiness in 
tI i-ont of a camera or microphone, all these things seem to leave very 11ttle roorn for an 
affirmative technology. 
The hesitation I have marked here once again calls us to the anibiguities inherent in 
Derrida's response to contemporary technology that I explored in Chapter 3. , \,, I argued, 
oii the one hand, the massive disruptlons that attend contemporary techno-, cientific 
. %5 DE.. p. 75. 
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innovation, are taken by Derrida to be exorbitant with respect to metaphysics, that is, 
they produce a "practical deconstruction" that marks the closure of the logocentric era. 
On the other hand, and at the same time, however, this same technology is said to 
represent a continuation of this history, it inscribes, carries, and preserves the traditional 
and dominant determination of technics as an instrument. Derrida's articulation of this 
circumstance opens him to the charge that his characterisation of the present is 
contradictory, hesitant and vague. This is inevitable. Although Derrida is indeed sensitive 
to technological difference, the method of deconstruction, its aporetic logic of inscription, 
forecloses the possibility of any systematic thernatization or thesis. Instead of raising the 
question of the material configuration of each technology, thereby offering an empirical 
research programme which would articulate a system of technical differentiation, the 
deconstructive method articulates the necessity of "an an-oppositional diffirance" 
between metaphysics and its other, between the transcendental and the empirical, between 
generalised inscription and its particular supplements. Thus, just as Derrida's arguments 
on contemporary techno-science and the media point up the affirm the co-implication of 
generalised inscription and originary technicity as transgressing any metaphysical 
determination of technics, we read: "[D]econstruction is inseparable from a general 
questioning of techne and technicist reasoning ... deconstruction is nothing without this 
, 066 interrogation. Deconstruction, in other words, works both to reveal and undo the 
contemporary accomplishments of metaphysics, both opens and prevents the effectivity or 
actualization (arrival) of technics. Put otherwise, for Derrida, the question pertaining to 
technics concerns the possibility of sustaining its non-actualization, of maintaining a 
virtual opening there where technics happens or takes place, an opening in which its 
possibility is implicated in the possibility of the impossibility of (finally) succeeding. As I 
now want to show this calls for marking the excess of technics. This excess constitutes 
the very condition of deconstruction's intervention into the field of techno-science and so 
W Jacques Derrida, Memoiresfor Paul de Man, trans. C. Lindsey, J. Culler, and E. Cadaver (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 16. 
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cannot be reduced to this field. Here, as we shall see, Derrida ýýill elaborate both 
deconstruction and technics from out of a thinking of invention that cannot be absolutely 
reduced to contingent determination and calculation. Rather, such invention is "to-conic" 
as the opening of the future. The excess of technics is the absolute future of technical 
determination, the event that irrupts from every technical invention. 
The machinic invention of the other (to come) 
Attempting to maintain an opening to what is to-come deconstruction becomes the 
site of a non-formalizable resistance to the totalizing ambitions of contemporary techno- 
science, to those multiple forces of appropriation and control at work in those projcct,,, 
which integrate the technical into a rational calculus thereby idealising it as a correlate of 
an autonomous and automatic system of formal elements whose syntax or mechanics can 
he calculated-the notion of a technics that can be completely Subordinated to logic 
becoming a resource controlled by industrial "finalities". For Derrida, such techne in the 
guise of "research" and "development" is technology "constructed on the basis of thýit 
instrumental determination of a calculable language. " 367 The concept of information or 
hil'ormatization is the most general operator here. It integrates basic research to oriented 
rescarch, the purely rational to the technical, thus bearing witness to the intermingling of 
the metaphysical and the technical. Drawing upon Heidegger's 1955-56 lecture course 
Der Satz Voln Grund (The Principle of Reason) Derrida affirms his assertion that 
"hiformation does not inform merely by delivering an informational content, it gi%-cs 
10"111, "in-fornilert, " foriniert zugleich. " It installs man in a form that permits him to 
ensure his mastery on earth and beyond. " 368 For Derrida 
Jacques Derrida, "The Principle of the Univcrsity i its Pupils, " trans. C. Porter and 
E. P. 
IIIi in the Bcs )I 
Moriss in Diacntics, Fall 1983. pp. 3-20. p. 14. 
. 16's Ibid., p. 14. 
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This is all to obvious in areas such as physics, biology, medicine, biotechnology, blo- 
programming, data processing and telecommunications. We have only to mention 
telecommunications and data processing to assess the extent of the phenomenon: the 
"orientation" of research is limitless, everything In these areas proceeds in "view- of 
technical and instrumental security. At the service of war, of national and international 
security, research programs have to encompass the entire field of infon-nation, the 
stockpiling of knowledge, the workings and thus also the essence of language and of all 
semiotic systems, structural and generative linguistics, pragmatics, rhetoric. 
369 
The contemporary world sees the massive planning and programming of invention along 
with the capitalization and appropriation of techno-scientific change by multi- 
international corporations and nation-states especially under the rubrics of "development 
and defense". The speed of change produces a continual disjunction or anachrony of the 
present whose future already besets it: "The time is out of joint, " says Derrida (after 
Hamlet). Yet this neutralizing and appropriative inventiveness gives rise to unforeseen 
cl'l'ects. The greater the speed of appropriating inventiveness and the stronger the 
1. economy of the same, " the more the future becomes incalculable, an incalculability 
whose symptom is the proliferation of forecasters and science fiction narratives that try 
to ýinticipate it. In this connection, it is worth briefly turning to Derrida's Archive Fever. 
This text, a transcript of a lecture delivered in 1994, contains what is becoming one of the 
niost frequently cited passages in Derrida's work, that in which he speculates on how far 
the field of psychoanalysis may have been determined by particular technologies of 
conu-nunication and archivization (print media, traditional postal services), and the -geo- 
technological shocks" that would have ensued if Freud and his contemporaries instead of 
Wnting thousands of letters by hand had had access to contemporary technologies such a, 
telephonic credit cards, portable tape recorders, computers, printers faxcs. televisions, 
164 Ibid., p, 13. 
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teleconferences and E-mail. Derrida says that he would have liked to have devoted his 
entire lecture to this retrospective science fiction and that he would have liked to have 
imagined the scene of the other archive after the "apres-coups" of its aftershocks. a scene 
which is indeed where we are today. "This earthquake" he writes, 
would not have limited its effects to the secondary recording, to the printing and to the 
conservation of the history of psychoanalysis. It would have transformed this history 
from top to bottom and in the most initial inside of its production, in its very events. This 
is another way of saying that the archive as printing, wnting, prosthesis, or hypomnesic 
technique in general is not the only place for stocking and for conserving an archivable 
content of the past which would exist in any case, such as, without the archive, one still 
believes it was or will have been. No, the technical structure of the archiving archive 
also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming into 
existence and in its relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much as it 
records the event. 
370 
What Derrida says here is that in the past, psychoanalysis would not have been what it 
ývas (no more than so many other things) if E-mail, for example, had existed. It would 
have been different in its very content if Freud had had access to the type of technologies 
that are so commonplace today. Moreover, "in thefuture it will no longer be what Freud 
and so many psychoanalysists had anticipated, from the moment, E-mail, for example, 
became possible. " 371 Such technologies have the consequence, among others, of radically 
transforming the relationship of such a science to its own archive. What is at issue then 11., 
nothing less than the future, of techno-scientific invention as an irreducible experience ol 
the future. As techno-science, invention, in its very movernent. consists not merely in 
37o Jacques Derrida, Archive Fevcr: A Freudi(in Impression, trans. Eric Prenowit/, (Chicag(vUrii'versity ol 
Chicago Press, 1995), p. 17. I'l 11 Ibid., p. 17. 
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conservational recording which puts into reserve ("stores"), accumulates and capitalizes 
the past, but, rather, in instituting and constituting whatever there was as anticipation of 
the future, of its incalculable possibilities. 
To conceive technical invention as the acceleration, intensification, multiplication, 
and, as it were, expansion of incalculable possibilities for the future is to be reminded 
how technical systems do not belong, by definition, by virtue of their topological 
structure, to the field of what they make possible. Always diffýrantial and thereby in 
excess of their concepts technical inventions are productive of unpredictable, 
unforeseeable, unprogrammable "effects". This circumstance enables technical invention 
to be seen as the irruption or incoming of the other, as that which disrupts the very criteria 
in which it would have been captured. What Derrida says in his essays "Psyche: 
Inventions of the Other" and "Deconstructions: The Im-possible" about invention as 
allowing and making to come will enable us to understand better what is at issue here. 
Attending to these will also return me to my claim that deconstruction is an affirmative 
technology. In these essays Derrida distinguishes between two forms of invention, the 
"modern politics of invention" which he calls an invention of the same and the invention 
that responds to the wholly other. With regard to the former, let us suppose the historical 
analysis of a "paradigm induced gestalt-shift" in the sense of Kuhn or an episteme in the 
sense of Foucault, some "themata, " or as they say, an historical analysis of givens, a 
configuration that explains that at a certain moment an invention was possible, that it 
became practicable under certain conditions, technical, economic, social, psychological, 
scientific, etc. According to this analysis, which Derrida holds to be necessary and 
legitimate, invention, paradoxically, invents nothing, since "it will have done nothing but 
make explicit, reveal, deploy that which was already there, potentially, programmatically 
in reserve. , 372 Such invention is what Derrida calls the invention of the same, which 
means an invention entirely knowable and technically executable in advance. In this 
372 DL, p. 23. 
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conventional invention, invention is domesticated, monitored by existing institution,, 
kept in check within a restricted economy, and "inventive" human subjects are given 
limited rein or latitude within a fixed or mobile horizon. The "Invention of the ýarne- is a 
discovery-invention also means "discovery, " to "come upon--of a possibility alread\ 
lying already embedded in the system. In this invention, the assemblage of existing 
institutions is strengthened and consolidated by appropriating every novelty. The existing 
order lies "ready and waiting to reduce it [invention]to the same, " to give it status and a 
patent within the current configuration, tending thus to "integrate the aleatory into its 
programmatic calculations". 
That is the prevailing concept and practice of "invention". The other invemion, the 
one that interests Derrida, is a deconstruction of this concept, a re-invention of invention 
that articulates a logic of the im-possible, of the unforeseeable, of what cannot be 
calculated or programmed: 
Letting the other come is not inertia open to anything whatever. No doubt the coming of 
the other, if it has to remain incalculable and in a certain way aleatory (one happens onto 
the other in the encounter), escapes from all programming. But this aleatory aspect of the 
other has to be heterogeneous in relation to the integrable aleatory factor of a calculus, 
and likewise to the form of undecidable that theories of formal system,, have to cope 
with. The invention of the entirely other is beyond any possible status. 
373 
Because the concept of invention must itself be re-invented, Derrida. is not happy with the 
M-('Unient simply that any invention must, by disrupting the possible status available to it, 
opeii up a state of undecidability of the type that much contemporary scicnce has to work 
With. The invention Derrida dreams of is in excess of such a formal calculus. it the knots 
373 Jacques Derrida, "Psvcliý: InNentions of the Othcr" in Readj*ng de Man Reading, eds- Lindsey 
Waters 
and NN'lad Godilch, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 25-65. P. S', -56: hercat-tcr 
cited as Plo. 
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together, in a single conjuncture, the aleatory, alterity and calculative rationalitý. In this 
connection, as Timothy Clark has pointed out, deconstruction represents a reJectIon of the 
view, powerful since the seventeenth century, that humanity necessarik, understands ýOat 
it has made better than what it has not. The irruption of the other. di reason and 
the possibility of calculation, both complicates and calls for a decision precisely to the 
extent that its status is incalculable. Such a decision involves a necessary and unavoidable 
negotiation with what one can't or doesn't know and puts into crisis the concepts and 
grounds whereby knowledge would have secured itself. 
374 In other words, one cannot 
rationally distribute the part [part] that is calculable and the part that is incalculable. One 
has to calculate as far as possible, but the incalculable happens; it is singularity, and 
chance, without one being able to do ones part [part]; the parting [partage: distribution] 
between reason and its other, the calculable and the incalculable. The necessary and the 
aleatory, is without example; it does not obey a logic of distinction, it is not a parting of 
two parts. For this reason, there is no question here of "opposing" the invention of the 
same to the invention of the other, since such opposition succumbs to dialectical or 
representationalist assimilation and remarks the logic of the same. Rather, as we might 
expect, one must conceive the diffýrance between the two. In this connection, as J. Hillis 
Miller rightly remarks, here is one sequence in Derrida's writings where a return to the 
original French is necessary, since the logic Derrida wants to mark here plays on the 
resources of double meaning and nuance in the French language. 375 Invention is taken 
here in the double sense that is justified by its etymology from inventio. "Invention" 
rneans both to make up and find there. Derrida's distinction between two forms of 
invention turns on that double meaning, and he plays on the associated French words 
(I'vilir. "future, " venii-, "come, " renvir, "return, come back to, " aventut-e, "adventure, " 
ývAenzent, "event, " and so on. By playing on such terms Derrida points up a notion of 
374 Cf. oi). cit., n. 10 at p. 251. 375 See 1. Hillis Miller, "Derrida and Literature" in in Jacques Derrida and the Hunianities., A Critical 
Rea, it, l-, ed. Tom Colien, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univcrsity Prcss, 200 1). PP. 58-8 1. p. 68. 
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invention that will again invoke the aporia in which deconstruction finds itself-that it is 
both possible and impossible at the same time, that is, is im-possIble. On the one hand, 
there is the invention of the possible, an extrapolation from what already exists and is 
institutionalized. On the other hand, an invention must announce itself as %ý hat would not 
appear possible, it must be impossible: 
nothing comes to the other from the other. For the other is not the possible. So it would 
be necessary to say that the only possible invention is the invention of the 
impossible ... 
[A]n invention has to declare itself to be the invention of that which did not 
appear to be possible; otherwise it only makes explicit a prograrn of possibilities within 
the economy of the same. 
376 
Derrida asserts that the impossible invention (in both senses at once and in neither) must 
always be invention of the other, of the irreducibly other; a double genitive. When the 
other does not appear in invention, when nothing comes to the other and from the other, 
thei-e is no invention, for the other is not possible, it cannot be built, calculated or 
prograrnmed. 
There is nothing fortuitous about this discourse on the im-possibility of invention as a 
letting come of the other. The interest of deconstruction, its force and desire, if it 
possesses any, turns on the constellation of venir and a venir, viens and invention, 
Paivnir and ýi, t`nement. "Deconstruction is inventive, or it does not exi St',, 
377 Derrida 
says. Its process (dimarche) is engaged in and by the in-venire, the incoming . the arrival 
O'enue), of what is coming, what is to-come (a-venir), in and by the future (Vavenir) and 
the adventure of the future. Deconstruction is "eventive" (evinement, ý-venlr) or it i,, 
nothing, the virtual emerging from the very heart of the actual. I- tn 
376 PlO., p. 60. 
r, Ibid., p. 43. 
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In plain English, if there is such a thing-and that remains a question anJ a 
hypothesis-deconstruction lies in the anticipation of the other, something unique and 
idiomatic, which is the only possible invention: "To prepare oneself for this coming 
(venue) of the other is what can be called deconstruction". 378 The preparation for what is 
to "come, " (viens) is what the deconstruction of the present, and of the value,, of 
presence, is all about. Deconstruction deprives the present of its privilege and exposes it 
to something tout autre, wholly other. Accordingly, everything in deconstruction is 
organized around what Derrida calls Vinvention de Vautre, the invention of the other a.,,, 
the in-coming of the other, the promise of an event to come, the event of the promise of 
something coming. For Derrida, the invention of the other is the invention of the 
absolutely undeconstructable and such invention is, he says, "the only invention in the 
world, the only invention of the world. " It is the invention of the world because it allow. s 
for an unanticipated opening, an origin, still to be invented. This inust certainly be linked 
up with what I said in Chapter 3 about the deconstructive method, with a movement that 
necessarily begins "wherever we are, " that inscribes itself in the general movement of a 
field in the process of deconstruction, that thereby inscribes itself in a context-and from 
this point of view there is nothing but context-but also produces a context, opens it up 
aiid brings about a new contextual given. From this point of view, deconstruction as the 
invention of the im-possible, will open up the production of a new context, wherever it 
may happen (arrive). In short, it will be the site of the event, a first event that is also a last 
event, an event in which the future is to-come and comes to us: "The future is not present, 
Nit there is an opening onto it; and because there is a future; [d ya de l'avemr], a context 
is akvays open. What we call opening of the context is another name t- or what is still to 
come". 
379 
In dealing with what-is-to-come (1'avenir), with the opening to the to-come 
"ou'r). that is, not only to the future, but to what happens (ce qui arrjj, (, ), comes (vient), 
37S 
Ibid., p. 56. 379 
TY, P. 20. 
230 
has the form of an event, Derrida makes his claim for deconstruction as affirmative, as a 
yeý, " to the opening of the future. More precisely, deconstruction is a "yes, ýcs- since if 
the future is the opening up of what-is-to-come, to the other, it is already the possibility of 
its repetition. 
380 Indeed: Viens, oui, oui. That is deconstruction in a word, in three words, 
in a nutshell. 
38 1 Not an automatism of the perpetually selfsame, but repetition in the 
sense of cleconstructive iteration whereby something absolutely surprising, an event for 
which we are not prepared is announced. Here the most basic feature of affirmation is 
disjunction. Affirmation is disjointed because it is based in the structure of 
We know what "diffýrance" means: it implies constant repetition and redeployment. The 
event is not merely something that happens in the order of presence, in the most usual and 
commonplace taking place of the familiar and ordinary time, but the t, -venir, the coming 
out, that breaks out. Viens calls for a break, for breaking out into the open, for something 
that, to reiterate a point already made, is not the actualization of a possible, a simple 
acting out, a realization, an effectuation, the teleological accomplishment of a power, the 
process of a dynamic that depends on a "condition of possibility". For there to be ail 
cvent, the event has to be possible, of course, it cannot take place without a system of 
marks that prepares, or invites, its place, but there must also be an exceptional, absolutely 
singular interruption in the regime of possibility. The event, to be worthy of its name, 
takes place without expectation, without an horizon of expectation, when a certain 
knoývledge still anticipates and amortises in advance. Put otherwise, the event, as what is 
to-corne, punctuates the horizon, defies anticipation, appropriation, or any form of pre- 
deterin i nation. Indeed, as exceeding any calculation it is, precisely, incalculable. it Is the 
Opening to a radical (non-human) alterity. 
3qO See: Jacques Derrida, "A Number of Yes (Nombre Du Oui)" in Deconstruct"Ons-A User's Guide, cd. 
Nicholas Royle, (Nc\\- York: Palgravc, 2000), pp. 97-105. 
381 Zý Scc: Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation ývith Jacques Derrtdci, cditcd with a commentry 
by 
John D. Caputo, (New York: Fordhani University Press, 1997), especially p. 27 and Chapter 6. 
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messianic without messianism 
Now, having said this much it would perhaps seem to be the case that Derrida's 
discourse on the invention and in-coming of the other is not restricted or eNcn chietly 
concerned with the tele-techno-scientific determination of deconstruction as I have been 
asserting. It would seem Derrida is not primarily thinking in terms of those sites of 
invention that are the machine, technics, techno-science, and above all tele-technology, 
but of a more Jewish, more Levinasian ethico-political alterity that shatters the frame of 
such technical invention, that underlines the saliency of the incomprehensible, something 
we confess we do not understand -Je ne sais pas. Il faut croire-before "-hich %ve can 
only say viens, oui, oui. The wholly other is not some new invention ývherc this Is equal to 
some new technology, but a blindness, a promising or confessing that wc are up against 
something, sans savoir, sans avoir, to which we can only bear witness. In this case 
"Pinvention de 1 autre" is more attuned to the anomaly of Abraham on Moriah than the 
techno-scientific anomaly, more a faith or promise, a prophetic call for a justice to come, 
than a discourse on tech no-scientific transformation. 
Of course. It is well known that Derrida has made an ethical turn in the 1980s that has 
focused on the philosophy of Emmanual Levinas and that during the 1990s Derrida has 
increasingly emphasised ethical themes like hospitality, donation, friendship, testimony, 
secrecy, responsibility, pardon and forgiveness, idea's that we would more traditionally 
perhaps relate to religion. Indeed, as John Caputo says, "[w]hat we will not have 
understood about deconstruction, and this causes us to read it less and less well, is that 
deconstruction is set in motion by an overarching aspiration, which on a certain analý..,, Is 
99382 can be called a religious of prophetic aspiration . Deconstruction tUrns out to 
have a 
very prophetico-apocalyptic-messianic ring, albeit with a deconstructed tone. His work- k 
, 1110calyptic (we should perhaps here recall the etymology of the word "apocalypse, ' troill 
the ancient Greek for "unveiling" or "revelation"), but it is an apocalyptism that k warý 
Cf. OP. cit., n 3S2 at p. xix. 
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of any final revelation. 
383 Correspondingly, Derrida's work is messianic, but this is a 
"messianic without messiani SM9084 This messianic motif appears alongside alongside his 
recent "circumfession" (circonfession) of his "alliance" ("covenant") with Judaism, never 
broken but never kept, his revelation of "my religion about which nobody understands 
anything', 385 
None of this means to say that Derrida is simply a religious person or a simple 
believer, that he is a pious Jew, liberal, orthodox, or conservative, or "believing" Jew, or 
religious in the conventional sense. The advent of the other, its incoming, is to be thought 
diffirantly, Derrida says, from a "theological order" where theology means onto-theo- 
logy. The messianic tone that deconstruction has adopted is the turn of faith it takes 
towards the irreducible and rebellious force of affirmation and promise of the future, the 
unforeseeable future to-come, absolutely to come, the undeconstructable justice, the 
democracy, the gift, the hospitality to come. Such is the future I have been discussing, a 
future without horizon of possibility, without the anticipation and arrival of some actual 
state of affairs, an impossible future: "This critique belongs to the movement of an 
experience open to the absolute future of what is coming, that is to say, a necessarily 
indeterminate, abstract, desert-like experience that is confided, exposed, given up to 
waiting for the other an for the event. , 386 This why Derrida distinguishes the universal 
structure of atheiological messianic, the "quasi -atheistic dryness of the messianic" from 
the various concrete "messianisms". By the concrete messianisms he means the specific 
religious beliefs, the historical doctrines and dogmas, of the "religions of the Book, " all 
three of them, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Moreover, Deffida extends the term to 
include the telelogies and eschatologies of Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger. Deconstruction 
is the thought of an other, messianic historicity, beyond the "philosophical messianisms, 
- 
3X3 See Jacques Derrida, "On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy. " trans. John. 
P. Leavey. Jr. 
in Raising the Tone of Philosophy, ed. P. Fenves. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univcrsitý, 
Press. 1993). 
394 
SM., p. 59. 383 Jacques Derrida, "Circumfession" in Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques 
Derrida. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 154. M6 
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the archeo-teleo- logical concepts of history in Hegel, Marx, and even as we saw in 
Chapter 2, Heidegger's epochal eschatology, a historicity that represents as Derrida saý-. s 
another opening of event-ness as historicity that permitted one not to renounce, but on 
the contrary to open up access to an affirmative thinking of the messianic and 
ernacipatory promise as promise: as promise and not as onto-theological or teleo- 
escatological program or design. 
387 
Deconstruction regularly, rhythmically repeats this religiousness, without the concrete, 
historical religions; it repeats nondogmatically the religious structure of experience, the 
category of the religious. It repeats the passion for the messianic promise-one could say: 
the structure of the promessianic-and messianic expectation, it repeats the movements 
of faith, of expecting what we cannot know but only believe. Such is the affirmation of 
deconstruction, its invention of the other. 
The future: other machines as other 
But what of technics in all this? Without horizon and radically open to what is to- 
come, Derrida's "religion" refers us back to his assertion that if there is an affirmation, if 
there is the promise of a future, a to-come, it has to do with some technology, with the 
deconstruction of the world by, through or within technology. In this case, Derrida's text 
yields a conception of religion along with an ethics and a politics haunted by 
technicity. 388 The issue continues to be that of a method devoted to originary technicity, 
of a method that at one and the same time articulates both what is happening-the 
event-and technology. A method, then, devoted to the generalised inscription, that is, 
virtualization, of the event by the machine, to a writing, spectral, or event-machine that 
387 Ibid., p. 75. 
'18A The relation between the promise, the messianic, religion, and technology is elaborated in 
detail in 
Derrida's "Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of "Religion" at the Limits of Reason Alone" in 
Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (eds. ), Religion (London: Polity Press, 1998). pp. 1-78. 
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exceeds the philosophical determination of the possibility of the possible, the classical 
opposition of the possible and the impossible. For Derrida, such a machine answers the 
question of the future. As he says, "[flechnology is not simply technique, it is not simply 
a set of instruments that simply repeats. We experience what we call techne or technology 
in art and in industry or in all kinds of technology as something which comes from the 
fUtUre,,. 389 The future can only be for such machines because these come closest to 
answering the question of how the sheer im-possibility of the future, its virtuality (under 
whose aspect actuality exists at all), appears not as a void of the actual but rather as the 
way of its arrival-as a path of actualization remaining open to other arrivals. Originary 
technicity, the event-machine, is also the answer to the "messianic extremity" which 
Derrida gives the name "eschaton". "Is there not a messianic extremity, an eschaton, 
whose ultimate event (immediate rupture, unheard-of interruption, untimeliness of the 
infinite surprise, heterogeneity without accomplishment) can exceed, at each moment, the 
final term of a phusis, such as work, the production, and the telos of any history ?,, 390 This 
messianic extremity, which goes beyond every telos and every labor; this extremity 
without which no future can be thought because thinking itself is indebted to it; this 
extremity which is divested of all determined and determinable religious, metaphysical, 
or technical figures of expectation, can, as Werner Hamacher has pointed out, only attest 
to itself in the sheerest abstraction beyond form or, if related to forms, only in their 
irreparable disintegration. Derrida seems to insist precisely on the diffirance between a 
form determined by a telos as its border and the extremity that, in the border or at it, 
traverses the border and, being external and exformal, can no longer fall under the 
category of form, of categorial thought-form or perception form. 
39 1 But if the future is an 
allocatagory of the transformative and exformative, if it "a-priori" diverges from the 
399 DE., p. 77. 390 
SM., p. 37. 
. 191 See, Werner Hamacher "Lingua Amissa: The Messianism of CommOdit)'-Languagc and Dcrriida's 
SPccters of Marx" in Futures of Jacques Derrida, ed. R. Rand. (Stanford. Calif.: Stanford 
University Press. 
2001) pp. 130-178. p. 146. 
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categorial framework of forms of thought, perception, and intuition, then it must be 
without appearance, aphenomenal, and can only attest to itself in the disappearance of all 
phenomenal figuresq in the continued dissociation of its phantasmagorias. The future "is" 
if it is at all, if it shows itself beyond everything posited in any way, it transpires as a 
spectral monster of diff9rance at the limit of appearance, of visibility and representability. 
Whatever arrives in this way first takes the form of the unacceptable, of even of the 
intolerable, of the incomprehensible, that is, of a certain monstrosity. Indeed, as was 
shown in Chapter 3, in his writings of the late 1960s Derrida charactefises the present 
age, and indeed, deconstruction, as monstrosities. Deconstruction has this status because 
it is clearly aligned with the law of diffirance, a movement of deferral and delay that 
articulates a certain dislocation or disjointedness of the present, that announces a birth in 
the world, the arrival of that which breaks with absolutely with constituted normality. As 
Derrida says, "[flexts and discourses that provoke at the outset reactions of rejection, that 
are denounced precisely as anomalies or monstrosities are often texts that, before being in 
turn appropriated, assimilated acculturated, transform the nature of the field of 
,, 392 reception. This event is the new mutation in the history of writing that articulates the 
closure of the logocentric-metaphysical era as exemplified by an unprecedented 
development in technology. A context in which "the future can only be anticipated in the 
form of an absolute danger[ ... ]and can only be proclaimed, presented as a sort of 
monstrosity". And a technology that constitutes a "practical deconstruction". 
Deconstruction shares with technology this status as a monstrosity insofar as both 
announce themselves as that name for "for which there is no self-presentation nor assured 
destination. " "A monstrosity never presents itself, " Derrida stresses, for "as soon as one 
Perceives a monster in the monster, one begins to domesticate it, 9 one makes it part of an 
9 393 economy of "the same9 To think both technology and the event together remains a 
monstrosity to come, an impossible event, and therefore the only possible event. 
. 192 Cf. op. cit., n 259 at p. 387. 393 Ibid., p. 386. 
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Understood in this way technology is exorbitant with respect to its present actuality and is 
the originary medium-the "medium of all possible media"-Of futurity. Whatever enters 
into it, or simply comes into contact with it, which as by now is clear means everything, is 
already pulled into a space where the characters of reality can only take place on the 
disjointed terrain of the not-yet-real of actualization. Technology is deconstruction insofar 
as it opens the place-the atopic place-of arrival, opens the gate to what is to-come, the 
entrance of an unpredictable and topologically indeterminate other. If, like Derrida, one 
thinks of technology from its relation to the future, if one thinks it as to come-as 
opposed to Heidegger for whom it is to be over-come-then the futurity of technics, its 
spectral i zation, must transform all its figures in advance, transform them by shifting into 
the virtuality of every form. Neither what is to-come "as such" nor the purely present, and 
yet both "at once, " the event-machine cannot be reduced to any techno-scientific, 
religious, or philosophical programs that might have anticipated it. Rather, it is the very 
field of deconstruction which, from its inception, is the machinic affirmation of the 
invention of machines to-come, other machines as other. 
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Conclusion 
In "The Time of the Thesis: Punctuations" Derfida recalls Jean Hyppolite's response 
to a paper that he had presented in the 1960s during a colloquium in the United States. 
After offering a few friendly remarks on the paper, Hyppolite had added: "That said, I 
really do not see where you are going. " Derrida's reply to this comment wa", he 
more or less as follows: "If I clearly saw ahead of time where I was ()-, oin(,, I really don't 
believe that I should take another step to get there. " Reflecting on this remark Derrida 
says, 
Perhaps I then thought that knowing where one is going may doubtless help in orienting 
ones thought, but that it never helped anyone take a single step, quite the opposite in fact. 
What is the good of going where one knows oneself to be going and where one knows 
that one is destined to arrive? " Recalling this reply today, I am not sure I reallý, 
understand it very well, but it surely did not mean that I never see or never know where I 
ain going and that to this extent, to the extent that I do know, it is not certain that I have 
ever taken any step or said anything at all. This also means, perhaps, that concerning this 
place where I am going, I in fact know enough about it to think, with a certain terror, that 
things are not going very well and that, all things considered, it would be better not to go 
there at all. But there's always Necessity, the figure I wanted recently to call Necessity 
\\, ith the initial capital of a proper noun, and Necessity says that one must akvaý's yield, 
that one has always to go where it calls. At the risk of never arriving. At the risk, it saý s, 
of never arriving. Calling it even, prepared for the fact that you won't make it. (Quaft, a 
ne pass arriver. Quitte, dit-elle, a ne pas arrive. Quitte pour ce que MW arrives pas. ) 
Tlik passage resumes in the most concise manner the methodological orientation of 
deconstructIon and its consequent relation the meaningful frames, ,n,, tIt LI tI onal structures, 
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and pedagogical norms that tie philosophical production to the ontological and 
logocentric encyclopedic system of the universitas. In this case, Derrida's remarks relate 
1 
to his hestitation over having to defend his thesis at the Sorbonne many years after he has 
established himself as a major philosopher. More precisely, they relate to Derrida's 
resistance to an academic presentation in the form of results, conclusions or of theses. As 
noted in the introduction to this study, it was clear to Derrida from early on that he did 
not think his work fit very well with the laws regulating scholarly discourse. His 
"research" not only called for a different mode of writing but also for a work of 
transformation applied to the rhetoric,. the staging and the particular discursive 
procedures, which historically determined as they are, dominate university discourse, in 
particular the type of text called the "thesis. " Indeed, the very idea of thetic presentation, 
of the position (Setzung or Stellung), of positional logic, of a theoretical approach that 
allows for a fixation on particular contents to become possible and which is recoverable 
as object, thing, or work, was one of the essential parts of the system subject to 
deconstructive questioning. What was then put forth under the heading of writing, trace, 
diffirance, dissemination, etc., explicitly dealt, in ways that were neither thetic nor 
thematic, with the value of the thesis, of positional logic and its history, and of its limits 
and rights, its authority and legitimacy. This was not, of course, to substitute for what 
existed some type of non-thesis, non-legitimacy or incompetance. Derrida's point is not 
that there is or can be no thesis. Rather, he is asking us to consider a thesis that is relayed 
or sent, a thesis which comes about through a work in which the thesis is constituted even 
as it is differed or deferred from itself. In short, if there is a thesis it presupposes that "as 
soon as there is there is diff9rance ... and there 
is postal maneuvering, relays, delay, 
anticipation, destination, telecommunicating network, the possibility and therefore the 
fatal necessity of going astray, etc. 1,094 Given that this network is irreducible one must 
3W PC., p. 66. 
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always yield to Necessity, to the Necessity of going where there is al%k-ays the risk that 
one may not arrive at ones destination (what a monstrous situation). 
Now I am once again recalling the Necessity and risk of the deconstructive situation 
with regard to the thesis because the impossibility of summing up or presenting thetic 
conclusions is a circumstance that the project I have undertaken here must come to terms 
with. Indeed, the one who comes here looking for results will quickly grow morose-and 
for essential reasons. As we have seen, the problems and questions in play here are 
integral to the attempt to evaluate the relationship between Heidegger and Derrida where 
this turns on the issue of what happens with regard to the transmission and inheritance of 
the related problematics of technology and philosophy, technology and metaphysics, 
technology and the West. In Chapter I an opening was made onto this via a reading of 
Heidegger's text that took into account its material conditions of presentation. As I said, 
Heidegger's question concerning technology is equally the question of how Heidegger's 
text becomes present for us today as a "philosophy". The production and transmission- 
techno-media-(tiz)ation-of Heidegger's thinking, its manifestation as an object of 
academic scrutiny and resource of scholarship, is not subsidiary to this thought. Quite the 
contrary, it affects it in its most intimate inside and accessible outside. As I argued, this is 
most evident in the way in which the immanent dynamic or path way-character of 
Heidegger's thought has been obscured by way of an interpretive thrust or attitude that is 
overly fascinated with exposing and making-present what Heidegger says, with 
fashioning an exposition of the contents and themes of his text. This attitude can be 
discerned in the way Heidegger's meditiation on the essence of technology has been said 
to be primarily a thesis "about" technology, a thesis which takes the representationalist 
outcome of philosophy as decisive and which articulates a static determination of Being. 
In this case, Heidegger's questioning-thinking into the essence of technology is 
understood as organizing itself according to the privilege and function granted to a 
constellation or chain of some of the major concepts of metaphysics, all of which can 
be 
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derived from Ge-stell and all of which emphasize the gathering, unifying, collecting, 
installing, setting-up or positing of "what is". This assessment, which is correct up to a 
point, fails to fully come to terms with the performative difficulty of Heidegger's thinking 
which corresponds to the transitivity of technology where this is equal to the 
liminological field or differential opening of thinking to the event (Ereignis). It thereby 
amounts to a letting fail of Heidegger's surpassing of metaphysics. In this case, even as it 
projects itself into a space withdrawn from the representational-calculative attitude of 
conceptual thought, Heidegger's thinking has been drawn back into the realm of 
metaphysical actuality. It may therefore be advantageous, no doubt timely, for scholarship 
to reflect on itself, to recognize the difficulties and hazards involved in following 
Heidegger's text (and not just his). Following Heidegger's question of technology 
demands much more than discerning and elucidating what is said on this matter. 
Philosophical thinking on philosophy, according to Heidegger's elaboration of Being- 
historical thinking, belongs to the "turn" of thought, its own immanent transformation as 
it traces the self-differentiating movement of die Sache. This is not to be confused with a 
"philosophy" nor with the progress of an intelligible argument. Rather, to follow 
Heidegger means to allow a shaking or trembling of that very intelligibility to take place, 
it is to follow the movement of thought in its becoming other, which, precisely as 
becoming, requires that thought be carried into a movement that exceeds it and carries it 
beyond itself. In this case it is imperative that the philosopher (the "professional, " 
66expert, " or technician) become more perceptive to the future of Heidegger's thought, to 
its differential movement or opening and not its accomplishments or results. 
The movement of Heidegger's thinking is provocative. It is provocative, first, because 
it calls into question the normally secure position of the thinking subject, the position 
defined by the metaphysics of subjectivity in its elaboration of the structure of 
representation. Here, the various philosophical machines or assemblages that are 
traditionally at work deciphefing or calculating with thought either break down 
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cornpletely or, at those times when they are seen to work efficiently, function by ývay of a 
restricted economy that is too Slow (too slow even for Heidegger's slow path). Only a 
most attentive reading of Heidegger's texts-one that traces and situates the disclosure of 
any particular theme, figure or statement across the various strata of a largcr and more 
general textual disposition or configuration-leads to an experience of the dynamic 
quality of his thinking and to an apprehension of the paradoxical nature of the matter 
(Sache) that claims his thought and gives it its identity and difference. Such a reading 
points to the necessary "tracing" or "inscription" of Heidegger's thought. It also points to 
the complex entanglement of his text with Derrida's. Indeed, as this study has shown, 
Derrida's text encompasses a second-order entanglement of two already immense 
networks, his own and Heidegger's. This entanglement manifests Derrida's somcwhat 
Heideggerian attitude to the history of Western philosophy and his mode of relating to 
that history where this concerns the joint thernatics of of the closure of presence and the 
closure of philosophy as the metaphysics of presence. It also manifests Derrida's concern 
to release a thought of general writing or inscription that has been repressed or forgotten 
by Western thought. In this case, the trace or diffýrance is seen by Derrida "as the 
strategic note or connection-relatively and provisionally prIvileged-whIch indicated 
the closure of presence, together with the closure of the conccptual order and 
I Thi denomination, a closure that is effected in the functioning of traces" 395 is statement is 
made overtly in conjunction with "the ontic-ontological difference In Heidegger, " and the 
question of closure indicates the uncircumventable necessity of Heidegger's analysis of 
the history of metaphysics. This is not say, however, that Derrida is simply Heideggerian, 
anymore than he is, say, Nietzschean or Levinasian. First of all, at stake here is a 
difference between Derrida and Heidegger where such difference is understood a" the 
IW6-ance of a dynamic that acknowledges a multiplicity of relationships running t-- 
bet\ý'cen complex formations of knowledge that cannot be reduced to the -diffcrences- of 
SP.. p. 13 1. 
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theses with impunity. In this regard the overiding point I have made in this studv is that in 
all these relations, one needs to acknowledge that Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger 
has, from the beginning, articulated a complex interplay of proximitics and distancie. ", 
rather than a simple demarcation along any given set of lines or positions, even if such 
lines, within a network, can be drawn and can be very effective. 
Derrida articulates this complex economy perhaps most explicitly in The Post C(11-tl 
and related texts where he puts into play or sets off a gigantic and interminable network 
or open matrix of telecommunications comprised of transmissions, relay's, delaý's, 
dispatches, deferrals, translations and transferences that bring his own text into 
conjunction with Heidegger's even as by means of a "switch point" this thinking Vs 
strategically subjected to various reinscriptions that re-route it and send it elsewhcre. 
Following the movement of Chapter 2 we were able to catch a glimpse of this prograrn, 
and in such a way that it became apparent that the complex network bet%%'Ccn Derrida and 
Heidegger involves and revolves around the transmission of the question of technolo. gy. 
In this regard, as with so many other matters, between Derrida's text and Heidegger's, 
there is, together with a radical displacement, a much closer, even uncanny proximity. To 
begin with, it would appear that Derrida's deconstruction of Heideacrer's text lands a L- L- 
decisive blow against his thinking of Being as well his claims about the technological 
completion of Western metaphysics. As Derrida wants to show, these claims, along with 
the more subtle, hidden, stubborn privilege in Heidegger of the values of gathering, 
nearness, presence, and the proper, will not only articulate Heidegger's belonging to 
inetaphysics, they are symptomatic of the traditional philosophical anxiety about 
technology, about the threat of artificial, mediate, technical and prosthetic corruption and 
contanii nation. Here, as in all other cases, the proximity of thinking to Being is at issue., 
the anxiety over technology leads Heidegger to subtract the thinkable or thinking frorn the 
field of technics, a rnovc which will relegate technology to a sccondary position in 
relation to its more original essence where this is, precisely, the matter (Sache) t-or 
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thought. For Heidegger, technology remains a question, and as a question asked by 
thinking, thinking is not "technical". Hence arise the famous pronouncements to the 
effect that "the essence of technology is nothing technological, " the essence of science 
has nothing to do with science, " and other propositions to that effect. 
It is this attitude that must be deconstructed. In connection with the deconstruction of 
the traditional treatment accorded to writing as a techne subordinated to speech and 
exterior to the logos (where this includes his consequent elaboration of the quasi- 
transcendental graphics of writing, diffirance, the trace, the supplement, etc. ), Derrida 
effectively demonstrates that even as it puts to Western philosophy the question of 
technology as the question about its history and its end, Heidegger's thinking constitutes 
itself through a disavowal or expulsion of technology, a move which amounts to the 
desire to purify thinking of an originary technicity. In elaborating the diffirance between 
his own text and Heidegger's, such technicity is precisely what Derrida's writings affirm. 
As I have shown, since the late 1960s Derrida has elaborated deconstruction within the 
context of an unprecedented technicization of the world and the human, the context, that 
is, of the massive programming, capitalization, and appropriation of techno-scientific 
invention by multi nternational corporations and nation states. A context in which the 
future can only be anticipated in the form of an absolute danger and can only be 
proclaimed as a "monstrosity". And a technology which constitutes a "practical 
deconstruction" of the contemporary world. Most strikingly, for Derrida it is the 
accelerating development of information and communications technology, of the 
44 media, " and tele-technologies of all types, that points to something singular that is 
happening or taking place in the world today, an event which Derrida first articulates in 
terms of the closure of metaphysics as manifest in a "new mutation in the history of 
writing in history as writing" and later in terms of generalized virtuality or 
41 spectral izati on". For Derrida, we can no longer speak of the event within the coordinates 
of gathering and sending, of arrival and appropriation (Ereignis), in the manner of 
244 
Heidegger. Nor, importantly, can we speak of the event in contradistinction to the 
processes of contemporary technics which both opens and prevents the realization of the 
metaphysical and techno-scientific concepts of technology: "techne, this is the entire- 
infinitesimal an decisive-diffirence, does not arrive. No more than metaphysics. 
therefore, and than positionality; always already it parasites that to which [Heideggerl 
says it happens, arrives, or succeeds in happening to [arrive a' arriver]. This infinitesimal 
nuance chances everything in the relation between metaphysics and its doubles or 
,, 396 others. Perhaps there is nothing more important in Derrida's work than the quasi- 
transcendental logic of this parasite, of the diffiýrance or trace of this event which happens 
to place [qui arrive au lieu]-which happens to take place, and to taking-place [qui arrive 
a (V) avoir-lieu], and which in happening presupposes some process of technicization. In 
this regard Derrida's work resists the widespead denegration of technology in Western 
thought and takes on the radical consequences of conceiving technics as an irreducible or 
originary condition that affects all thinking and all beings in their very interior and in all 
their relations to the other. Here, Derrida's main point, among other things, against 
Heidegger is that the technological is not a mode of disclosure, it is not something which 
is destined, which arrives, and which becomes actual at the end of a series of epochs in 
which its essence has been concealed from thinking as the "oblivion" of Being. On the 
contrary, for Derrida, technics has always already begun just as writing has already begun. 
Both in fact occur in the same movement, introducing the necessity and irreducibility of 
generalized inscription. This irreducibility of inscription enables Derrida to maintain that 
thinking is already-always already-writing, let alone speech, whose value as opposed 
to writing, is determined by philosophy in its immediate proximity to thinking. But by 
virtue of this irreducibility of inscription and within the same general economy, Derrida 
shows the irreducibility of techne in the thinking of Being, shows, that is, that technics is 
4, older" and more "originary" than the un-thought difference (Unter-Schied) 
between 
PC., p. 192. 
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Being and beings or between an actual technics and its essence. No deconstruction, then, 
without technicization, without an originary technicity and without the indissociability of 
the event and technics. 
The question remains, of course, where this movement of Derrida's thought lead us? 
What is reserved in the general text? As I argued in Chapter 4, Derrida's text f nds it ef IsI 
having to face up to the barely calculable shock that its belongs within the horizon of the 
topics of the Heideggerian understanding of technology, that it signals an extra turn that 
simultaneously dissimulates and entrenches the "end" of metaphysics. Regarding this end, 
Heidegger proposes that the Ge-stell as the optimatization of calculation, implicates a 
64peculiar quality" wherein the modern world projects itself into "a space withdrawn from 
representation and so grants to the incalculable its proper determination and its historical 
,, 397 uniqueness. In this case, the essence of technology lies primarily in the setting-up of a 
network of endless deferrals, in the elision of that definateness, of those "proper" 
boundaries, which were the hallmark of the "object, " and in the ongoing storing-up, 
switching, rechanneling, and calculating of "what is". Here the restricted economy of the 
so-called subject-object schema loses it significance since both are seen to be mere 
16 effects" of a generalized machinism that reserves priority over both. Through such 
cybernetic key-words as information, regulation, feed-back, the basic ontological 
catagories that had hitherto served the productionist orientation of the -rational animal" 
so well are transformed in an uncanny manner such that traditional philosophical thought 
is divested of its ground. This is not simply a reversal of classical priorities; rather, as it 
moves into its technological stage thinking must respond to the provocative circumstance 
that it is carried to the point where it is dispossesed of its representational capacities and 
must negotiate a space where it determined soley by the "surface fluctuations" of global 
technics and its operations. 
397 
AWP., p. 135-136. 
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If deconstruction is indeed symptomatic of technological thinking, it should be 
possible to locate in its affirmation of originary technicity the decisive features of 
Heidegger's own notion of Ge-stell. This would seem to be the case. As I argued, the 
idea that for deconstruction generalized inscription suborns the distinction between 
human beings and other living organisms and between Being and beings by enlarging the 
possibilities of differing and deferring and of "putting in reserve" reiterates the very terms 
by which Heidegger defines the way in which metaphysics completes itself in the 
permeation of the world by technical relations. In this case, the Derridean text finds itself 
inscribed back within the thinking of Being even as it re-inscribes it. Here, everything 
happens as if the yet-to-come elaboration of writing and originary technicity was written 
or pre-scribed in advance, in advance and reproduced and reflected in the thinking of the 
Ge-stell. This dual movement of writing, moreover, is necessitated by Derrida's failure to 
follow Heidegger's thinking as it is carried beyond the metaphysics of representation. 
Hence, Derrida's point of departure, his strategic wager or calculation with respect to 
Heidegger's thinking of technology, is inadequate to his own attempt to mark the closure 
of metaphysics through the structural opening of technics. Deconstruction articulates 
what is most metaphysical about thought in the technological epoch: it is the system of 
discourse which authorizes the Ex appropriation of the identity of the entity in favour of 
its availability for "play" with the functional system of writing. What Derrida calls 
originary technicity signals the consummation of metaphysics in technology and defines 
its 66 essence" by way of the erasure of essence. Of course, as Derrida insists, 
deconstruction is not merely a technical operation used to dismantle systems, nor that it 
is 
a constructor of systems in the manner of, for example, cybernetics. On the contrary, the 
metaphysical operation of cybernetics is the dissimulating shadow of the originary 
technicity of writing and of the trace etc which is inseperable from a general questioning 
of techne and technicist reasoning. This is not to say, however, that 
deconstruction thinks 
something other than the metaphysics of cybernetics; rather, 
it thinks cybernetics more 
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radically that it can think itself by thinking the gramme as "an element without 
simplicity, 
From a Heideggerian perspective, the evolution of Derrida's thinking from Of 
Grammatology to his latest texts, does nothing, perhaps, but register and confirm the 
productive possibilities and powers of late twentieth-early twenty first century capitalism, 
if it is true that the ever accelerating pace of techno-scientific programming and invention 
and the massive capitalization and appropriation of technical change by multinational 
corporations is the accomplishment of metaphysics and the oblivion of Being. In this 
case, the aporetic: logic of the deconstructive method-that it works both to reveal and 
undo the contemporary accomplishments of metaphysics, both opens and prevents the 
effectivity or actualization (arrival) of techno-scientific invention-is complicit with 
capitalism in this respect: that the capitalist situation (there where capital plays an 
essential role between the actual and the virtual) is nothing other than a "practical 
deconstruction, " 66writing, " "spectralization, " "globalization" or "worldwide-ization" 
(inondialisation A monde) of the world. This is not to say, however, that deconstruction 
and capitalism coincide anymore than it is to say metaphysics and deconstruction 
coincide or that metaphysics and capitalism coincide. If Derrida's work tells us anything, 
it is that "all is not to be thought of at one go, " that the "time is out of joint, " and that 
"this situation has always already been announced" and calls for an "Interminable 
analysis". 
Is the point of departure of the Derridean text inadequate to its own point of 
departure? Does this text as text amount to a failure to think technics radically enough, 
which is to say, to think technicity as an epochal event of the unconcealment of beings? 
For Heidegger, to pose the question concerning technology is to continually re-pose this 
398 
question, it is to maintain an "openess to the mystery" This opening, maintains the 
398 Martin Heldegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John E. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, (New 
York: 
Harper & Row, 1966). p. 55. 
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incalculable distance between Heidegger and Derrida even in their closest proximity, in 
the diffirance (where this would include Heidegger's Unter-Scheid) of disclosure and 
inscription. And this because the mystery remains irreducible whether technicity is 
thought in an originary fashion as generalized inscription or on the basis of Being- 
historical thinking. To raise the question concerning technology is to affirm the mystery 
as the opening of the future. Strangely enough, the Derridean text replicates but reverses 
the Heideggerian thought that this affirmation means to enter into the essence of 
technology as event of appropriation (Ereignis). That is, since Heidegger's thought 
articulates a metaphysical disavowal of the originary technicity of the event, it cannot be 
open to a future "to-come, " it cannot be Vinvention de Vautre, an invention of the other. 
is Heidegger's text thereby a closed book? By no means. However, this text has its 
afterlife in the excess of technics, in a machinic repetition (can there be any other kind? ) 
in which we affirm the future as what is to-come in the form of technology. Here, 
Heidegger's text, like Derrida's, is always other, is always to-come. For this there can be 
no thesis. 
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